The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is gearing up for the September 3rd military parade in 2025, showcasing to the world its “mighty army”. However, behind the glamorous facade, chaos reigns within the CCP’s military, leaving those with a conscience and common sense full of doubt. People can’t help but wonder: What is really going on with the CCP’s military?
Below, I will provide some insights and analysis on the chaos within the CCP’s military that I have observed.
The Central Military Commission is the highest command organ of the CCP’s military.
The Central Military Commission formed after the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022 consists of seven members, including Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia, and He Waidong, as well as members Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin.
In less than three years since the 20th National Congress, three out of the seven members of the Central Military Commission have been sidelined. They are: CCP Political Bureau member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, General He Waidong, Central Military Commission member and Minister of National Defense, General Li Shangfu, and Central Military Commission member and Director of the Political Work Department, General Miao Hua.
He Waidong was the first personal confidant of Xi promoted and entrusted with important roles in the military. Li Shangfu was the first senior CCP military leader to be sanctioned by the United States, closely watched due to Xi’s personal promotion against significant American pressure. Miao Hua was handpicked by Xi to oversee the selection and appointment of senior military officers, serving as a crucial figure akin to the “Minister of Foreign Affairs” within the CCP military, attracting significant external attention.
However, Li Shangfu’s tenure as Minister of National Defense lasted only 5 months, making him the shortest-serving Minister of National Defense in the CCP’s 76-year governing history.
Miao Hua was officially removed from office on November 28 last year, becoming another senior political worker within the military to fall after former Political Work Department Director Zhang Yang committed suicide due to severe corruption.
Since his “disappearance” on March 11 this year, foreign media outlets have received information from various sources indicating that He Waidong has been removed from office. He Waidong now joins the ranks of other top military leaders like Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who were investigated and removed from office after being investigated by the CCP Political Bureau and the Central Military Commission.
The Central Military Commission’s vacancy of three out of seven members in the past 49 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution is extremely rare. This indicates that there are major issues at the highest command level of the CCP military.
On August 20, when Xi Jinping met with colonel-level officers of the stationed troops in Lhasa, Major General Fang Yongxiang, director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission, was absent, with only Deputy Director Qiu Yang accompanying. In March and April of this year, individuals familiar with CCP politics revealed on overseas social media platforms that Fang Yongxiang had been dismissed from his position.
Before Fang Yongxiang, Zhong Shaojun served as Xi’s secretary in Zhejiang at around the age of 30. In just 14 years and almost 10 promotions later, Zhong became one of Xi’s most important confidants in the military. He held key positions as the Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission, Director of the Chairman’s Office of the Central Military Commission, Director of the Reform and Establishment Office of the Central Military Commission, Director of the Office of the Leading Group for Deepening National Defense and Military Reform of the Central Military Commission, and a member of the Military Election Committee. From 2013 to 2024, Zhong went from colonel to major general and then to lieutenant general, holding positions as Xi’s aide and supervising the military for 11 years.
However, in April 2024, foreign media reported that Zhong Shaojun was reassigned from the military’s top leadership to serve as the political commissar of the National Defense University.
Recently, the Singapore Ministry of Defense posted a photo on Facebook of a meeting between Zhong Shaojun, Political Commissar of the National Defense University, and Singapore’s Permanent Secretary for Defense, Chen Qingji, on August 18th in Beijing. However, the official website of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense only reported Defense Minister Dong Jun’s meeting with Chen Qingji, omitting any mention of other attendees.
On Chinese social media platform Weibo, a prominent figure reposted a photo from the Singapore Ministry of Defense’s Facebook page showing Chen Qingji meeting with Dong Jun, Xu Qiling, and Yang Xuejun, but Zhong Shaojun was notably absent. A search for Zhong Shaojun’s name on Weibo yields a result stating, “Sorry, no relevant results found,” while searches for Xu Qiling and Yang Xuejun return normal results.
This suppression of news relating to Zhong Shaojun on Chinese internet platforms and his name being censored on Weibo suggests that he is in a precarious position with an uncertain future.
Zhong Shaojun’s predecessor, Qin Shengxiang, served as the first Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission after Xi took office as Chairman of the Military Commission in 2012. In 2016, Qin Shengxiang also assumed the position of Director of the newly established Office for Reform and Organization of the Central Military Commission after the military restructuring. In 2017, Qin Shengxiang succeeded Miao Hua as the Political Commissar of the Navy and was promoted to Admiral in 2019. In 2023, he became the Deputy Chairman of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress Social Construction Committee.
Reports emerged from overseas sources that Qin Shengxiang was “suddenly unreachable” on July 28, 2025, with rumors circulating that he had been secretly taken away for investigation.
The Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission is often referred to as the “Chief Administrator of the Military.” They are Xi’s most trusted confidant within the military and play a crucial role in liaising with senior military personnel. Their significance is irreplaceable in the military hierarchy.
Regarding the news on Fang Yongxiang, Zhong Shaojun, and Qin Shengxiang, Zhong Shaojun’s reassignment to the Political Commissar of the National Defense University has been confirmed. Qin Shengxiang was rumored to have been investigated since October last year, with reports of further investigations being made on July 28. On July 31, during the celebration of the Army Day by the CCP, Qin Shengxiang’s absence seems to confirm that he has run into trouble, though official confirmation is pending. The news of Fang Yongxiang’s dismissal is yet to be confirmed.
If Xi’s close confidants like Fang Yongxiang, Zhong Shaojun, and Qin Shengxiang are either reassigned or investigated, it emerges as a significant anomaly in the current chaos at the highest levels of the CCP’s military.
On November 28, 2024, Miao Hua, a Central Military Commission member and Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, was officially announced to have been investigated for “serious disciplinary violations.”
On April 30, 2025, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued an announcement terminating Miao Hua’s status as a member of the National People’s Congress. The reason cited was “serious disciplinary violations,” leading to his dismissal as a member of the National Central Military Commission on June 27.
On July 9, 2024, Xi Jinping held a ceremony to appoint General He Hongjun as a Vice Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission. He was later reported to have been taken away for investigation along with the Political Work Department’s Deputy Director, Chen Jiang, on April 20, according to overseas reports on May 19 by independent commentator Cai Shunkun.
From April 24, 2025, when news surfaced about the investigations into General He Hongjun and others, to the reports of his alleged attempted suicide and subsequent death at the hospital on May 18, He Hongjun has remained out of public sight. The CCP has not officially refuted the claims of his investigation, indicating the possibility that the allegations against He Hongjun are indeed accurate.
The CCP often emphasizes the importance of “political military construction.” The Political Work Department of the Military Commission is the highest specialized leadership body responsible for the CCP’s “political military construction,” akin to the organizational and propaganda departments within the military. The Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission is equivalent to the “Political Director” of the military, overseeing the selection and appointment of senior military officers, as well as supervising the top military officials. The Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission serves as the “Deputy Political Director,” responsible for these functions.
Nine months have passed since Miao Hua’s removal from office, yet the CCP has not appointed a new Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission. He Hongjun has been “missing” for four months without any public appearance, and the CCP has also not appointed a new Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission.
On July 21, 2025, the CCP Military News published a notice announcing the issuance of the “Regulations on Comprehensively Clearing Out the Negative Influences and Reshaping the Political Cadre Image and Prestige.” Who these regulations precisely target remains unspecified explicitly, but they seem to be aimed at cleaning out the negative influence left by figures like Miao Hua within the military.
The current acting positions of the Director and Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission have not been publicly disclosed by the CCP. The leadership behind the “Comprehensive Clearing Out of Negative Influences and Reshaping the Image and Prestige of Political Cadres in the Military” remains undisclosed by the CCP.
These significant issues concerning “political military construction” are shrouded in mystery for the majority of grassroots officers, soldiers, and ordinary citizens. This further highlights the perplexing state of the current CCP military.
With only eight days left until the September 3rd military parade in 2025, the total commander of the parade has yet to be announced.
Since the reorganization of China’s military regions into 12 major military regions from six in 1955, with the renaming of the North China Military Region to the Beijing Military Region, military parade coordinators at various CCP national celebrations have traditionally been appointed from the Beijing Military Region. Even in the 2015 parade, the Beijing Military Region Commander served as the parade director.
However, the Beijing Military Region was dismantled in July 2016, and a new Central Theater Command was established to lead and command the armed forces of seven provincial-level administrative regions, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, and Hubei, with the headquarters based in Beijing.
According to previous practices, the coordinator of the September 3rd parade in 2025 should be from the Central Theater Command.
The current Commander of the Central Theater Command remains undisclosed by the CCP. Former Central Theater Command Commander Huang Ming was reassigned to Commander of the Northern Theater Command last August. Speculations regarding the former Northern Theater Command Commander Wang Qiang possibly switching positions to become the Central Theater Command Commander have not been addressed in CCP’s official media reports.
If Wang Qiang is the Commander of the Central Theater Command, his absence along with Political Commissar Xu Deqing during this year’s CCP Army Day celebrations on July 31 could signify a potential issue with both officials.
Should both the Commander and Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command be relieved of their positions, this could explain the delay in announcing the total coordinator of the September 3rd parade in 2025.
Examining these four aspects, from the highest command organ to the central executive body to the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, reveals alarming chaos within the CCP’s military. However, the turmoil within the CCP military goes beyond these instances. Due to space constraints, let’s summarize several instances of disarray briefly:
– North Theater Command Commander Huang Ming, East Theater Command Commander Lin Xiangyang, and former South Theater Command Commander Wang Xiubin have reportedly been apprehended.
– Navy Chief of Staff Li Hanjun has been arrested. Navy Commander Hu Zhongming and Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi were absent from the CCP Army Day celebrations. Yuan Huazhi was rumored to have been arrested, and Hu Zhongming was suspected to have been detained.
– Former Army Commander Han Weiguo has been reportedly detained. Current Army Commander Li Qiaoming was present during this year’s “Two Sessions” in March but was absent from this year’s CCP Army Day celebrations, suggesting a potential arrest. Former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong was previously rumored to have been arrested.
– Former Air Force Commander Ding Henglai was arrested. Deputy Commander of the South Theater Command and South Theater Air Force Commander Qiao Xiangji was reportedly detained.
– After previous Rocket Force Commanders were investigated, the current Commander Wang Houbin and Political Commissar Xu Xisheng were rumored to have been detained.
– Deputy Secretary of the Discipline Committee Chen Guoqiang was reassigned as the Political Commissar of the National Defense University, with some interpreting it as a demotion. Deputy Secretary Tang Yong was reportedly investigated, and Political and Legal Affairs Secretary Wang Renhua was said to have been detained.
– Armed Police Force Commander Wang Chunning and Political Commissar Zhang Hongbing were reportedly arrested.
– Rarely, Xi did not promote any officers to the rank of General during the CCP Army Day celebrations in July 2025.
As of August 25, 2025, according to official data provided by the Central Disciplinary Commission, since Xi came to power 13 years ago, 778 officials above the deputy provincial level and other central-level management cadres have been investigated. In 2024 alone, 92 central-level cadres were investigated, marking the highest number of central-level cadres investigated since the 18th CCP National Congress; 36 corrupt officials with assets exceeding one billion Yuan were also sentenced, the highest recorded number in recent years.
Starting from the investigations of senior Rocket Force officers in March 2023, to the scrutiny of Political Work Department Director Miao Hua in November 2024, to Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Waidong’s “disappearance” in March 2025, and the release of regulations to “comprehensively clear out negative influences” by the Central Military Commission in July 2025, the CCP’s military has been undergoing a series of purges. Currently, the fourth wave of purges is still ongoing.
By 2025, how has the CCP’s military reached such a deplorable state?
Numerous analyses have been conducted prior to this, making further elaboration redundant. Generally speaking, well before Xi Jinping’s rise to power, the CCP’s military had become a marketplace for power, money, and influence due to the leading role of a group of severely corrupt individuals like Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, whom Jiang Zemin and Jiang greatly promoted and trusted.
In the first ten years of Xi Jinping’s ascension, despite addressing corruption and initiating military reforms, he not only failed to alter the CCP military’s nature as a “party guard army” but further reinforced this foundation through centralization and continuous purges. Xi also concentrated power and undermined any shared responsibility, strengthening the military’s connection to the CCP’s political goals.
The CCP has always asserted the absolute leadership of the party over the military while vehemently opposing the nationalization of the armed forces. The CCP clings onto the concept of a “party guard army,” entrenching the military within the party’s sphere to uphold the party’s interests above all else. Regardless of the party’s pervasive corruption, growing detachment from the people, lack of credibility, and subsequent public discontent, the CCP is resolute in preserving the party’s domination.
In such circumstances, the CCP’s insistence on “preserving the party” translates to prioritizing the interests of the very few CCP elites over the well-being of millions of Chinese people. This motivation itself is inherently selfish, fundamentally at odds with the interests of the Chinese people. The CCP’s motivation to preserve the party is impure, its ideology flawed, and its actions riddled with deception. It neither speaks the truth to the Chinese people nor to its party members.
The CCP’s neglect of severe corruption within its military is demonstrated by its day-to-day survival strategy, deceitful tactics, and postponements until the day of reckoning.
The footnote denotes that as of August 25, 2025, the Central Discipline Committee’s website reported that since Xi Jinping assumed power, there have been investigations into 778 high-ranking officials above the provincial level and other central authorities. In 2024, 92 central-level officials were investigated, marking the highest number of investigations into central authorities since the 18th CCP Congress in 2012. Additionally, there were 36 verdicts for corrupt officials with assets exceeding one billion Yuan, a record high since the 18th CCP Congress.