The long-awaited Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC) will finally be held from July 15th to 18th. Although personnel changes in the Third Plenum have been minimal in recent decades, this year may be an exception.
Since the 20th National Congress in 2022, several Central Committee members and alternate members handpicked by Xi Jinping have been dealt with. Among them are former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, former commander of the Rocket Force Li Yuchao, and former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian. In addition, there are alternate members such as former chairman of the Aerospace Science and Technology Group Yuan Jie. These appointments need to be confirmed by the Plenum.
Several individuals embroiled in scandals and dismissed from their positions, such as former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang, former director of the National Health Commission Ma Xiaowei, former chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission Yi Huiman, former political commissar of the Rocket Force Xu Zhongbo, and former commander of the Strategic Support Force Ju Gansheng, may face uncertainties regarding their position as Central Committee members at the Third Plenum.
Furthermore, former Central Committee members from the 19th Congress who have fallen from grace, such as former Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe, former Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Sun Zhigang, and former Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Wu Yingjie, will also require confirmation at the upcoming Plenum.
In cases where serving Central Committee members are removed, their positions cannot remain vacant and will be filled by alternate Central Committee members in accordance with their voting results. Additionally, the Plenum may consider appointing new Central Committee members. Unlike the rules for filling vacancies, there are no set procedures for appointing new members. In previous Party history, the Third Plenum of the 11th National Party Congress appointed several new Central Committee members for subsequent approval by the 12th National Congress. This practice also extended to the election of new members to the Central Political Bureau.
While the replacement of officials is standard practice, the focus of this upcoming Third Plenum will be on potential new appointments. Given the recent spate of high-ranking officials falling from grace and extensive purges within the military, Xi Jinping may potentially promote individuals to the Central Committee outside the usual channels. For example, following a restructuring of senior officials in the Rocket Force in 2023, Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng were simultaneously promoted to the rank of General – respectively assuming the positions of Commander and Political Commissar of the Rocket Force. Currently, neither of these individuals are alternate Central Committee members, but it is likely they will be considered for appointment to the Central Committee this time.
In August last year, Li Shangfu fell from grace and was subsequently relieved of his duties as State Councilor, Minister of National Defense, and member of the State Military Commission in October. Subsequently, in December, Dong Jun was appointed as Minister of National Defense. However, up to now, Dong Jun has not assumed the usual additional roles of State Councilor and Central Military Commission member that typically accompany the position of Minister of National Defense. Previous Third Plenums have seen instances of appointing new Central Military Commission members, such as Cao Gangchuan at the 15th Third Plenum. Therefore, the question remains whether Dong Jun will be appointed as a Central Military Commission member at this Third Plenum.
Of particular interest is whether the Third Plenum will elect new members to the Central Politburo. This precedent was set during the 11th Third Plenum in 1978. Notably, while the 18th and 19th Central Politburo comprised 25 members, the 20th Politburo currently has 24 members, therefore adding one member at this time would be justifiable.
There has been widespread speculation on the international internet about the possibility of Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan, being appointed to the Politburo. While these rumors may have originated to tarnish Xi Jinping’s reputation, the possibility of new appointments to the Politburo cannot be discounted.
A noteworthy development occurred on June 28th, with changes in the Party Secretaries of Jilin, Anhui, and Ningxia provinces. Following the removal of Jing Junhai as Party Secretary of Jilin Province and Han Jun as Party Secretary of Anhui Province, both have been reportedly designated for “other assignments”.
It is speculated that Han Jun, who previously served as Director of the Office of the Central Rural Work Leading Group before assuming the post of Party Secretary of Anhui Province in March 2023, might be replacing the recently disgraced Tang Renjian, the former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
On the other hand, Jing Junhai may have a more promising future. Born in December 1960, Jing Junhai hails from Xi Jinping’s home province of Shaanxi and is one of the few individuals whom Xi trusts. His extensive resume includes serving as Deputy Minister of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, Party Secretary of Shaanxi Province, Deputy Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, Governor of Jilin Province, and Party Secretary of Jilin Province. Formerly considered a potential candidate for promotion to the Central Political Bureau during the 20th National Congress, this prospect did not materialize. Given Xi Jinping’s unprecedented challenges and the urgent need for loyal allies, there is a possibility that Jing Junhai could be appointed as a member of the Central Politburo (or Secretary of the Central Secretariat).
The prolonged delay of the Third Plenum can be attributed to the tumultuous state of the Chinese economy, severe disagreements among top leaders, and the highly precarious political situation. Xi Jinping faces unprecedented challenges in controlling the situation by presenting his strategic vision and firmly controlling personnel decisions. The upcoming Third Plenum may witness unexpected moves by Xi, but any surprises that do not align with existing power structures could exacerbate his predicament.