In recent years, the term “associating with political swindlers” has frequently appeared in reports on fallen senior officials. Even on January 9, 2023, Xi Jinping emphasized at the Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that “severe crackdown on the so-called ‘backed’ ‘political swindlers'”. The Chinese media called this Xi’s first public mention of “political swindlers”. One year later, on January 8, 2024, Xi continued to emphasize at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: breaking “hidden rules”, establishing “clear rules”, resolutely preventing the formation of “small circles”, “worshiping subordinates”, “scheming for personal gain”, and vigorously combating various political swindlers.
In early April, in response to Xi’s request, the Communist Party of China issued a “Notice”, announcing that from April to July, the entire party will carry out in-depth study and implementation of the “Disciplinary Punishment Regulations”, making it an important political task for party committees at all levels.
The Communist Party of China’s “Disciplinary Punishment Regulations” were formally issued in 2003 and have not been amended for a long time. However, since Xi took office in 2012, they have been revised three times in 2015, 2018, and 2023 respectively. In the latest 2023 version, a new article about political swindlers was added, as follows:
“Article 55: Engaging in speculation, associating with political swindlers, or being used by political swindlers shall be given a serious warning or removal from party positions; in serious cases, they shall be subjected to party disciplinary measures or expulsion from the party.
“Those acting as political swindlers shall have their party positions removed, be subjected to party disciplinary measures, or be expelled from the party.”
The media coverage of the Communist Party’s recent activities has focused on the phrase in the “Notice”: preventing “low-level red” and “high-level black”. In fact, the Xi administration has a special purpose – to crack down on “political swindlers”.
For the post-70s generation, “political swindlers” may seem like a common term. However, for someone like Xi Jinping, born in the 1950s, “political swindlers” have a specific meaning. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi was denounced as a traitor, capitalist-roader, and inner traitor. Later, the term “politically deceive like Liu Shaoqi” emerged. Who does this refer to? Lin Biao after the “September 13th Incident” in 1971. Why not directly name Lin Biao? Because Lin Biao was chosen by Mao as his successor and even mentioned in the Party Constitution. It would have been too embarrassing if Lin Biao had fallen from grace directly, so this misleading term was coined. (Chinese media avoid this when interpreting “political swindlers”).
Among the current seven members of the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, Zhao Leji, and Wang Huning are all “worker-peasant-soldier-students” from the Cultural Revolution era, very familiar with the slogan “politically deceive like Liu Shaoqi”. They all bear the deep imprint of the Cultural Revolution. The reappearance of the term “political swindlers” in high-level Communist Party meetings and documents is not without reason. If this still seems too abstract, let’s look at a case.
Fu Zhenghua served as the chief of the Beijing Public Security Bureau, Deputy Minister of Public Security, Minister of Justice in March 2018, took on a role in the CPPCC in May 2020, fell from grace in October 2021, and was sentenced to death with a reprieve in September 2022. In the official reports of his “double-opening” (investigation), on one hand, Fu Zhenghua’s political ambitions were greatly expanded, he joined Sun Lijun’s political group, formed factions, engaged in collusion, and indulged in party-forming activities; on the other hand, it was mentioned that he irresponsibly criticized the major political guidelines of the Communist Party Central Committee and had been associating with various “political swindlers” for a long time.
At Fu Zhenghua’s level, it’s all about alliances. His promotions depended on the power and layout of the political factions he aligned with. Since he had already “joined Sun Lijun’s political group” (the group included at least seven high-ranking officials from the public security system, besides Fu Zhenghua, there were former director of the Shanxi Public Security Department, Liu Xinyun, former director of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau, Gong Daoan, former director of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau, Deng Huilin, former secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Wang Like, member of the Party Committee of the Ministry of State Security, Liu Yanping, member of the Party Committee of the Liaoning Provincial Public Security Department, Liu Leguo), he was already on board, why would he need to associate with “political swindlers”? What kind of “political swindlers” have the power to deceive someone like Fu Zhenghua?
In a documentary aired in 2023 by the Communist Party focusing on anti-corruption, Fu Zhenghua was deceived by two individuals he had known for decades, retired Beijing Public Security Bureau cadre Shi Xiaochun, and Li Quan, who claimed to be a senior adviser around the leader, causing his bewilderment. However, this “exposure” raised suspicions instead. Fu Zhenghua, having led the Beijing Public Security Bureau for many years, must have had various sources of information about high-level dynamics. Otherwise, how could he engage in political opportunism? If Shi Xiaochun and Li Quan could deceive Fu Zhenghua for 20 years, then these two individuals should not be the so-called “political swindlers” mentioned by the Xi administration, but rather facilitators who connect and run errands for certain political forces within the Communist Party.
Fu Zhenghua is not an isolated case. Many provincial and ministerial-level fallen high-ranking officials mentioned in official reports have been associating with “political swindlers”. For example, the former acting secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee, Huang Xingguo, the former secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee, Bai Enpei, the former secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee, Qin Guangrong, the deputy governor of Shanxi Province and former director of the Provincial Public Security Department, Liu Xinyun, the former secretary of the Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee, Wan Qingliang, the former member of the Gansu Provincial Party Committee and deputy governor, Yu Haiyan, the former deputy chairman of the Liaoning Provincial Political Consultative Conference, Liu Guoqiang, and the former deputy director of the Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress, Sun Guoxiang, and so on.
The direct cause of this is that after the Communist Party’s “Reform and Opening-up”, a few elite families have formed a political oligarchy controlling China. Each elite family has its own sphere of influence and personnel. Lower-level officials seeking promotion must make connections and build bridges; it’s what they call “having connections in the court makes for an easier time being an official”. Consequently, all sorts of political intermediaries and the like have emerged.
Since Xi took office and aimed to be the core figure, with power concentrated in him, the infighting with the 500 elite families has been quite intense. Xi’s purging of the officialdom is essentially about reshuffling the interests of these 500 elite families. However, to control the situation, maintain party unity, and prevent the infighting from getting out of control, Xi has to make certain compromises, such as scapegoating some “political swindlers” to uphold the appearance of unity within the Communist Party.
The prevalence of “political swindlers” in today’s China is a smokescreen, a ploy by the Communist Party to play both internal strife and concealment.