On June 21, Reuters exclusively reported that China and the United States had their first semi-official nuclear weapons talks in five years back in March. The American representatives expressed concerns about the possibility of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the Chinese side stated that they believe they could defeat Taiwan in a conventional war without the need for nuclear weapons, though it is inaccurate to say that the CCP “promised not to use nuclear weapons against Taiwan”.
Typically, government-to-government negotiations are referred to as the first track; while the participants in the second track talks are mainly former officials and scholars, having a semi-official status. The recent China-US nuclear talks fall under the second track. China sent a delegation of scholars and analysts, including some former military officers. The American organizer was David Santoro, the chairman of the Pacific Forum in Hawaii, who mentioned that he was preparing a report on the discussions for the US government, but it would not be publicly released. The US State Department noted that the second track talks could be “beneficial”, and although they did not participate, they were aware of the discussions. Members of the Chinese delegation and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense did not respond to requests for comments.
Before the second track nuclear talks, the first military dialogue between China and the US since the Obama administration took place on November 6 last year, just before the Biden-Xi summit. The dialogue was led by Mallory Stewart, the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control at the US State Department, and Sun Xiaobo, the Director of the Arms Control Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the talks did not yield any concrete results.
While the US State Department acknowledged the constructive nature of the discussions and put forward some positive suggestions (such as missile launch notifications, similar to agreements already in place between China and Russia), these were not accepted by the Chinese side. The Chinese delegates refused substantive engagement, stating that they “did not provide us with any suggestions” on issues like nuclear expansion, nuclear strategic thinking, policies, or budgets.
Due to the inflexible attitude of the CCP, the White House official responsible for arms control and non-proliferation, Pranay Vaddi, informed a Washington think tank on January 18 that the US was not expecting to engage in formal nuclear arms control negotiations with China in the short term. However, he emphasized the need to involve key decision-makers or influencers from China in matters concerning China’s nuclear posture, stating that “we know that their nuclear arsenal is still expanding” and expressing the hope for substantial responses from China regarding US proposals for risk reduction. The US State Department spokesperson, in an interview with the Semafor website on May 2, mentioned that China had refused to continue negotiations with the US on arms control and non-proliferation issues.
Nevertheless, the nuclear issues between China and the US go beyond arms control and non-proliferation. From the US perspective, there are two other key issues to address: the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in nuclear weapon systems and the potential use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
The American strategic community has conducted in-depth research on these matters. For instance, on March 4, James Anderson, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, argued in an article titled “The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats” that if the Chinese leadership decides to invade Taiwan, the use of nuclear weapons might become a valid option to prevent significant losses. Western analysts tend to downplay the nuclear aspect when evaluating specific scenarios of Chinese invasion of Taiwan, despite China’s historical use of nuclear threats. The conclusion was that the safest way to deal with potential nuclear crises is to prevent them from occurring in the first place.
Similarly, on November 30 last year, Matthew Kroenig, Vice Chairman of the Atlantic Council and Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, published a research report titled “Deliberate Nuclear Use in a War Over Taiwan: Scenarios and Considerations for the United States”, which proposed considering the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan if conventional forces were insufficient to deter the aggression. The report urged the United States to adopt a clear strategy towards Taiwan, promising defense against unprovoked Chinese incursions and potentially extending the US nuclear umbrella over Taiwan.
It appears that the US has been actively addressing the nuclear issues in a (potential) future conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is undoubtedly feeling the pressure, considering the huge disparity in nuclear capabilities between the US and China and the US’s willingness to use nuclear weapons when necessary. In an effort to gauge US intentions, amid the stalemate in government-to-government nuclear arms control talks, China initiated the second track nuclear talks, leading to the first semi-official nuclear weapons talks between China and the US in five years in March.
Undoubtedly, the CCP may have long been exploring the prospect of using nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan (there were reports of the “leave the island, not the people” concept), including how to deal with US nuclear retaliation. However, both conventionally and in nuclear terms, China is far behind the US and is hesitant to underestimate the US’s commitment to defending Taiwan or end up in a situation similar to Russia’s in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Hence, they find it challenging to make a final decision. This context sheds light on a report in the Financial Times on June 15, 2023, where Xi Jinping reportedly told the President of the European Commission that the US was trying to lure China into invading Taiwan, a claim unprecedentedly voiced by Xi Jinping to a foreign leader, suggesting that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait may not be entirely avoidable.
Returning to the China-US second track nuclear talks in March, the Chinese representatives’ statement that they “believe they could defeat Taiwan in a conventional war without the need for nuclear weapons” is likely an attempt to divert attention. However, American strategic research on the matter is extensive, making it challenging for China to play games with the US.
In conclusion, the geopolitical environment around the Taiwan Strait is tense, with nuclear issues being a significant concern for China and the US. The recent efforts towards nuclear discussions between the two countries reflect the complexities and potential risks involved in navigating this sensitive landscape.