Western observers say that the exclusion of Chinese Defense Minister and Navy Admiral Dong Jun from key decision-making bodies may complicate military relations between the United States and China.
An article published by Defense One, written by Shanshan Mei, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Dennis Blasko, a retired intelligence officer from the US Army, raises a highly sensitive question: “Has Beijing just downgraded the Ministry of National Defense?”
Following the Third Plenum of the Communist Party of China, Dong Jun was neither able to enter the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China as expected by the outside world, nor was he appointed as a State Councilor. Western observers believe that this clearly signals a downgrade in the status of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense.
During times of heightened tension between China and the US, the Chinese side often cuts off military hotlines first. According to Mei and Blasko’s observations, currently, senior leaders in the Chinese Communist Party do not seem eager to promote Dong Jun nor engage in substantive military dialogues with the United States.
The article suggests that excluding Dong from the Central Military Commission raises questions about his interactions with Xi Jinping and his influence within the political system of the Chinese Communist Party. Prior to Dong Jun, Xi Jinping had already dismissed two of Dong’s predecessors: Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe.
Mei and Blasko question whether this move signals an intentional effort by senior CCP leaders to reduce the role Defense Minister plays within the party-state bureaucracy.
Historically, the Chinese Defense Minister has always been held by a member of the Central Military Commission, directly managed by the highest leader of the CCP. The Defense Minister typically also holds the position of State Councilor, giving them equal status to other government ministers and direct access to the Premier.
The primary responsibility of the Defense Minister is to manage the relationship between the Chinese armed forces and other entities, such as engaging with foreign military and media, collaborating with other government departments and organizations, and overseeing recruitment and enlistment at the local level. The Defense Minister is not part of the direct command system for combat operations, nor is a member of the CCP’s highest decision-making body, the Political Bureau, and its Standing Committee.
Like his 13 predecessors, Dong Jun currently holds the rank of a three-star admiral, the highest rank in the Chinese military structure. However, he is the first Navy Admiral to serve as Defense Minister.
By the nature of his position, Dong Jun may need to report to one of the Vice Chairs of the Central Military Commission of the CCP – either Zhang Youxia or He Weidong – or possibly to one of the other three members of the Central Military Commission.
“In fact, if Dong Jun is unable to directly interact with Xi Jinping, the US Defense Secretary may be more willing to engage directly with the Vice Chairs of the Central Military Commission of the CCP, whose responsibilities within the Chinese system are more similar to those of the top civilian leaders at the Pentagon, similar to the situation several years ago,” the article stated.
“If the Chinese Defense Minister is not in the chain of command or the Central Military Commission, what role does he play in dialogue among operational commanders?” the article questioned.
As Dong Jun was transferred from a military commander to Defense Minister, a lateral move, he retains a position equivalent to that of five theater commanders and four service chiefs. The US Department of Defense requires the Indo-Pacific Command to engage with the Southern and Eastern Theater Commands of the Chinese military. This level is lower than that of a Minister.
In other words, Dong Jun’s current rank evidently may not be sufficient for dialogues with the US Defense Secretary, and a more suitable interlocutor for the US Defense Secretary would be a Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission of the CCP.
Mei and Blasko believe that the “unexpected dismissal” of Dong Jun may indicate that Chinese military diplomacy – especially its military contacts with the US – remains a low priority on Beijing’s agenda.
The Chinese military has become increasingly opaque. For example, the last time the Chinese Communist Party released a defense white paper was five years ago. Meanwhile, China has been increasing military exercises and “patrol” activities with foreign forces like Russia. Beijing also constantly seeks to improve relations with US allies to potentially undermine relations between those allies and the United States.