Recently, the U.S. International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) released a report titled “The Limits of Influence: U.S. Security Cooperation in the Age of Strategic Competition”, conducting research on the effectiveness of using security cooperation and arms transfers as a means of exerting influence in the context of strategic competition.
The report highlights that security cooperation, security assistance, arms transfers, and military sales are a part of the long-standing effort by the United States to strengthen and expand its military influence, aligning other countries with its policy priorities and values. The existing infrastructure, perceptions, and plans were developed prior to comprehensive strategic competition with China and the intensification of security competition with Russia.
The significant increase in military spending by major U.S. allies and partners, as well as the shift in industrial policy (including in key defense sectors), are reshaping the landscape. Meanwhile, the role of U.S. aid in conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza has sparked significant controversy regarding the functionality and oversight of U.S. security cooperation programs.
The report recommends that federal agencies need to establish clear priorities and goals, ideally backed by Congress as well; otherwise, even large and powerful departments such as U.S. weapon manufacturers and trainers could risk being too thinly spread, allocating precious resources to lower-value objectives.
Time has shown successes in Ukraine’s comprehensive defense against Moscow’s invasion in 2022 and in NATO’s strength, both of which are noted as significant military achievements for the U.S. in terms of security cooperation and arms transfers. The report also emphasizes the success achieved by the U.S. in military security, military influence, and interoperability goals through the sheer volume of arms transfers and the increasing gap between the U.S. and its competitors in the arms trade.
The report states that both the Biden and Trump administrations consider competition with China and Russia as a top national security priority. Strategic competition involves competing with adversaries in multiple areas such as economic, technological, military, and ideological spheres, without escalating into armed conflict.
It stresses that strategic competition should not lead the U.S. to abandon norms and standards and must be approached based on values and the rule of law, even though it may be challenging.
The report includes findings and recommendations for the State Department and inter-agency, reflecting ISAB members’ shared belief that strategic competition is not passive and is not determined by the choices of U.S. adversaries.
The report details some of China’s practices in security cooperation and strategic competition, outlining its shift towards increased arms sales, broader training programs, and upgraded equipment complexity over the past two decades. Additionally, Chinese private security firms have entered global markets alongside Russian, American, and other competitors.
Observers note that Chinese cooperation offers several advantages including cheaper weapons and faster delivery. Cooperation can be provided regardless of human rights records, and Beijing’s emphasis on military integration with the state appeals particularly to countries with lower levels of democracy.
As scholars Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon put it, the most successful and intensive security assistance programs by Beijing often focus on regime security and internal security.
Beijing’s regime utilizes advanced surveillance and information control technologies for monitoring, providing cooperation partners with control and predictability, unlike the unpredictability of democratic systems. Authoritarian regimes, unlike democratic systems, prioritize procedures over the survival of regimes.
The asymmetric practices of the U.S. and China present both opportunities and challenges. Some U.S. officials may be overly optimistic about China’s capabilities, with one senior official mentioning China’s goal of having everyone speak Chinese and attend Chinese schools.
The research group suggests a strategic approach to strategic competition that is neither passive nor determined by U.S. adversaries. It emphasizes the need for a strategic method that involves clear thinking and tough choices, considering where to compete and how to leverage values in competition.
They believe further analysis is necessary in several areas: 1) when and why Chinese and Russian efforts succeed based on recipient country standards, 2) what influences countries to accept Chinese and Russian security cooperation, and 3) what leads countries to choose security cooperation with the U.S. in a tripartite strategic competition world.
Finally, the report quotes from the “2022 National Security Strategy”: “… the post-Cold War era has clearly ended, and great power competition is underway to determine the future. As long as we work together with countries that share our vision of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world, no country is better positioned than the United States to succeed in this competition.
“This means that the basic principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, countries must be free to choose their own foreign policy, information must be allowed to flow freely, universal human rights must be upheld, the global economy must operate in a fair competitive environment, providing opportunities for everyone.”