In this episode, Grant Newsham, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Policy and an expert on Asia-Pacific affairs, discussed the strategic actions of the Chinese Communist regime in controlling the South China Sea over the past decades. These actions range from land reclamation and island-building to constructing military bases, deploying coast guard ships, maritime militia, and fishing fleets to harass and intimidate other countries.
Newsham pointed out that “Zhubi Reef has been transformed into a military base larger than Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.”
Recent conflicts near Ren’ai Reef involved Chinese coast guard ships ramming Philippine vessels, using water cannons, and causing injuries to several sailors.
The book “When China Attacks: A Warning to America” authored by Newsham explains that such incidents witnessed in the Philippines are another step towards consolidating China’s control over the entire South China Sea. While the Chinese regime claims these actions do not involve the military, they effectively exercise control through coast guard, maritime militia, fishing fleets, and the Chinese navy.
According to Newsham, China’s efforts to control the South China Sea over the past 20 to 30 years have seen significant advancements. The regime gradually but steadily advanced its presence without directly using force, establishing a significant foothold with coast guard, maritime militia, fishing fleets, and naval forces.
By around 2015, China had effectively gained control over the South China Sea, a process that began nearly a decade earlier.
The Chinese government adamantly asserts its sovereignty over the South China Sea, going to great lengths to fabricate legal arguments to support its claims through domestic laws.
Looking back, China’s endeavor to control the South China Sea began roughly 30 years ago with the seizure of islands from Vietnam in the Paracel Islands in 1974, escalated to the Spratly Islands in 1988, and continued through various strategic moves in territories claimed by the Philippines.
From 2013 to 2015, China initiated a remarkable island-building campaign, constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea, notably in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, including prominent features like Mischief, Zhubi, and Fiery Cross Reefs.
Zhubi Reef, in particular, has been transformed into a military base, surpassing Pearl Harbor by size, equipped with deep-water anchorages and long runways capable of deploying naval forces.
Despite Xi Jinping’s assurances to then-President Obama that these artificial islands would not be militarized, they have indeed been fortified under the pretext of defense, ostensibly for fisheries management and maintaining order in the South China Sea without actual military deployments.
Newsham highlighted China’s engagement in “gray zone operations,” provocative actions designed to achieve objectives without triggering significant responses, consistently testing boundaries as part of a strategic approach. He emphasized that these island constructions are akin to a form of gray zone warfare.
The concept of the gray zone is relatively new, suggesting actions that fall short of provoking a full-scale war. If one side perceives that the other side won’t take action, they will continue pushing boundaries, knowing the tendency to avoid confrontation.
China’s activities in the South China Sea extend beyond island-building to disrupting American and allied aircraft and vessels, a persistent behavior over the years. While termed as gray zone operations, these actions effectively serve as rehearsals for potential conflicts, enhancing their military readiness while eroding patience of opposing parties.
The primary goal remains to prevent war and conflicts, often opting for concessions. Newsham suggested reconsidering approaches to make China consider potential repercussions for its actions rather than hoping for de-escalation without consequences.
Recommendations include suspending operations of the Bank of China in the US for six months and imposing a temporary ban on high-tech exports to China, ensuring repercussions for Chinese actions.
Newsham analyzed that China strategically blurs the lines between its coast guard, maritime militia, and civilian organizations, combining these elements to enforce control effectively. By deploying a vast fishing fleet posing as civilian vessels with reinforced structures and armaments, alongside armed maritime militia forces, China establishes a permanent presence in multiple locations.
Additionally, China’s coast guard fleet, while ostensibly for law enforcement, features combat-capable vessels, some even larger than certain US Navy ships. Their naval forces, totaling around 350 ships, have been rapidly expanding, unlike the US Navy, tasked with global coverage.
China’s integrated approach to control over the South China Sea combines coast guard, maritime militia, and fishing fleets as essential elements in enforcing their dominance in the region.
Recent events near the Philippines are seen as another step in China’s efforts to assert control over the entire South China Sea. Pressure on the Philippines began as early as 1996 but escalated in 2012 at Scarborough Shoal west of Luzon Island. The recent conflicts near Ren’ai Reef south of Palawan Island involved Chinese interference with Philippine vessels, indicating their ongoing territorial disputes.
The main issue arises from the Philippines’ defense treaty with the US, where the latter pledged assistance in repelling armed attacks, leading the Philippines to expect actual support from the US.
In conclusion, Newsham emphasized the strategic importance of the region extending from Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia, collectively forming the so-called “first island chain.” From China’s perspective, the South China Sea is akin to a bathtub where the first island chain poses significant armed defenses. Proper strategizing could impede China’s attempts to breach these defenses, providing a potential foothold for opposing actions.