Before the Beidaihe Conference, a new round of inspections by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) has been carried out in 16 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, involving territories of the Xi Jinping faction. Analysts believe that this round of inspections involves many vice-ministerial level officials, especially power bases of the Xi Jinping faction, highlighting intense infighting within the CCP before the Beidaihe Conference. The recent sensitivity in CCP politics has led local officials to take preemptive actions.
According to CCTV News on July 17th, the 16 inspection teams of the Sixth Round of Central Committee Inspections have begun their entries. Currently, the Ninth Inspection Team of the central government has stationed in Shandong Province.
The targets of this round of inspections, announced on July 14th, include 16 provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government) such as Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Chongqing, Guizhou, Tibet Autonomous Region, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, conducting routine inspections. They will collaborate with relevant provincial party inspection institutions to conduct joint inspections in 10 vice-provincial-level cities such as Shenyang, Dalian, Harbin, Nanjing, Xiamen, Jinan, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xi’an.
As usual, the Sixth Round of Central Committee Inspections will be completed by the end of July and will last for about 2 and a half months in the inspected areas until early to mid-October.
Previously, the targets of the Fifth Round of the 20th Central Committee Inspections were announced on April 9th, and by April 16th, the inspection teams had completed their entries and worked in the areas for about 2 and a half months, ending the inspections by the end of June.
Traditionally, the Beidaihe Conference of the CCP is held in secrecy from the end of July to early to mid-August; the Fourth Plenum will convene in October. Recent reports suggest that the Fourth Plenum will be held at the end of August. This indicates that the Sixth Round of Inspection Teams will be present throughout the Beidaihe Conference period, and possibly even overlap with the Fourth Plenum.
Commentator Li Yanming pointed out on July 17th in the Epoch Times that this round of inspections involves the power bases of many Politburo members, Standing Committee members, and other national-level officials, highlighting fierce infighting within the CCP before the Beidaihe Conference and the Fourth Plenum, possibly affecting the next round of high-level personnel arrangements; significant personnel changes may occur during the Fourth Plenum.
The Party Secretary positions of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing are currently held by Politburo members Yin Li, Chen Jineng, Chen Min’er, and Yuan Jiagun respectively. The current Party Secretary of Guangdong Province is Politburo member Huang Kunming. Chen Jineng, Chen Min’er, and Huang Kunming are key figures in Xi Jinping’s network from Tsinghua University, Zhejiang, and Fujian respectively, while Yuan Jiagun is a member of the military industry clique highly valued by Xi Jinping.
Fujian, Guizhou, and Shandong, which are the subject of inspections, are the strongholds of different factions within the Xi Jinping camp. Among them, Shandong is the hometown of Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan. Xi Jinping’s trusted aides Li Zhanshu and former colleagues like Chen Min’er have successively held key positions in Guizhou. Xi Jinping has had a long history of service in Fujian and Xiamen. The current Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi, Politburo member and Vice Premier He Lifeng, and State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Wang XiaoHong are all former colleagues of Xi Jinping in Fujian. He Lifeng and Wang Xiaohong have served in Xiamen. State Councilor Chen Yiqin, promoted after the 20th CCP Congress, also has ties to Guizhou.
Of note, Xinjiang has been subject to continuous inspections. During the recent Fifth Round of inspections, several officials linked to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps were investigated, including Party Committee member and Deputy Director of the Grass Lake Project Area of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Song Quanwei, former Party Secretary of the Tenth Division of North Tunch City of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, former political commissar Wang Shengping, Party Secretary and political commissar Zhang Xuejun of the 4th Regiment of the First Division, were all dismissed.
Shortly after the end of the inspections of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, on July 1st, Politburo member Ma Xingrui was removed from his position as Secretary of Xinjiang to be replaced by Chen Xiaojiang, Executive Deputy Minister of the United Front Work Department.
Ma Xingrui, a senior official promoted by Xi Jinping, is also a fellow native of Peng Liyuan from Yun Cheng, Heze, Shandong. With his departure from office for over half a month and unclear future career prospects, many suggest that Ma Xingrui may be transferred to a different position, similar to his predecessors Zhang Chunxian and Chen Quanguo.
Commentator Li Yanming believes that the recent change in Xinjiang’s Party Secretary, along with being included in the inspection targets, indicates that the ongoing cleanse in Xinjiang’s political arena is still unfolding, adding further uncertainties to Ma Xingrui’s future.
Commentator Li Linyi suggested that there is a saying in the CCP about “moving the tiger down the mountain.” After Ma Xingrui was reassigned from Xinjiang, the region was immediately inspected, potentially uncovering various issues. Additionally, since Chen Xiaojiang has a background in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, this could be disadvantageous for Ma Xingrui. Nevertheless, Ma Xingrui’s future journey remains to be observed.
Furthermore, Qinghai and Shaanxi, targets of the Sixth Round of Central Committee Inspections, are territories of the current Chairman of the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region is a territory of the former Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Guo Shengkun. In the past three months, a number of senior officials from Guangxi have been investigated, including former chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region government Lan Tianli, former vice chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region CPPCC Peng Xiaochun, and Jin Xiangjun, former secretary of the Fangchenggang Municipal Committee and now Party secretary of the Guixi Key National Development and Opening Experimental Zone in Shanxi Province. All three are former colleagues of Guo Shengkun who previously held key positions in Guangxi.
Several informed sources and interviewees recently revealed to the Epoch Times that security measures from Beijing to the coastal town of Beidaihe in Hebei had been upgraded in late June. There has been an increase in sentry posts along the route, with multiple inspections in place at train stations and on trains. Currently, regardless of being a visitor or a dissident traveling from Beijing to Beidaihe for tourism purposes, individuals are being strictly monitored.
The outside world continues to monitor the black box operations of the CCP’s top leadership, as there may be sudden major changes happening at critical junctures.
On June 30th, the CCP Politburo met to review the “Regulations on the Decision-Making Coordination Mechanism of the Central Committee,” sparking continued discussions.
On July 17th, Nikkei Asia published an article by senior media figure Chen Zekai, stating that since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, various CCP internal institutions have rapidly expanded, significantly interfering with specific policies, including personnel arrangements and budgeting, gradually weakening the authority of the State Council of the CCP. Discussions surrounding the functioning of the Central Decision-Making Coordination Mechanism indicate that the senior CCP leadership has shown concerns about Xi Jinping’s excessive centralization of power, and local officials are highly sensitive to the shifting political undercurrents in Beijing.
Chen Zekai learned from sources familiar with China’s political and economic situation that officials in places like Shanghai and Shandong had already sensed subtle changes at the central level early in June and began to strategically position themselves.
He believed that this political game within the CCP may continue to escalate at the upcoming Beidaihe Conference. The political moves since the beginning of summer indicate the quiet onset of a new round of internal power struggles.
On July 16th, independent scholar Wu Zuolai analyzed in an article for Taiwan Central Broadcasting Corporation, stating that the newly established “Central Decision-Making Coordination Mechanism” differs from previous leadership groups but carries significant authority, suspecting that the party elders have intervened in high-level decision-making. Given Xi Jinping’s monopolistic rule leading the CCP into severe crises domestically and internationally regarding politics, economy, and diplomacy, it is inevitable that political elders, different factions, interest groups, and military forces might unite in counteraction, leading to significant political changes.
Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in the Taiwan-based “Up paper” in July, stating that within the current CCP Political Bureau, there has been a vast shift in the internal power map, with factions being weakened and engaging in internal strife, portraying an apocalyptic scene in Zhongnanhai. Amid the CCP’s internal and external struggles, its regime may face unexpected contingencies and subversion at any time.