In today’s society, the role of weapons and military forces carries a deeper meaning than just slaughter. Powerful military forces are often used for deterrence, maintaining world peace, and ensuring human security. Although wars have become more covert, they never cease. “Military Affairs” takes you to the forefront to see the details and truths of the struggle between right and wrong.
One often sees images circulating on social media of Ukrainian soldiers facing unmanned drones in panic and helplessness. This is a simple illustration of the biggest feature of modern warfare, the “transparent battlefield,” where there is hardly anywhere to hide. The concept of a “transparent battlefield” is one of the most important ideas put forward by Ukraine, providing real-time tactical and operational information to infantry, officers, and strategic decision-makers in the battlefield information space.
With the rapid development and diffusion of sensors, communication, computers, and artificial intelligence technology, the situational awareness capabilities on the battlefield are piercing through the fog of war like never before. This has been particularly evident on the Ukrainian battlefield, which has become a testing ground for new military concepts and technologies.
A transparent battlefield refers to one side being able to see almost all tactical dynamics of the other side. This capability is largely driven by the development of various technologies such as command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition (C4ISTAR). The proliferation of drones and sensors has had a particularly significant impact on the Ukrainian war and other conflicts.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies pointed out in a report last year that sensor saturation has created a transparent battlefield, making it easier to detect and target enemy forces compared to the past few decades. The British Army Land Operations Concept (LOpC) released last year also arrived at similar conclusions.
High-cost-effective and low-risk drones undertake intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition missions, while attack drones have greatly reduced the reaction time from sensors to targets and increased the speed of the kill chain. Radar, infrared, and electro-optical sensors can provide clearer battlefield images and even penetrate vegetation to observe targets.
Military and commercial satellites have civilianized intelligence systems previously limited to government and military use. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) from social media and commercial satellites allows ordinary people to access intelligence and support military operations. These real-time battlefield intelligence resources were previously only accessible to intelligence agencies and specially trained personnel. In Ukraine, civilians can provide OSINT to the Ukrainian military, acting as a “force multiplier.” Smartphones allow civilians to relay enemy information to the military within seconds, which was unimaginable in the past.
On a transparent battlefield, troop movements are hard to hide, making it even more challenging to launch large-scale assault operations. As the British Army Land Operations Concept noted, soldier concealment and survival are becoming increasingly difficult. With military operations under stricter real-time surveillance and tracking, maintaining surprise, deception, and legitimacy becomes more challenging.
This may also make offensive operations more challenging to successfully implement. Therefore, in the balance of attack and defense on the Ukrainian battlefield, the defending side sometimes finds itself in a relatively advantageous position. Russia failed to achieve strategic and tactical breakthroughs in its initial invasion in Ukraine because its troop movements along the Ukrainian border were clearly visible on Google Maps.
In conclusion, both recent Russian and Ukrainian offensives have yielded minimal results. During the peak of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023, the Ukrainian military only advanced an average of 90 meters per day. The key issue is that attacking forces are often quickly detected by numerous sensors on the battlefield. At the very least, this means losing the element of surprise and at worst inviting ground artillery, airstrikes, or drone attacks. Therefore, it is very difficult for attacking forces to defeat an enemy that is well-prepared for defense.
A transparent battlefield not only increases the likelihood of being detected but also expands the scope of precision strikes. For example, drones can extend the observation range of frontline observers, thereby increasing the precision and range of artillery and guided missile attacks on targets. This may expose rear forces and logistical operations to enemy fire, putting previously considered safe supply lines at greater risk. Both opposing sides face the same challenges.
The US Army also views the “transparent battlefield” as a significant lesson learned from the Ukraine war. Carrying out surprise attacks, protecting logistics, and hiding forces are becoming increasingly difficult activities not shielded from continuous surveillance. The survivability of some tactical platforms may be significantly threatened by battlefield transparency. For instance, the US military has extensively relied on transport helicopters to provide reconnaissance, supply, attack, and rescue capabilities, but their survival in high-intensity environments against a range of sensors, drones, and air defense systems has become highly questionable.
Especially for attacking forces, survivability is a critical issue as the likelihood of being discovered has significantly increased compared to before, and long-range precision strikes by the enemy have become commonplace. This is why the British Army Land Operations Concept emphasizes the need for tactical transformations, where combat units must disperse, deceive, and conceal themselves while engaging enemy artillery, surveillance assets, logistical supply lines, and command nodes.
Although battlefield transparency presents deadly challenges to troop survivability, it does not mean that troops are completely defenseless against sensors and drones. Technology can make the battlefield transparent but can also make it opaque or be used to deceive opponents. Opportunities for deception and concealment still exist and may manifest in surprising ways. For example, the Ukrainian military used realistic inflatable models equipped with heating functions to deceive Russian reconnaissance personnel using thermal imaging devices, making them believe they were seeing real Hemas systems, thereby drawing enemy fire to protect the actual Hemas systems from attack.
A transparent battlefield poses challenges and opportunities for both sides, but in terms of battlefield intelligence resources, Ukraine may have a relative advantage over Russia. This means that Ukrainians may observe Russian forces clearer than Russians observe Ukrainian forces. This is due to the intelligence support from the US and the West, providing Ukraine with large-scale reconnaissance drones and the use of satellite systems. This has allowed the defensive Ukrainian forces to hold their ground despite the disparity in ammunition that led to a 10:1 ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery rounds fired. Contrary to what European Command Chief Kovaly had predicted, the Ukrainian forces did not collapse within a few weeks, instead, they continued to inflict significant casualties on the Russian forces and even intensified attacks on Crimea and targets within Russia.
On the night of April 16, Ukrainian forces once again attacked the Russian Air Force base in Konskie, northern Crimea, resulting in the destruction or severe damage of four sets of S-400 air defense system missile launchers, radars, and air defense command posts. Hours after destroying the air defense systems, a second wave of attacks targeted the maintenance center at the base. Fire information from the Fire Information Retrieval and Monitoring System (FIRMS) through orbital infrared sensing almost instantly observed at least six fires around the base. Social media reports indicate that approximately 30 Russians were killed, and casualties may exceed 100. Russian military bloggers claimed that the Ukrainian forces used the US-supplied MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
Although to a certain extent, Ukraine has gained a relative advantage of a “transparent battlefield” over Russia with the support of Western intelligence, helping them extend the standoff with Russian forces amidst severe ammunition shortages. However, a “transparent battlefield” does not mean victory in war entirely as the battlefield is always filled with uncertainty. Therefore, the advantage of a “transparent battlefield” cannot offset the catastrophic impact of the widening firepower disparity between Russia and Ukraine on the Ukrainian forces. Without further military assistance, not to mention launching an attack, even defending may become challenging for Ukraine. The current question is whether the next stage of US military aid will continue, how long it will take to arrive, and how long the Ukrainian forces can hold out before new military aid arrives.
On April 18, US House Speaker Johnson stated that he is willing to take personal risks to advance the House’s vote on military aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. It is expected that the House will soon vote to provide approximately $95 billion in additional military aid to Ukraine and Israel. The bill proposes allocating $61 billion in additional funds to Ukraine and promptly providing them with long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS).
The latest developments show that the US House has passed the aid bill to Ukraine without suspense. US Secretary of Defense Austin emphasized that delays have already caused severe consequences on the battlefield. Time is of the essence. The battlefield situation has begun to shift in favor of Russia.
Pentagon spokesperson Pat Ryder expressed hope to urgently provide the necessary amount of security assistance to help Ukraine succeed, which could be achieved within a few days.
The US has two avenues to accelerate the delivery of weapons and ammunition. One is Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which allows weapons and ammunition to be drawn directly from existing US military stocks. Normally, weapons transferred under PDA can arrive within a few days. The other is to draw from European stocks, which could almost immediately deliver 155mm artillery shells and anti-aircraft ammunition to Ukraine.
Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate chief Budanov mentioned that Russia may launch the next offensive at the end of May or early June.
Regardless of Western weapons aid, Ukraine will face significant challenges. These challenges stem from Russia increasingly utilizing highly mobile and agile forces, infiltrating Ukraine’s rear in more distributed ways to reduce its vulnerabilities on the transparent battlefield.
Therefore, even with military assistance, Ukraine’s future path is not without obstacles.