On October 7th, two important pieces of news from both domestic and international sources mutually confirmed each other, suggesting that the top leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, may have lost his ultimate power and could even be under house arrest in Beijing, unable to attend the 80th anniversary celebration of the North Korean Workers’ Party.
At the same time, there were reports from external sources indicating that former Premier Wen Jiabao is currently controlling the temporary highest authority within the Chinese Communist Party, overseeing the approval of all internal party communications.
Furthermore, party elders are preparing to have Xi Jinping and Cai Qi resign at the upcoming Fourth Plenum by citing “health” and “age” as reasons.
Today, we will analyze how this high-level power storm will change the political landscape of the CCP.
Independently commenting, Cai Shenkun revealed on his YouTube program on October 7th that he received inside information from a friend in China, suggesting that Xi Jinping and Cai Qi might be forced to step down due to age-related issues.
The source of this information was described as someone with frequent contact with top officials in Zhongnanhai, familiar with Chinese political affairs, and even provided chat screenshots as evidence. The content discussed how Xi Jinping and Cai Qi should withdraw from the political stage based on their age.
Cai Shenkun mentioned that it remains unclear who is pushing for Xi Jinping and Cai Qi to resign due to age concerns – is it Zhang Yuxia or the current party elders? Even the friend who provided the information could not provide an answer to this question.
The leaked information also highlighted the unique position of Wen Jiabao, stating that all internal communications within the CCP must now be approved by Wen Jiabao.
It was also mentioned that the conflict between Xi Jinping and Zhang Yuxia has escalated to an irreconcilable point, with a “fight to the death” scenario.
Cai Shenkun further disclosed on his program, “Yesterday, there was news that Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli are directly commanding the military now. All military authority has shifted to Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli’s hands, and Xi Jinping has completely lost control over the military. Security in Beijing and Zhongnanhai has been completely taken over by the military.”
The term “yesterday” here refers to October 6th. Cai Shenkun explained that the military taking over refers to the Central Guard Bureau and Beijing Garrison being responsible for defense, particularly in the central region. With the disappearance of the commanding officers and political commissars in the central region, it is uncertain who is currently in charge, creating opacity for outsiders.
Cai Shenkun expressed reluctance to speculate excessively on the stability of Xi Jinping’s power. However, he highlighted the likelihood of Xi Jinping and Cai Qi being forced to retire soon due to age-related matters, reflecting internal questioning within the party’s high echelons.
He believed that if such events were to unfold, significant changes in China’s political landscape would ensue, possibly in unforeseen ways.
These disclosures align with previous rumors circulating within the public sphere:
Firstly, Wen Jiabao is assumed to have taken control of the temporary highest authority of the CCP. According to overseas reports, in late June, CCP elders established the “Central Party Central Decision Coordinating Mechanism,” sidelining Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee, with Wen Jiabao being the actual wielder of power in this mechanism, while Wang Yang oversees daily operations.
Before this development, on May 19th, Xi Jinping suddenly paid a visit to Luoyang, believed to be a deliberate arrangement coordinated by Wen Jiabao and others. This gesture was interpreted as signaling Xi Jinping’s declining influence.
In Chinese culture, the highest ruler is compared to the sun, and the literal meaning of Luoyang signifies the setting sun, an extremely unfavorable location for the top leader. Mao Zedong, in his entire life, never visited Luoyang, understanding its particular political significance within the CCP hierarchy.
For Xi Jinping, who often emulates Mao Zedong’s actions, his decision to visit Luoyang likely holds profound political symbolism. The sudden change in Xi Jinping’s itinerary suggests a lack of voluntary action on his part.
Secondly, Xi Jinping and Cai Qi might be forced to retire due to health and age reasons, aligning with previous speculations. Hu Jintao had expressed the desire for Xi Jinping to resign on health grounds to ensure a smooth transfer of power and to avoid publicizing internal party struggles, thereby preserving the CCP’s image. However, Zhang Yuxia and Liu Yuan were concerned that Xi Jinping might not comply willingly, prompting them to bolster measures for intimidation within the military.
The use of the term “forced retirement” in Cai Shenkun’s disclosure implies external coercion for Xi Jinping and Cai Qi to step down. The exact method of coercion, whether through military pressure or other means, was not specified by the informant. Nevertheless, it was suggested that Xi and Cai might be compelled to resign.
Reasonably, it can be inferred that the military forces under Zhang Yuxia’s control played a decisive role in this coercive process.
Lastly, the relationship between Zhang Yuxia and Xi Jinping is described as a fight to the death. This observation corresponds to the extensive internal purges observed within the military over the past year.
Since the Third Plenum last year, senior military officials who have disappeared or faced disciplinary actions were affiliated with Xi Jinping’s faction, including those considered crucial allies. This includes prominent figures such as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong and other regional commanders.
On September 28th, a day before the CCP announced the schedule for the Fourth Plenum, a significant number of military vehicles were witnessed entering Beijing along the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macau Expressway section. It was estimated that more than a hundred military vehicles, including armored vehicles, logistics carriers, troop transports, and medical vehicles, were part of this convoy. Speculations point to the presence of at least a thousand soldiers.
Baoding is the base of the 82nd Group Army, a loyal faction controlled by Zhang Yuxia. Just before the convening of the Fourth Plenum, Zhang Yuxia mobilized elite units of the 82nd Army towards Beijing, not for security purposes but as a coercive measure to ensure Xi Jinping voluntarily resigns on health grounds.
Additionally, Xi Jinping’s cancellation of numerous foreign visits is indicative of his diminishing authority and imminent resignation.
On October 7th, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Premier Li Keqiang would lead a CCP government delegation to attend the 80th anniversary celebration of the North Korean Workers’ Party from October 9th to 11th and hold formal talks with North Korea.
Under normal circumstances, this event should have been attended by the CCP leader Xi Jinping. However, the decision to send Premier Li Keqiang raises questions about Xi Jinping and Cai Qi’s political predicaments, making it increasingly unlikely for them to travel abroad for official engagements.
American political commentator Tang Jingyuan surmised in his media program that Li Keqiang’s sudden visit to North Korea represents a highly unusual occurrence, signaling an unforeseen turn of events.
Tang Jingyuan explained that Xi Jinping had reportedly planned to visit North Korea. After Kim Jong-un attended the CCP’s September 3rd military parade, an event that significantly boosted Xi Jinping’s prestige, it was highly probable that Xi Jinping verbally committed to attend the North Korean Workers’ Party anniversary parade. Within a month of Kim Jong-un’s return to North Korea, he promptly dispatched the North Korean Foreign Minister to Beijing, presumably to finalize details of Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea.
However, if Xi Jinping had categorically rejected Kim Jong-un during the September 3rd parade, it would have been unlikely for Kim Jong-un to send his Foreign Minister to Beijing for further negotiations.
Consequently, the last-minute substitution of Li Keqiang to attend the North Korean Workers’ Party celebration suggests a hasty rearrangement due to unforeseen circumstances. This deviation from the expected protocol and the absence of Cai Qi from this event further hints at underlying irregularities impacting Xi Jinping and his political allies.
Tang Jingyuan highlighted that recent unprecedented actions within the CCP leadership, such as Xi Jinping attending commemorative events in Tibet and Xinjiang, regions not typically visited by CCP leaders, signal a shifting power dynamic. His omission of references to Taiwan unification during his National Day address further underscores his waning authority, considering his earlier commitment to resolve the Taiwan issue by 2027, a cornerstone for securing a third term.
Xi Jinping’s decision to avoid mentioning Taiwan unification, a crucial narrative for his re-election prospects, along with other observable anomalies, hints at a calculated maneuver possibly paving the way for his eventual resignation.
On October 8th, commentator “Ordinary People Inside the Wall” remarked on their YouTube program that if Xi Jinping fails to attend the North Korean parade on October 10th, it is improbable for him to participate in the APEC summit in South Korea at the end of the month. It is speculated that Wen Jiabao might have begun monitoring Xi Jinping, who might have no choice but to step down during the Fourth Plenum.
These series of abnormal indicators suggest cracks emerging within Xi Jinping’s power structure. From military authority to diplomatic engagements, from the Politburo Standing Committee to the inner sanctum of Zhongnanhai, signs of a “power transition” are becoming evident.
If Wen Jiabao indeed reasserts control over the CCP’s central decision-making apparatus, the forthcoming “power realignment before the Fourth Plenum” represents not only an internal reckoning but potentially the most dramatic power transition in the CCP’s over seventy-year history.
Will this storm ultimately lead to Xi Jinping’s resignation, or will it escalate into a more extensive political meltdown? “Epoch Focus” will continue to monitor and analyze the unfolding developments.