In recent news regarding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), speculation arises that the seven members of the Standing Committee of the CCP are still hiding in Beidaihe. Various political rumors hint at changes in the top leadership, but confirmation is lacking. With the upcoming 120th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s birth a week away, the party’s media have started building up anticipation for the commemoration, which also raises sensitivities around Xi Jinping. Articles comparing Xi Jinping to Deng during the Third Plenum session have been removed from CCP media, attracting attention. Experts suggest that anti-Xi forces are biding their time, and Xi’s close allies are not completely united, potentially signaling a sudden shift in CCP politics.
August 22 marks the 120th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s birth. On August 12, the CCP’s official magazine published a 4800-word article praising Deng’s technological ideology, highlighting his role in advancing technology post Cultural Revolution. Notably, Xi Jinping’s “new productive forces” theory was only briefly mentioned in the seventh paragraph, with his name mentioned only once throughout the entire article.
Taiwan’s Deputy Researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Studies, Gong Xiangsheng, noted that the article aims to emphasize CCP’s “respect for expertise” through commemorating Deng Xiaoping, with Xi Jinping mentioned sparingly. This tactic is used to underscore the correctness and continuity of Xi’s leadership in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms.
Chinese affairs expert, Wang He, suggests that the CCP’s praise for Deng Xiaoping’s technological ideology is a timely move intended to venerate Xi Jinping under a different guise, portraying Xi as furthering Deng’s technological ideals by introducing the so-called “new productive forces.”
However, Renowned Professor at National Chengchi University’s International Affairs School, Ding Shufan, believes that recent observations made by Westerners visiting China indicate that “Chinese scholars are openly complaining about certain policies.” This article may reflect this growing sentiment, highlighting Deng Xiaoping’s policies and contributions while addressing current shortcomings.
Deng Xiaoping passed away in 1997, and the CCP holds significant events every ten years to commemorate his birth. Xi Jinping is expected to deliver a speech on this occasion. During the Third Plenum in July, a lengthy article titled “Reformer Xi Jinping” was released by Xinhua News Agency on the opening day of the conference (July 15), framing Xi as a “reformer” following in Deng Xiaoping’s footsteps with an approach dubbed as “Xi-style reform.” However, before the conclusion of the Third Plenum on July 18, this article was removed from the Chinese internet in its entirety.
Wang He suggests that the circumstances surrounding this incident are indeed suspicious, with rumors circulating about conflicts between Li Shulei, the Minister of the Central Publicity Department of the CCP, and Cai Qi, the Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the CCP, indicating internal discord within the CCP.
“Xi Jinping is currently politically passive and may potentially be ill. Li Shulei and Cai Qi, both close to him, could be at odds, leading to conflicting strategies. In this scenario, Xi Jinping’s mindset is likely wavering. It’s possible that Xi Jinping may adopt a more conciliatory approach (such as removing the article), similar to Mao Zedong’s step back during the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference and then seeking opportunities to regain control,” stated Wang He.
Ding Shufan posits that while Xi Jinping sees himself as a reformer, his approach differs from Deng Xiaoping’s style of reform. Assessing Xi’s reform against Deng’s standards might provoke displeasure from Xi and lack widespread acceptance within society.
CEO of the Taiwan Inspiration Alliance (TIA), Lai Rongwei, expressed that the recent decisions made during the Third Plenum regarding deepening reforms go beyond mere economic policy adjustments, extending to addressing social issues and the instability in governance. The removal of articles praising Xi as a reformer is a sign of seeking stability, potentially indicating various doubts being raised during the Third Plenum.
Lai Rongwei asserts that since Xi Jinping took office, he has suppressed and purged factions associated with Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and even descendants of Deng Xiaoping, undermining some of the institutional foundations laid during Deng Xiaoping’s rule. However, Xi’s personal authority does not rival that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, prompting silent anti-Xi forces to wait for the right moment.
On August 9, the CCP’s People’s Daily released an article through the military network regarding experts on vacation in Beidaihe, signaling the end of their break while hinting that the seven members of the Standing Committee of the CCP remain concealed in Beidaihe.
Recent rumors swirling around Xi Jinping and internal turmoil in Zhongnanhai cannot be verified. Speculations range from Xi Jinping stepping down due to severe illness, a decision during the Beidaihe meeting appointing Hu Chunhua to replace Xi Jinping as General Secretary, or suggestions from a new list of candidates proposing Ding Xuxiang as General Secretary, among others.
Wang He notes that the Beidaihe meeting has historically served as an informal party decision-making conference, making it challenging to discern the actual operational details. Each year, the meeting tends to generate numerous speculations, whether true or false, representing various political attitudes within the CCP factions.
Lai Rongwei emphasizes that the increasing abnormal internal information within the CCP is not insignificant. Any unusual messages conveyed through official media outlets must be carefully observed. In the midst of factional struggles, the emphasis on the credibility of the source is crucial. He further states that if unexpected news emerges from CCP-controlled media or military publications, it should not be overlooked, as these can be indicators of internal conflicts.
During this tense period, on August 10, the CCP military network published an article revealing the recent distribution of the “Democratic Centralism Reader,” organized by the CCP Military Commission, throughout the entire military, emphasizing the implementation of democratic centralism at all levels of the military.
Commentator Zhou Xiaohui suggested in a recent article for the Epoch Times that this development is significant. While the CCP has occasionally mentioned “democratic centralism” in recent years, it is widely understood to manifest only in rhetoric with the actuality being the consolidation of power by the leader. The sudden promotion of learning democratic centralism throughout the military diverging from the CCP leadership’s direction poses a critical issue. The author observed that such moves fuel rumors about significant events within Beijing’s elite circles, indicating a shift from the norm.
In response to these developments, Lai Rongwei mentioned that if issues arise in CCP-controlled media or military publications, it is undoubtedly unusual. These occurrences might be construed as anti-Xi forces expressing their views through media channels or potentially a deliberate move by Xi Jinping to provoke a reaction.
During the Beidaihe meeting, retired professor from Renmin University, Leng Jiefu, released an open letter advocating for the CCP to voluntarily step down and establish the Chinese Federal Republic, a nation based on democratic constitutional governance. He mentioned that, through WeChat, he learned that Xi Jinping is severely ill and unable to work, leaving the overall governance on the shoulders of Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, and He Wende. For this reason, he hopes both individuals will support this initiative.
It is important to note that WeChat is heavily monitored by the CCP, and as of the current date (August 14), there have been no official interventions following Leng Jiefu’s open letter.
Lai Rongwei noted that when similar incidents occurred in the past, some individuals speaking out were later mysteriously silenced. The recent emergence of public dissent against Xi Jinping signifies widespread dissatisfaction, particularly among individuals belonging to the “second red generation” and “third red generation,” thus lending greater credibility to these dissenting voices.
He speculates that Leng Jiefu’s bold statements might go unpunished, suggesting that Xi Jinping may currently be preoccupied with other pressing matters.
Wang He highlights that few of those elevated by Xi Jinping are genuinely supportive of him. With personal ambitions prevalent, everyone is waiting for an opportunity. Due to the opaque nature of CCP politics, sudden shifts in the political landscape could swiftly arise. Xi Jinping’s abrupt decision at the end of 2022 to eliminate the “Dynamics Control” policy without forewarning illustrates the unpredictability of CCP politics, indicating that Xi Jinping’s decision-making mindset may not necessarily align with normal thought processes.