The latest official announcement from the Chinese Communist Party reveals the dismissal of four generals from their positions as members of the National People’s Congress, including General Wang Chunning, the commander of the People’s Armed Police, Lieutenant General Zhang Lin, Minister of Logistics Support of the Central Military Commission, Lieutenant General Gao Daguang, Political Commissar of the Joint Logistic Support Force of the Central Military Commission, and Major General Wang Zhibin, the discipline inspection secretary of the Rocket Force. Wang Chunning was rumored to have fallen from grace at the end of last year due to his absence from important events.
Experts believe that the ongoing purge within the ranks of the CCP’s military has put everyone on edge, weakening their combat capabilities. If the authorities forcefully provoke Taiwan, it could potentially trigger internal revolution.
The recent military clean-up highlights intensifying internal struggles not only within the Rocket Force but extending to the People’s Armed Police, the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission, and the Joint Logistic Support Force of the Central Military Commission. The downfall of the discipline inspection secretary of the Rocket Force, Wang Zhibin, deserves attention as well. In the anti-corruption campaign of the CCP, discipline inspection secretaries, originally tasked with combating corruption, are now being targeted and labeled as “moles.”
Wang Zhibin has served in various positions within the military, including Commander of the Anqing Military Subdistrict in the Anhui Military Command and Political Commissar of the 13th Coastal Defense Division in the Fujian Military Command. He later held positions such as Director of the Political Department of the 1st Group Army, Director of the Political Work Department of the 73rd Group Army, and was eventually promoted to Political Commissar of the 81st Group Army in April 2018. By March 2022, he had risen to the rank of Major General and again to Lieutenant General in March 2022 when he was appointed the discipline inspection secretary of the Rocket Force.
Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Strategic Studies Director, Su Ziyun, emphasized that the current arrests are evidently targeting the issues stemming from the military reform initiated by Xi Jinping in previous years. The apprehension of these individuals, combined with potential revelations from previously arrested figures and internal power struggles, will significantly undermine the practical combat capabilities of the Chinese military. As these individuals are seasoned military leaders, their accumulated experience and expertise cannot be easily replaced, affecting the morale and talent development within the military structure.
The continuous downfall of generals ranging from senior to junior ranks, coupled with their affiliations with military academies, creates an atmosphere of apprehension where everyone is at risk of falling from grace. Such circumstances will inevitably impact morale, talent development, and result in structural damage within the military.
Su Ziyun believes that amidst the internal purges within the CCP, external distractions such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait may be utilized to divert attention. However, the likelihood of a direct assault on Taiwan remains low as the authorities lack definitive assurance. Failure in such a risky venture could jeopardize the stability of CCP rule.
Research Fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Strategic Studies, Shen Mingshi, highlights that under the continuous cleansing of the military by the authorities, Xi Jinping is becoming more cautious in inciting conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. The United States staunchly opposes any aggression from Xi Jinping towards Taiwan, and many military leaders within the CCP are also hesitant to engage in military actions due to the inability to win against the United States, unwilling to put their lives and fortunes at risk.
Assigning these military leaders high-risk military tasks during such precarious times, especially when they are unwilling to execute them or if the missions fail, could harm Xi Jinping instead. If Xi loses control over the military, he will undoubtedly become more cautious, as any misstep could incite internal revolution.
Commentator Zhou Xiaohui suggested in an article for Da Ji Yuan that the dismissal of the four National People’s Congress representatives, including Wang Chunning, may have connections to Xi Jinping’s allies, Miao Hua and He Weidong. Zhang Lin, Gao Daguang, and Wang Zhibin may have sought to buy influence from Miao Hua. During Xi Jinping’s tenure as Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee, Wang Chunning served in the 1st Group Army assigned to Huzhou, Zhejiang. It cannot be ruled out that they had acquaintance during this period. Xi subsequently appointed him as the Commander of the Beijing Garrison Command and later as the Commander of the People’s Armed Police, indicating a certain level of trust.
Zhou Xiaohui speculates that Zhang Lin, Gao Daguang, Wang Zhibin, and Wang Chunning could be aligned with Xi’s faction. The consecutive downfall of these individuals raises questions regarding the elimination of Xi’s influence within the military. Who is leading these purges, Xi or others? Is it Xi or Zhang Xiaxia who controls military power? If it is Xi, will he destroy his own stronghold?