The Century-old Truth: AB Group’s Old Revenge – Anhui Southern Incident

In China’s modern history, there has been a major event that has been distorted for over eighty years – the Wannan Incident.

This incident, which the Communist Party of China has consistently promoted as a scheme by the Kuomintang to oppress them, with Zhou Enlai’s famous quote, “Within the same household, swords are crossed, what’s the rush to boil over,” even being included in textbooks, moving countless people. But is the truth really like this?

Today, let’s peel back the layers of fog and talk about the truth behind the Wannan Incident.

Let’s go back to the year 1940, a crucial period during the Chinese resistance against Japan. While the Kuomintang and the Communist Party appeared to be cooperating against the Japanese on the surface, there were undercurrents of conflict running deep. While Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang was busy fighting the Japanese on the front lines, Mao Zedong of the Communist Party was strategizing in Yan’an on how to strengthen his own power.

Especially with the New Fourth Army, a unit that was nominally under the command of the Kuomintang but actually followed Mao Zedong’s orders entirely. They took Kuomintang’s military funding but engaged in activities such as expanding territories and fighting in civil wars. The New Fourth Army specifically targeted the Kuomintang’s anti-Japanese forces and barely engaged with the Japanese themselves. This was something Chiang Kai-shek could not tolerate.

In July 1940, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order: the New Fourth Army must move north, retreat beyond the Yellow River, and give up the Yangtze River Basin to the Kuomintang. This order seemed reasonable, given the importance of the overall war effort, and the need for unified deployment of forces. However, Mao Zedong simply ignored it.

By October, Chiang Kai-shek reiterated the order, demanding the New Fourth Army to withdraw within a month, or face the consequences. And what did Mao Zedong do? He remained unmoved. He had bigger plans in mind.

Speaking of which, we need to introduce a key figure – Xiang Ying. The political commissar of the New Fourth Army, an old revolutionary of the Communist Party, but also an enemy of Mao Zedong.

Back in the days in the Jiangxi Soviet Area, Xiang Ying clashed with Mao. At that time, Mao carried out a campaign of “eliminating counter-revolutionaries” in order to consolidate his power, under the pretext of “counter-revolutionaries,” he killed tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers and officers, with brutal methods that were appalling. Xiang Ying couldn’t bear to witness this, openly opposing Mao’s bloody violence, and even came close to toppling Mao from power.

Later, he opposed bringing Mao Zedong on the Long March, feeling that this guy had too many ambitions and would eventually seize power. By 1940, Xiang Ying was still the person who dared to speak out against Mao, even mocking Mao’s leadership to his face.

Mao’s hatred towards Xiang Ying ran deep in his bones. But he was patient, waiting for an opportunity to both get rid of Xiang Ying and put the blame on Chiang Kai-shek. The Wannan Incident was a meticulously designed play by Mao.

By the end of 1940, most of the New Fourth Army’s troops had been transferred by Mao to the north of the Yangtze River, forming the Jiangbei Command, led by Mao’s ally Liu Shaoqi.

What remained in Jiangnan was only the headquarters of the New Fourth Army led by Xiang Ying, stationed at Yunling in Huangshan. This unit was pathetically small, with only over 8,000 soldiers and over 1,000 staff, not even one-tenth of the total strength of the New Fourth Army, stranded next to the Kuomintang-controlled area.

The time Mao had been waiting for had arrived.

For the New Fourth Army to move north and cross the Yangtze River, there were two routes: one was the Anhui Eastern route, crossing the river from Fanchang, Tongling, and heading straight north; the other was the Suzhou-Nanjing route, crossing the river from the lower reaches of the Yangtze in Zhenjiang.

Chiang Kai-shek specifically instructed Xiang Ying to take the Anhui Eastern route because the area around Zhenjiang on the Suzhou route was where Kuomintang forces were in conflict with the New Fourth Army, and Chiang feared Xiang Ying’s forces would cause trouble by passing through. On December 10, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram specifically to Xiang Ying’s nominal superior Gu Zhutong, making it clear: “Do not go through Zhenjiang, only go through Anhui East.”

Initially, Mao Zedong also agreed on the Anhui Eastern route. On December 29, he even telegraphed Xiang Ying, “Move directly to Anhui East in batches.” But the very next day, on December 30, Mao suddenly changed his mind, instructing Xiang Ying to take the Suzhou-Nanjing route, the Zhenjiang route that Chiang Kai-shek had explicitly forbidden.

Most crucially, Mao didn’t notify Chiang Kai-shek of this change at all! Chiang thought Xiang Ying would obediently take the Anhui East route, so much so that on January 3, 1941, he sent another telegram, reiterating to go through Anhui East and even stating that Nationalist Army troops were “concealing” along the way.

And what did Xiang Ying do? He realized something was amiss and hurriedly sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on January 4, intending to inform him that they were changing their route to Anhui South. However, this telegram never reached Chiang Kai-shek.

Why? Because Mao had already made it a rule that Communist leaders couldn’t directly contact Chiang Kai-shek. All telegrams had to go through him and then be relayed by Zhou Enlai. Mao held onto Xiang Ying’s telegram and didn’t inform Zhou Enlai until the 13th!

What evidence supports this? In a telegram Mao sent to Zhou Enlai on January 13, he said, “Xiang Ying’s telegram on the 4th was worded improperly, do not deliver without further instruction.” This indicates that Mao received Xiang Ying’s telegram on the 4th, but deliberately withheld it until the 13th to inform Zhou. By this time, the battle had been raging for a week, and Xiang Ying’s forces were almost completely annihilated!

On the night of January 4, 1941, amidst storms, Xiang Ying set out with ten thousand troops from the New Fourth Army on the route Mao had ordered, heading towards the Suzhou-Nanjing route. He thought Chiang Kai-shek was already aware of the route change, and that Nationalist Army troops along the way would let them pass.

But he never expected that Chiang Kai-shek had not received his telegram at all, and the over a hundred thousand Kuomintang forces stationed in Wannan had not received any notification either. When they saw the New Fourth Army suddenly trespassing into their territory, they thought it was a provocation and immediately opened fire!

By then, the commander of the Kuomintang’s Third War Zone, Gu Zhutong, already held a deep grudge against the New Fourth Army for the Huangqiao Battle, where several Kuomintang generals were killed by the New Fourth Army.

On January 6, Gu Zhutong ordered a “thorough clean-up” of Xiang Ying’s forces. The battle raged from January 7 to 13, with Xiang Ying’s over nine thousand forces surrounded with no way out, with casualties and captives, leaving only over two thousand to break through.

Commander Ye Ting was detained during negotiations, while Xiang Ying barely escaped, only to be shot by his own deputy two months later.

During those seven days, Xiang Ying was in a desperate situation, sending one telegram after another to Yan’an, pleading for Mao to negotiate a ceasefire with the Kuomintang. But what did Mao do? He remained silent.

On January 9, Liu Shaoqi sent a telegram from the Jiangbei Command, mentioning Xiang Ying’s plight, and only then did Mao leisurely reply, stating that he hadn’t received Xiang Ying’s telegram since the 5th and had no knowledge of the situation. This explanation raised suspicions!

Xiang Ying’s distress signals were being sent out on the radio continuously, Liu Shaoqi received them, but Mao’s radio mysteriously didn’t? Even if he truly hadn’t received them, why didn’t Mao promptly re-establish contact? This was a moment crucial for the survival of the New Fourth Army headquarters!

Even more absurdly, on January 10, Xiang Ying sent another telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, pleading for the siege to be lifted. This telegram was meant to be relayed by Mao. But what did Mao do? He held onto it again! He said to Zhou Enlai that this telegram from Xiang Ying had a “worse stance” and adamantly refused to forward it.

It wasn’t until January 12 that Mao allowed Zhou Enlai to “make a serious protest to the Kuomintang,” but he deliberately downplayed it, saying that the New Fourth Army could still “hold out for seven days,” completely hiding the desperation of Xiang Ying’s forces which were “on the brink of extinction.” Consequently, Zhou Enlai only formally protested on the 13th, while Chiang Kai-shek had already voluntarily ordered a cease-fire on the 12th.

You might wonder, why was Mao so callous, watching Xiang Ying’s forces being wiped out? The answer is simple: this was the result he wanted!

Mao had a finely orchestrated plan. Firstly, he wanted Chiang Kai-shek to fire the first shot so that the Communist Party could legitimately cry foul and shift all the blame to the Kuomintang. Secondly, he wanted to pressure the Soviet Union into sending troops by using the Wannan Incident, to help him wage a full-scale civil war and overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. Thirdly, he conveniently got rid of Xiang Ying, a major internal threat – killing three birds with one stone!

Mao’s true intentions were glaringly exposed in his communications with the Soviet Union. On January 15, he had Zhou Enlai go seek the Soviet Ambassador, Alexander Panyushkin, to ask the Soviet Union for “rescue” of the Communist Party. Panyushkin poured cold water on the idea, directly suspecting that the Wannan Incident was a deliberate maneuver by Mao to send Xiang Ying to his death. Zhou Enlai even lied, saying that the break in communication between the New Fourth Army and Yan’an only occurred in the afternoon of the 13th, contradicting Mao’s statement that there was no contact since the “5th.” Panyushkin didn’t believe him at all.

Seeing that Panyushkin wasn’t buying it, Mao panicked and sent a bunch of “hysterical” telegrams to Stalin, claiming that Chiang Kai-shek was trying to “completely exterminate the New Fourth Army, eliminate the Eighth Route Army, and destroy the Communist Party,” that the Communist Party was in danger of being “cut up and annihilated.” He desperately implored the Soviet Union to send troops, even explicitly stating the need for “specific military assistance,” not just weapons but direct involvement of Soviet troops!

However, Stalin wasn’t foolish, he had already interacted with Mao and knew the kind of person he was, not easily fooled by him.

At the time, what Stalin needed most was cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, keeping Japan entangled on the Chinese battlefield, so he didn’t have the energy to meddle in China’s civil war.

He directly criticized New Fourth Army Commander Ye Ting as being a “undisciplined guerrilla unit,” hinting that the Wannan Incident was provoked by Mao. He warned Mao: “Do not provoke a rupture!”

He even directly telegraphed Mao: “A rupture is not inevitable; you shouldn’t provoke one.” Mao had no choice but to grit his teeth and replied: “I will obey your orders.”

Although Mao couldn’t drag the Soviet Union into the mix, the Wannan Incident still reaped him several benefits.

Firstly, he got rid of Xiang Ying. After Xiang Ying escaped the encirclement, Mao hastily issued a statement in the name of the Central Committee, placing the blame for the Wannan Incident entirely on Xiang Ying, labeling him as a “opportunistic leader,” even insinuating he was a traitor right after Xiang Ying had died an untimely death, he was branded as a “traitor.”

Secondly, fearing an escalation of civil war, coupled with threats from the Soviet Union to stop supplying military equipment and the United States talking about suspending a $50 million loan, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to compromise, agreeing to let the New Fourth Army remain in the Yangtze River Basin. The Communist Party didn’t lose any territory.

Lastly, through the Wannan Incident, Mao took the propaganda of the “eternal injustice” to new heights. The Communist Party’s Xinhua Daily News extensively sensationalized the incident, and the national opinion was stirred up, completely framing Chiang Kai-shek as an “anti-Communist” criminal. In this propaganda war, Mao played a masterful hand!

The Wannan Incident was called the “eternal injustice,” but the real injustice was suffered by Xiang Ying and those innocent New Fourth Army officers and soldiers who were sacrificed, caught up in power plays, becoming victims of history.