In the period from June 2024 to May 2025, there have been 4 incidents of small Chinese Communist vessels successfully infiltrating from New Taipei City to Hsinchu area in Taiwan, raising concerns about national security. A report from the Taiwan Supervisory Committee recommended the Coast Guard Administration to conduct unannounced infiltration tests on coast guard units by its special forces to enhance the alertness of monitoring units.
On June 9, 2024, the incident of the Chinese vessel Hong Jin entering the critical river defense area of the Tamsui River in Taiwan occurred, followed by incidents on September 14 of the same year, May 16 and May 18, 2025, involving Chinese nationals successfully infiltrating by rubber dinghy. Chairperson of the Ocean Affairs Council, Kuan Pi-ling, stated on April 17 that during law enforcement operations, the Coast Guard had discovered fishing vessels using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of Chinese maritime police ships.
After the investigations by Taiwan Supervisory Commissioners Lai Ding-ming, Yeh Yi-chin, and Hsiao Tzu-yu, they found the case to be critical for review due to the strategic location of the Tamsui River mouth as a critical defense area. This location is only 8 kilometers from Guandu Bridge and 22 kilometers from the political and economic center, identified as a key location for the Ministry of National Defense’s long-term plan to counter possible “decapitation operations” by the People’s Liberation Army, which led to the establishment of the “Guandu Area Command” to address this threat.
The report highlighted that previous Han Guang exercises by Taiwan had conducted multiple live-fire drills to address this threat. However, the ease with which a 7-meter-long, 1.97-meter-wide, 1.8-ton Chinese speedboat penetrated to Tamsui Pier at a speed of 18 knots raised concerns about the failure of river defense mechanisms.
The report recommended reviewing the feasibility of conducting surprise infiltration tests to enhance the vigilance of monitoring units, similar to the “Thunder Evaluation” mechanism employed by the Ministry of National Defense to test the preparedness of military units against infiltration and sabotage threats. In response, the Coast Guard Administration stated that evaluation drills had been conducted at 13 patrol area command centers by the Education and Training Evaluation Center in 2023 and 2024, totaling 26 times.
The Supervisory Committee of Taiwan believed that the nature of the Coast Guard’s evaluation drills differed from the military’s “Thunder Evaluation” in terms of surprise and urgency, making it difficult to enhance the vigilance of monitoring units and identify surveillance vulnerabilities. The report recommended that the Coast Guard should incorporate concepts of resource management into training, evaluate the feasibility of surprise evaluation drills, and ensure the effectiveness of coastal surveillance mechanisms.
The report mentioned that from June 2024 to May 2025, there were 4 successful infiltration incidents by small Chinese vessels along the northwest coast, indicating the inadequate capacity of coastal monitoring and surveillance units to counter such infiltration strategies, some of which landed near critical infrastructure, posing national security vulnerabilities.
The Supervisory Committee of Taiwan pointed out that reasons for this included the coast guard’s difficulty in tracking small targets like rubber dinghies on coastal radars, inadequate automation in surveillance operations requiring personnel to focus on monitoring for long periods, insufficient deployment of intelligent coastal monitoring systems and infrared imaging systems, and limited recognition distances of optical telescopes on watchtowers, all of which require review to formulate effective countermeasures.
The report highlighted that Taiwan’s coastline is approximately 1,520 kilometers long, with some terrain and topography forming blind spots in surveillance. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are considered essential tools for modern monitoring and response while streamlining manpower. However, the Coast Guard’s procurement and utilization of UAVs were not proactive, with only 16 operational UAVs with a flight endurance of 50 minutes.
Furthermore, the report mentioned that procurement of second-generation UAVs faced difficulties, with each UAV flying for only about 155.5 hours in 2024. For instance, after the infiltration incident at Pengxi River Estuary on September 27 of the same year, only 8 UAV missions were deployed in the adjacent area for a total of 4 days throughout the year. There was also a lack of technological advancement in smart patrolling and mission management, hindering the development of effective monitoring capabilities, prompting the Coast Guard to actively review UAV procurement and utilization.
The report also noted that the use of AIS shipborne transponders coupled with Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) codes allows for vessel identification and positioning. With the increasing intensity of gray zone challenges, many countries have begun to strengthen regulatory measures. While Taiwan’s current regulations mandate AIS installation and MMSI code use on vessels, plans are underway to mandate all national vessels to install AIS and require vessels within territorial waters to activate and maintain normal operation, regardless of nationality.
The Supervisory Committee of Taiwan pointed out the challenges in enforcing these regulations, with many AIS shipborne transponders unable to bind MMSI codes due to the lack of enforcement power by the maritime and fisheries authorities responsible for regulations. They can only seek assistance from the Coast Guard, whose workload is already high when necessary, highlighting the ambiguity in the current maritime traffic safety legal framework and the risks of agency-centered practices, necessitating a review and improvement.
The Supervisory Committee recommended that the Coast Guard Administration, in accordance with Article 14 of the Administrative Procedure Act, should coordinate with relevant agencies under the joint supervision of the Executive Yuan to establish a regular cooperation mode. This is to deter abnormal use or falsification of AIS and MMSI codes to ensure the ability for enemy identification and situational awareness along the nearshore locations.