Japan’s 2025 Defense White Paper recently detailed the current status of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) main military capabilities. One prominent piece of data shows that the PLA Rocket Force’s inventory of Dongfeng-26 medium-range missiles has surged from 140 in 2024 to 250, nearly doubling, while the quantities of Dongfeng-17 and Dongfeng-21 missiles have remained unchanged. Following the purge of the PLA Rocket Force, there seems to be a focus on the Dongfeng-26, for various reasons both internally and externally. Comparatively, other equipment changes within the PLA forces have been minor.
According to past Japan Defense White Papers, in 2020, the PLA’s Dongfeng-26 missile inventory stood at 72, increasing to 110 in 2021, remaining steady through 2022 and 2023, before rising to 140 in 2024, and suddenly spiking to 250 in 2025. In contrast, the inventory of the PLA Rocket Force’s other two medium-range missiles, the Dongfeng-17 and Dongfeng-21, has not seen any changes.
The Dongfeng-17 missile is touted by the PLA as the latest supersonic anti-ship missile with a maximum range of 1,600 kilometers, boasting 2,500 kilometers according to Chinese claims, mainly targeting the US Navy aircraft carrier fleet. It should have been considerably increased in production; however, the inventory remains at 48 missiles in 2025, the same as in 2024.
The PLA Rocket Force seems to put more hope in the Dongfeng-26 missile, showing little interest in the latest Dongfeng-17 missile, which might puzzle observers.
The Dongfeng-21 missile seems to be on the verge of abandonment by the PLA Rocket Force, with its inventory remaining at 24 missiles in 2025, the same as in 2024. The inventory stood at 134 missiles in 2022, decreased to 70 in 2023, further dropped to 24 in 2024, with no change in 2025, only retaining the Dongfeng-21A/E models.
The Dongfeng-21D anti-ship missile, once promoted as the “aircraft carrier killer,” has disappeared for two consecutive years. These changes coincide with the purge of the Rocket Force, indicating that during investigations into corruption, the true performance of the Dongfeng-17 and Dongfeng-21 missiles may have been revealed. Consequently, most of the Dongfeng-21 missile stock has been removed, and the production of Dongfeng-17 missiles has also ceased.
The Dongfeng-26 missile is developed based on the Dongfeng-21, still carrying the large size and weight characteristics of Soviet/Russian missiles. The Dongfeng-26 missile is 14 meters long, 1.4 meters in diameter, and weighs about 20 tons, reminiscent of the recent Iranian missile debris found in Israeli territory, both being large-sized products that are essentially transfer technology from China.
In August 2020, the PLA claimed to have launched two missiles into the South China Sea, one Dongfeng-26 and one Dongfeng-21. However, the US monitored the entire process and stated that a total of four missiles were actually launched, with a Dongfeng-26 from Qinghai and a Dongfeng-21D from Zhejiang. The PLA claimed precise hits, but no target markers were observed in the landing zone in the South China Sea. Some analysis suggests that the PLA actually launched four missiles, with possibly two not reaching the intended target area, which led to the claim of launching only two.
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation is primarily responsible for missile development and production, and in recent years, with officials being ousted, further raising doubts about the true performance of PLA missiles.
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, abbreviated as CAST, is a super large central state-owned enterprise mainly engaged in aerospace industry design, manufacturing, launch, and maintenance. Initially known as the Fifth Research Institute of the Ministry of National Defense, with Qian Xuesen as the first director, their research projects included missiles and carrier rockets. It was restructured in 1999 as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and restructured and renamed in 2017 as the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Limited.
In December 2023, Wu Yansheng, Liu Shiquan, and Wang Changqing were stripped of their qualifications as members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, publicly announced to be ousted. Wu Yansheng was formerly the chairman and party secretary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation; Liu Shiquan was formerly the chairman and party secretary of the China Ordnance Industries Group, and Wang Changqing was formerly the deputy general manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Group.
Wu Yansheng had been working at China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, becoming chairman in 2018. Liu Shiquan had previously served as the general manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Group, before transitioning to the chairman of the China Ordnance Industry Group in May 2022. Wang Changqing had served as the deputy director of the Third Institute of China Aerospace Science and Industry in 2023, before becoming the deputy general manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Group in June 2023. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Group is another super large Chinese state-owned enterprise engaged in the development and production of missiles and aerospace equipment.
After the purge of the PLA Rocket Force, companies involved in missile development and production have suffered, and under the corruption cases, it is inevitable that there will be falsification of missile performance data and even the exposure of useless truths.
In April 2024, Yuan Jie, formerly the general manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and the chairman and party secretary of China Aerospace Science and Industry Group, was dismissed.
Recently, Ma Xingrui, the Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang, was removed from office, citing another appointment, yet there has been no public disclosure of his new position. Ma Xingrui had long worked in the aerospace field, serving as the deputy director of the Fifth Institute of the China Aerospace Corporation in 1996, the deputy general manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation in 1999, the party secretary and general manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation in 2007, then leaving the defense industry in 2013 and entering politics, becoming the governor of Guangdong in 2017, the Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang in 2021, and a member of the Political Bureau at the 20th National Congress of the CPC in 2022.
Yuan Jiagun, another member of the Political Bureau, currently serves as the Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, having previously been the deputy director and director of the Fifth Institute of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. In 2007, he became the deputy general manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, working alongside Ma Xingrui, the general manager.
With two members of the Political Bureau coming from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, the enterprise has also produced a plethora of corrupt officials. The relationship between China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation should be intertwined with the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Equipment Department, and it’s not hard to speculate on the true level of PLA missile capability.
China’s nuclear warhead count has rapidly increased to 500, but the carriers for nuclear weapons have not seen a rapid growth, likely due to difficulties in reaching missile performance standards. The quantity of land-based strategic nuclear missiles in China has remained relatively stable, with the Dongfeng-5 inventory continuing to be 18, the Dongfeng-31 inventory unchanged at 86, while the Dongfeng-41 missile stock has risen from 36 in 2024 to 44 in 2025, only a slight increase.
It is likely that China’s various missile data has been found to be falsified, with most being ordered to cease production. However, the continued substantial increase in production of the Dongfeng-26 is estimated not only due to internal issues but also out of fear of the US military.
China is banking on the Dongfeng-26 missile primarily because of its range, reaching up to 4,000 kilometers, or as China claims, 5,000 kilometers. This might only be achievable with smaller nuclear warheads to reach that range of 5,000 kilometers.
While the accuracy of the Dongfeng-26 missile is not considered high, with a perceived margin of error of about 100 meters, the longer range allows for deployment in inland areas, increasing survivability.
The Dongfeng-17 and Dongfeng-21 missiles, with lesser ranges than the Dongfeng-26, can only be deployed closer to the coastline; otherwise, they face challenges threatening US aircraft carriers. With the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in the Philippines, the fires from this position can cover the PLA Rocket Force missile bases along the southwestern coast of China; US destroyers and submarines can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, along with American bombers carrying AGM-158 long-range missiles, all potentially attacking the Dongfeng-17 and Dongfeng-21 missile bases directly.
With the Dongfeng-26 missile primarily deployed farther from the coastline, avoiding the striking range of the aforementioned US missiles, the US B-2 bombers can penetrate deep into Chinese inland regions for raids, showing how the Rocket Force may still struggle to defend.
The substantial increase in production of the Dongfeng-26 missile is also likely to serve the purpose of deploying them across more diverse bases to avoid total destruction in a single strike by the US military. However, this may exacerbate the problem of a shortage of talent in the PLA Rocket Force; with more dispersed locations for Dongfeng-26 missiles, the corresponding personnel and equipment must be increased simultaneously. Given that China’s technical talent is a scarce resource, this situation may be constraining. Starting this year, the PLA has been emphasizing the recruitment of university students into the military, likely trying to address an urgent need.
The recent US B-2 bomber airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities should alarm the PLA Rocket Force. While the US initiated Operation Midnight Hammer, some B-2 bombers flew to the Western Pacific, effectively sending a warning to China.
The bombing of PLA Rocket Force missile brigade bases by US military aircraft should be relatively easier, with multiple options available. The simplest method would be to destroy the missile launch vehicles in the garages, removing the launch platform for the Dongfeng-26 missiles; other options may include targeting fueling stations, command centers, test sites, barracks, etc., to quickly stop PLA missile attacks.
These facilities are all ground-based, and B-2 bombers attacking these targets would not require bunker-busting bombs; dropping precise 2,000-pound guided bombs can complete the mission. A B-2 bomber can carry 16 such 2,000-pound bombs or 80 500-pound bombs, capable of consecutively attacking several PLA missile brigade bases. Furthermore, a B-2 bomber can carry 16 B-61 tactical nuclear bombs, with one bomb capable of leveling a PLA missile brigade.
If B-2 bombers carried bunker-busting bombs, they could target explosive materials or fuel storage points at PLA missile bases, considered underground facilities but not too deeply embedded, making daily operations above and below ground difficult. Bunker-busting bombs and tactical nuclear weapons are more likely used to strike PLA strategic nuclear missile bases or underground command centers in Beijing and other locations to guarantee one-shot hits.
The US military is currently in the process of developing the B-21 bomber, planning a fleet of 100 primarily tailored for China. If the US perceives that China is preparing for a large-scale attack, it can deploy stealth bomber airstrikes, first demolishing PLA bases, thwarting China’s attack plans. Although China has significantly ramped up production of Dongfeng-26 missiles, the calculations might still fall short, with no other options viable at the moment.
Japan’s 2025 Defense White Paper reveals that China’s J-20 fighter jets increased from 200 in 2024 to 230 in 2025, marking an annual increase of 30 jets. The previous year saw a surge of 60 jets compared to 2023, indicating a slowdown in production likely due to stricter controls by the US and its allies, making it challenging for China to obtain precision machinery and components, including high-end chips.
China’s J-16 fighter jets increased from 292 in 2024 to 312 in 2025, showing a second consecutive year of slowed growth. With Russian military aircraft underperforming in actual combat, China may have lost interest in Russian-style aircraft. China continues to retain imported Su-30 and Su-35 fighters from Russia – 97 and 24 respectively – minimizing their use to extend their service time. The Su-27/J-11 fleet remains steady at 327, suggesting that production lines have likely ceased.
Carrier-based J-15 aircraft increased from 60 in 2024 to 70 in 2025. The Liaoning and Shandong aircraft carriers are now discontinued, with China seemingly not planning to equip these two carriers with more combat aircraft. With the Fujian carrier yet to be delivered, the progress on catapult testing seemingly unsatisfactory, the J-15 jets designated for catapult takeoff are still under development and not yet in mass production.
The touted J-10 fighter jet increased from 588 in 2024 to 608 in 2025, while the H-6K bomber also increased by 10, both experiencing gradual growth. The highly advertised J-35 fighter, introduced in 2024, has no concrete service quantities available at present.
In 2024, China boasted about the new 054B frigates, introducing two into service, followed by the continued production of the 052D destroyers, likely adding three to four new vessels. China also boasted about the 076 amphibious support ship, but it has been tested following its launch and is not yet in service. The submarine count has remained unchanged, and China’s total naval vessels have decreased from 720 in 2024 to 690 in 2025, indicating that some older ships have been decommissioned.
China’s army may still not be receiving the attention it needs, with the quantities of tanks like the 99/A, 96/A, 88A/B decreasing from around 6,050 in 2024 to about 5,950 in 2025. This might be because these tanks, modeled after Soviet/Russian versions, are lagging, and China has not developed new models, so they refrain from procurement. The PLA Marine Corps size has remained at around 40,000 personnel, showing no change, suggesting no immediate readiness for a Taiwan offensive.
While China has significantly ramped up production of Dongfeng-26 missiles, the overall military strength growth has slowed down, likely due to internal chaos. Corruption cases within the PLA and military industrial enterprises have led to revelations about weapon capabilities, realizing the difficulty of resisting destructive strikes from the US military, leaving the so-called “strengthening the military” path directionless.