On May 23, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military announced a politically charged military exercise encircling Taiwan, continuing to expose several vulnerabilities. This exercise involved Taiwan’s outlying islands, including Kinmen and Matsu, indicating that the CCP is well aware that these islands cannot be avoided in a Taiwan invasion. If the CCP fails to quickly capture these outlying islands, the operation to attack Taiwan Island itself may be delayed. Moreover, if the cost of taking over the outlying islands is too high, it will also divert limited resources. Kinmen and Matsu pose a real challenge for the CCP’s planned Taiwan invasion.
Among Taiwan’s outlying islands, Kinmen is the largest. It is only 1.8 kilometers away from the CCP-controlled Jiuyu Island, and Lietyu Island (Little Kinmen) is about 5 kilometers from Xiamen. However, Kinmen is 210 kilometers away from Taiwan Island. Kinmen consists of 12 islands including Kinmen Island, Lietyu Island (Little Kinmen), Dadan, and Erdan, which have gone through practical combat experiences.
In 1949, the CCP’s attempt to land on Kinmen failed; in 1950, the battle to land on Dadan Island next to Kinmen also failed, leading to the island being renamed Dadan Island. These two battles made Chiang Kai-shek realize the importance of Kinmen and dispelled any thoughts of retreating from the island. From August 23, 1958, the CCP initiated artillery bombardment on Kinmen, launching over 57,000 shells on the first day, exceeding the intensity of today’s Russia-Ukraine conflict. It lasted 21 years until 1979 when the CCP officially announced the cessation of shelling on Kinmen, launching a total of 470,000 shells.
At that time, the U.S. military provided Kinmen with 203mm caliber heavy artillery, gaining superiority in counter-artillery warfare and destroying some of the CCP’s artillery, forcing them to retreat. Kinmen’s defenders are still operating 203mm and 240mm caliber heavy artillery provided by the U.S. If the CCP attacks Taiwan, they cannot ignore the deployment of heavy artillery in Kinmen; they must capture Kinmen.
For the CCP, capturing Kinmen is not only a tactical necessity but also a political one. The number of troops the CCP mobilizes to attack Kinmen will determine how quickly they can take it over and also affect how many resources need to be diverted from the Taiwan attack. This poses a headache for CCP military leaders.
In the early morning of October 25, 1949, the CCP’s 10th Corps deployed approximately 19,000 troops in an attempt to attack Kinmen. The first wave of three regiments with over 9,000 troops successfully landed, but over 100 sailing boats were destroyed and only a few ships returned. The second wave could not provide substantial reinforcements. After three days of fighting, about 3,900 out of the initial 9,000 troops were killed, and the rest were captured.
Following internal CCP assessments, it was believed that they would need to transport 40,000 to 50,000 troops with three days’ worth of rations to land and confront the 30,000 defenders on Kinmen, hold the beachhead, and wait for further reinforcement.
Currently, Kinmen’s regular forces have significantly decreased to approximately 3,000 troops, but if the CCP military movements are detected, reinforcements should be readily available. While it is unlikely that Kinmen’s forces will increase to tens of thousands, their firepower now greatly surpasses that of 75 years ago. If the CCP does not deploy tens of thousands of troops, they will have difficulty ensuring a swift conquest.
75 years ago, the CCP’s navy and air force were at a disadvantage, with only the army possessing overall superiority but lacking amphibious landing vessels. Today, the CCP has gained advantages but is faced with the challenge of how many aircraft, warships, missiles, and other resources to mobilize for capturing Kinmen.
The CCP’s missiles may only target a small number or even none on Kinmen because the CCP’s artillery and rocket system already provides sufficient coverage. Back in August 23, 1958, the CCP suddenly launched artillery shelling, with over 57,000 shells on the first day, targeting key points of the Kinmen defenders, resulting in numerous casualties, with over 440 officers and soldiers killed or wounded; at that time, Kinmen had tens of thousands of defenders having dinner, completely unprepared. In the 21-year shelling, a total of 618 military and civilians in Kinmen died, and 2,610 were injured.
This data remains relevant today, suggesting that the initial impact of the CCP’s artillery and rocket attacks may not be as effective. If the Kinmen defenders are timely warned and take cover in advance, the CCP’s shelling effectiveness will decrease significantly. If most of the Kinmen defenders maintain their combat capabilities, the CCP will have a hard time overcoming them.
When the CCP forces are about to land, Kinmen’s tanks and armored vehicles will appear at the shore, subjecting the landing boats to the tank guns, chain guns, and heavy machine guns close-range fire, causing a disaster. The CCP’s soldiers forcing a concentrated assault are likely to encounter landmines planted at the beach and be hit by the 120mm mortars of the Kinmen defenders, resulting in heavy casualties. The first and second waves of attacks may struggle to engage in infantry combat with the Kinmen defenders.
If the CCP troops continue to land in waves, they may occupy some beachheads, but they are only lightly equipped infantry and will face difficulties in both advancing and holding the ground without tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. The CCP’s limited Marine Corps forces and amphibious composite brigades would likely concentrate all their forces in ports far from Kinmen, preparing to attack Taiwan Island. These forces’ amphibious tanks are unlikely to appear in the waters around Kinmen.
The CCP’s limited helicopters are most likely concentrated on Pingtan Island, closest to Taipei, preparing for low-altitude assaults. The support available for the battle around Kinmen may be minimal. The forces attacking Kinmen may not expect support from fighter jets such as the J-16, J-10, and H-6, as these aircraft will likely be busy in the Taiwan Strait conflict; perhaps only the JH-7 might appear, dropping some free-fall bombs but may refrain from launching rocket attacks on marked points, as they risk being targeted by Kinmen’s air defense missiles. The CCP’s large drones are mainly used for transiting the Taiwan Strait, with some small drones possibly used around Kinmen. Kinmen’s drones could also be used to attack the CCP forces.
The CCP’s missile forces, navy, and air force will primarily be focused on the Taiwan Island conflict, with minimal support for the Kinmen battle or even none at all. If the CCP mobilizes resources for Kinmen and suffers losses, their operation to attack Taiwan Island will be severely impacted. The CCP’s army may have to undertake the attacking of Kinmen alone; if they lack sufficient forces, they will be unable to achieve their goals quickly. If they deploy too many troops, it will affect their plan to attack Taiwan Island.
Some of the CCP’s light infantry troops may cross the Taiwan Strait by boat to land at different locations to harass and constrain the Taiwan defenders. If too many are allocated to Kinmen, their presence may have limited effects. The CCP’s deployment of troops and resources for the Kinmen battle will directly impact the speed of capturing Kinmen.
If the CCP’s attack on Kinmen cannot be concluded within 24 or 48 hours, their entire operation to attack Taiwan will be significantly affected, and they will face tremendous political pressure. A repeated assault on Kinmen might turn into another nightmare for the CCP’s military.
The CCP is estimated to simultaneously attack Kinmen and Taiwan Island. If the CCP chooses to take Kinmen first before moving on to Taiwan Island, it would provide the Taiwan defenders with adequate time to prepare. If they simultaneously attack, they will have to divide their forces and allocate limited resources. The CCP might mobilize at least seven out of 13 Group Armies, totaling up to 500,000 troops, to have the capacity to attack Taiwan; deploying only 20,000 to 30,000 troops to attack Kinmen poses risks of failing to promptly occupy it and could lead to another disastrous defeat. Even if they deploy 30,000 to 50,000 troops or more, a substantial proportion of their forces, they may still suffer significant casualties. Even with a bloody victory, their morale will likely take a severe blow.
While the CCP’s large numbers tactic might achieve a beachhead, the light infantry would still need to hold their positions, awaiting temporary pier construction for unloading tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery, leading to protracted urban combat that’s challenging to resolve swiftly. Without deploying significant forces and resources, the Kinmen battle may drag on, putting the CCP in a passive position.
If the CCP attacks Taiwan, they are unlikely to abandon Kinmen. The Kinmen defenders would immediately gain intelligence on the enemy and utilize their giant guns to target the CCP military objectives. The CCP may consider temporarily relinquishing an area of at least several dozen kilometers around Kinmen; however, not utilizing the surrounding coastline to attack Taiwan would seem feasible from a military standpoint but would be politically nonviable for the CCP.
The CCP’s encirclement military exercise around Taiwan, with coast guard ships appearing near Kinmen and Matsu islands, indicates the CCP’s understanding of the strategic importance of these islands.
Matsu Islands consist of 19 islands, with the five main ones being Nangan, Beigan, Dongju, Dongjyu, and Xiju, along with smaller islands like Liang Island, Gaodeng Island, and Daqiu Island. The islands are closest to Fujian’s Beihou Peninsula, approximately 9.25 kilometers away. These islands are about 170 kilometers away from Taiwan.
Nearby ports in Fujian such as Ningde and Yantian would likely serve as the primary gathering points for the CCP’s main landing fleets, with a small number of patrol ships stationed there currently. If the CCP were to attack Taiwan, they would most likely head straight for Taipei. The landing ships, destroyers, and patrol ships stationed in the Zhoushan Islands and Shanghai would have to relocate to Ningde, Yantian, with a few likely being concentrated around Fuzhou to shorten the attack route significantly. These movements would not escape the detection of the Matsu Islands defenders, signaling Taiwan for immediate alerts. If the CCP were to initiate the attack on these small islands first, their entire operation to attack Taiwan would be exposed prematurely.
The total forces in Matsu Islands amount to just over 2,000 soldiers, and though not significant in number, they are armed with 155mm, 105mm cannons, and 120mm, 81mm mortars. Most of the islands have rugged terrains, making them defensible but difficult to attack. The CCP’s amphibious tanks would be of limited use, and securing the islands would be quite challenging.
Gao Deng Island, situated about 9 kilometers from the Fujian coast, covers an area of approximately 1.84 square kilometers and has seen multiple conflicts. In 1951, the CCP sent eight speedboats and over 20 sailing boats to besiege Gao Deng Island, but they were repelled by the defenders. In 1955, the CCP tried to land on Gao Deng Island using sailing boats but was once again repulsed. They subsequently shelled Gao Deng Island multiple times until 1956, with skirmishes continuing in the nearby sea. In 1960, the CCP launched another artillery attack on Gao Deng Island.
If the CCP plans to capture Kinmen and Matsu first before Taiwan Island, the two sides would essentially be back in a state of direct conflict. Any CCP ships approaching within 200 kilometers of Taiwan would face anti-ship missile attacks. These maneuvers would mean the end of the encircling military exercises around Taiwan. Furthermore, the CCP’s aircraft would refrain from crossing the central line of the Taiwan Strait, or risk being shot down by anti-aircraft missiles.
Should the CCP attack Kinmen, Matsu, or Dongsha Island, the United States and its allies would immediately respond to prevent further escalation by possibly establishing no-fly or no-sail zones, restricting CCP military access. The U.S. may also opt to destroy CCP military facilities on South China Sea islands, creating a second front.
The U.S. would coordinate with allies to impose sanctions on the CCP, potentially instituting a maritime blockade. The CCP’s oil supplies would be severed, leading to a significant reduction in imports and exports. The CCP could be removed from the U.S. dollar trading system, and its overseas assets might be frozen. As a result, the Chinese economy would plummet, leaving the CCP with almost no capability to further attack Taiwan Island, leading to a severe internal power crisis and potential internal strife.
The CCP’s recent encirclement military exercise around Taiwan serves as a political propaganda ploy that exceeds the military exercise itself, continuously exposing the CCP military’s “false combat capabilities.” The threats posed towards Taiwan’s outlying islands reflect the ongoing challenges faced by the CCP military in their plans to attack these strategic locations.