Shanghai, known as the most dynamic international metropolitan city in China, is facing widespread attention on social media in recent days as its birth rate has dropped to one of the lowest levels globally, with predictions that it will gradually move towards a “disconnection” situation. Questions like “Where have the local Shanghai people gone?” and “Why can’t we hear Shanghai dialect on the streets anymore?” reflect the deep-seated challenges the city faces in terms of its population structure and cultural heritage, indicating a pessimistic expectation of losing its future vitality.
According to the latest data released by the Shanghai Health Commission, the total fertility rate in Shanghai was only 0.6 in 2023, setting one of the lowest records globally. This means that Shanghai’s fertility rate is less than a third of the replacement level. Although it slightly increased to 0.72 in 2024, it still falls far below the internationally recognized 2.1 needed to maintain the replacement level, making it one of the lowest globally. Shanghai has been deeply trapped in a “low fertility rate trap.”
Not only is this a problem unique to Shanghai, but China’s population data also raises red flags: in 2023, China’s total fertility rate was significantly below the “highly sensitive warning line” of 1.5. Once the total fertility rate remains below 1.5 for an extended period, there is a risk of the overall economic and social development falling into a “low fertility rate trap.”
Of particular note is that the recent slight increase in China’s fertility rate is largely due to the cumulative effect of the comprehensive two-child policy, where previously restrained reproductive desires were concentrated and released in the short term, which is not a sustainable long-term trend.
The natural growth rate of Shanghai’s household population has shown negative growth for several consecutive years. According to official Shanghai data, at the end of 2023, the annual number of births in the resident population was 98,000, with a birth rate of 3.95‰; while there were 158,000 deaths, with a death rate of 6.37‰. In 2024, the number of births increased to 118,000, with a birth rate of 4.75‰; and deaths were 156,000, with a death rate of 6.28‰. The natural population growth rate has remained negative.
Moreover, in 2024, among the resident population of Shanghai, the proportion of first births was as high as 70.2%, while the rate for second births was only 25.4%, and the rate for third births was extremely low, indicating that “having fewer children” or even “not having children” has become the mainstream choice.
Financial experts like “He Yafu Garden” and financial blogger “Little Coffee Talk” have collectively revealed multiple factors behind the reluctance of young people in Shanghai to marry and have children:
High housing prices: As one of the cities with the highest housing prices in China, housing pressure is a major factor discouraging many couples of childbearing age from having children.
High urbanization rate: Urban residents generally have lower fertility rates compared to rural residents, and in Shanghai, which is highly urbanized, this feature is particularly evident.
Delayed childbearing age: The average age at first childbirth for Shanghai registered women has been continuously pushed back, from 29.01 years in 2015 to 31.66 years in 2023, significantly narrowing the fertility window for women.
Decline in marriage rates: According to the “Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2023,” the number of marriage registrations in Shanghai dropped from 149,500 couples in 2013 to 72,000 couples in 2022, directly impacting childbirth rates.
Comprehensive social pressures: In addition to economic factors, a series of comprehensive factors including social environment, cultural pressure, education stress, elder care burdens, and the lack of experience in managing marriage for only children have collectively suppressed young people’s desire for childbirth.
“Little Coffee Talk” points out that among the Shanghai “post-50s” generation he knows, many of their children, aged around 40, either not married or married but have no intention of having children, and even less than half are willing to have a third generation. More despairingly, many young people around 40 no longer date, let alone get married and have children.
He laments that the post-50s and post-60s generations, who had large numbers of siblings, have raised a generation of young people who are single and likely to have no descendants. This means that as the post-50s, post-60s, and post-70s generations age, many of them will face their later years without grandchildren or children by their side. In the future, they will have to rely on nursing homes and care facilities to complete their final journey. Furthermore, many post-70s Shanghai residents even support their children not getting married or having children, believing it will cause less trouble and pain.
“The pressure of marriage, house buying, child rearing, education, workplace, the lack of marriage experience for only children; almost all burdens are concentrated on the shoulders of young people. Therefore, more and more young people choose not to marry, not to have children, and even not to date. This could lead Shanghai towards a ‘disconnected’ situation.”
With the continuing negative natural population growth and low fertility rates, Shanghai’s urban population structure is undergoing a significant change. This is reflected not only in the slowing replenishment rate of young people, but also in the exacerbation of urban aging (by 2025, it is projected that 20% of Shanghai’s population will be over 65 years old), which directly impacts the city’s cultural landscape.
On social media, many people lament that they hear less and less of the Shanghai dialect, and that the “old Shanghai flavor” is disappearing. Behind this, blogger “Little Coffee Talk” mentions several major trends:
Population suburbanization driven by demolitions: While large-scale demolitions have brought compensation, they have also pushed local people who were originally concentrated in the city center to the suburbs, breaking the traditional warmth and neighborhood bonds of the alleyways, and replacing them with alienation and unfamiliarity brought by concrete high-rises.
Influx and assimilation of “New Shanghai Residents”: In order to fill the population gap, Shanghai’s household registration system is expected to further relax, attracting more talents from outside. However, whether they are highly educated professionals or ordinary workers, once they settle in Shanghai, their desire for childbirth will assimilate to Shanghai’s extremely low level, ultimately causing “whether they are locals or new Shanghai residents, they will become Shanghai people who do not want to have children.”
Rise of female independence: The unmarried rate among Shanghai registered women remains high, with local women being more willing to remain single, reflecting a growing sense of independence from societal pressures to marry.
“Same-ness” in urban culture: As old alleyways, stone gate houses, corner shops, and traditional breakfast places gradually disappear, being replaced by national and chain restaurants, and even local Shanghainese children speaking Shanghai dialect less and less, the unique cultural fabric of the city is being diluted, potentially leading to a “thoroughly immigrant, hollowed-out supercity.”
This dramatic shift in population structure also heralds a massive social change — the intergenerational transfer of wealth.
“Little Coffee Talk” points out that as the generation with accumulated wealth of the post-50s, post-60s, and post-70s ages, their real estate, savings, and stocks will be inherited at a staggering pace. This “multi-trillion-yuan” wealth transfer, covering over 50% of the population, could have repercussions akin to a large-scale war. Solitary elderly individuals may even need to seek care from “distant nephews,” with underlying family disputes and significant structural changes in society.
Shanghai, as China’s largest city, is witnessing astonishing acceleration towards aging. According to data from the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, by the end of 2023, the number of elderly people aged 60 and above with Shanghai household registration had reached 5.8156 million, meaning that there is one elderly person for every approximately 2.56 registered Shanghainese individuals.
Apart from the high number of elderly people, the population of individuals aged 80 and above is also rapidly increasing, with the figure reaching 860,000.
The aging population in the Hongkou District is particularly severe, with the proportion of elderly people exceeding 45%. The situation is not much better in Chongming District, where the outflow of non-local residents is especially acute, leaving behind mostly aging native Shanghainese individuals, further burdening an already heavy eldercare load.
A recent report by the “Sanlian Weekly” revealed that the life expectancy of Shanghai’s permanent residents is 83.18 years. This implies that many individuals will face the end of their parents’ lives before or after retirement, meaning that when they are in their fifties and sixties, just as they are retiring and entering middle age, they are also burdened with the heavy responsibility of caring for their aging parents.
“Shanghai is just the forerunner, the patient showing symptoms first. The entire China is being pushed towards the same outcome by the same set of economic and social logic.”
The “low fertility and aging” phenomenon in Shanghai is not an isolated case; it is just the harbinger of the overall population dilemma in China. According to statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs, the number of marriage registrations nationwide fell below 7 million pairs in 2023, reaching a new low since 1978, and halving compared to the peak period in 2013 with 13.46 million pairs.
In 2024, the number of marriage registrations in China dropped to 6.106 million, which is a key reason why many people are pessimistic about the birth rate in 2025.
Blogger “Little Coffee Talk” analyzes that behind this trend lie a combination of economic conditions, high housing prices, unstable job market, rising living costs, mental stress, and education anxiety.
He predicts that in the future, China may face challenges such as widespread population decline, urban hollowing out, and even economic stagnation or negative growth. This dilemma will start from the streets of Shanghai and gradually spread to every city in the country. “With the absence of children’s cries, the absence of wedding celebrations, and the emergence of more empty-nesters, more solitary young individuals, and increasingly quiet, desolate streets — the loss of this fundamental confidence is starting from the streets of Shanghai and spreading across cities nationwide.”