【Epoch Times News, July 31, 2025】The Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party held a meeting on July 30th, where it exceptionally listed “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” “Three Represents,” “Scientific Development Concept,” and “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” in the meeting communiqué, collectively serving as the guiding principles for the “15th Five-Year Plan” period. The meeting also mentioned traditional ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. This comprehensive listing has sparked high attention to the internal power struggles within the CCP.
Some scholars pointed out that given the recent emphasis on “Xi Jinping Thought” in top CCP documents, this move is unusual, indicating a potential adjustment in the party’s internal propaganda focus, intending to downplay the exclusive status of “Thought on the New Era.” The documents also suggest that Xi Jinping is facing pressure from within the party and is no longer insisting on his personal “thought.”
The 20th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP, originally scheduled for the fall of 2024, has been repeatedly postponed. According to Xinhua News Agency, the Political Bureau meeting decided to hold the Fourth Plenary Session in October 2025, delaying it by a full year. An informed political figure in Beijing revealed that there’s ongoing controversy at the top level regarding the direction of the plenary session, with many current and retired officials expressing dissatisfaction with the current economic difficulties, calling for Xi Jinping to focus more on pragmatic development and “less on struggles.”
The source stated, “The re-inclusion of ideological systems from the Deng, Jiang, and Hu eras in this announcement is a result of Xi’s compromise. The Fourth Plenary Session report may potentially absorb some reform and opening-up thoughts.”
In response, Zhang Chengxi, a researcher of CCP party history, mentioned in an interview with Epoch Times on July 31 that although the 20th National Congress of the CCP had mentioned the governing ideologies of Deng, Jiang, and Hu, since 2023, important official documents have mostly retained the expression of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Zhang noted that in 2024, Premier Li Keqiang’s government work report only mentioned Deng Xiaoping as the architect of reform and opening up, no longer referencing Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. This demonstrates Xi Jinping’s intention to distance himself from his predecessors and emphasize his personal standing, causing dissatisfaction amongst retired party members and elders, including individuals like Zhu Rongji and Li Ruihuan. Thus, Xi Jinping had to make concessions.
Zhang opined that the naming of the ideologies of past leaders in this meeting is a signal that Xi Jinping Thought is facing challenges within the party, indicating that the top level may be reserved in its support for his governance direction.
He pointed out that during the closed-door Third Plenary Session last year, Xi Jinping encountered differing voices within the party, so this adjustment may be a forced response. “The elders and technocrats hope to return to the governance model of the Hu-Wen era. Although Xi Jinping may not be willing, he has to compromise temporarily. This is the general trend, as stated by Li Keqiang before leaving office when he told his colleagues, ‘The Yellow River and the Yangtze River will not reverse.'”
Analysts also suggest that facing internal and external challenges, a declining economy, and weak public confidence, Xi Jinping may be trying to restore policy continuity and party “legitimacy” by revisiting past governing ideologies.
Feng, a Chinese issues researcher in the United States who focuses on internal party affairs and political reform, said, “In recent years, CCP policies have been highly centered around Xi Jinping’s personal thought, almost marginalizing the ideologies of other leaders. However, with local fiscal constraints, foreign capital withdrawal, and declining social confidence, the central leadership may realize the need to unite all parties, thereby reintroducing the governing lines of Deng, Jiang, and Hu, signaling unity or harmony.”
He added, “However, the current situation in China is vastly different from the Jiang-Hu era. During that time, Sino-American relations were close, and foreign investors actively entered the country; whereas now, it’s more about closure, scrutiny, risk avoidance, and the loss of capital confidence.”
In the meeting communiqué, there were also mentions of “supporting economically strong provinces to lead the way,” “advancing ‘double’ construction,” and “boosting consumption special actions,” emphasizing the effective utilization of development opportunities, potential, and advantages. Mr. Guo, a political scholar at a university in Beijing, stated that while these policy wordings do not directly return to the previous governing principles, they resonate with Hu Jintao’s era focus on “coordinated regional development and emphasis on growth quality.”
Guo believed that this indicates the fading of the core features of the “New Era” discourse. “While Xi Jinping’s name is still emphasized, the language structure and policy focus of the communiqué have changed from before.”
Chang Yang, a scholar currently in Japan, commented during an interview, stating, “This may not be a complete denial of the New Era thought but appears more like a policy harmony and theoretical ‘patching’ amid a complex situation. Constructing new legitimacy within the party may be a more practical goal. However, regardless, it indicates Xi Jinping’s delicate situation.”
Although the emphasis on past governing ideologies in this meeting has stirred public attention, some observers caution that if the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session and the planning for the “15th Five-Year Plan” do not bring substantive policy adjustments but only rely on symbolic homage at the discourse level, it may be challenging to reverse the broad distrust brought about by the current economic and governance challenges.
