Epoch Times reported exclusively recently on the internal structure, personnel, and operating mode of the Chinese Communist Party’s Ministry of State Security Bureau 10th Department (referred to as State Security Bureau), exposing its deep infiltration overseas. Experts analyzed that internal fighting within the CCP is interwoven, revealing the root of the threats posed by CCP agents and asserting that those who serve the CCP tyranny will not have a good ending.
The article, written by senior researcher Feng Zheng in the field of CCP intelligence, dissects the State Security Bureau 10th Department, responsible for overseas espionage under the guise of “foreign defense and reconnaissance,” providing alerts, interventions, and suppression of overseas Chinese communities, exile dissidents, and external threats. In recent years, numerous countries worldwide have exposed the CCP’s large-scale surveillance, transnational pressures against overseas Chinese communities and dissident groups, and even election interference activities related to the State Security Bureau.
Feng’s article reveals that the personnel of the 10th Department are just a part of the CCP’s large army of overseas spies, estimated to be around 40,000 people globally, spread throughout Chinese communities worldwide.
The 10th Department covers counter-espionage, political security, and intelligence collection. Officially stated as “overseeing and monitoring Chinese personnel of overseas institutions (such as embassies, enterprises, student associations) and investigating activities of hostile or reactionary organizations abroad.” Its responsibilities involve protective security and offensive counter-subversion.
The article points out that in preventing CCP officials or citizens from defecting or leaking secrets overseas, the CCP’s State Security Bureau 9th Department (internal defense and reconnaissance) is responsible for similar protection domestically, while the 10th Department extends its reach overseas. While not primarily responsible for economic and technological intelligence collection, the 10th Department may gather economic and technological intelligence through overseas channels.
In terms of undercover operations, CCP State Security officers operate overseas under official covers (diplomatic, media, scholars) or unofficial covers (business people, travelers). The 1st Department of the State Security Bureau manages the “Secret Line” (unofficial covers), the 2nd Department manages the “Open Line” (diplomatic covers), and the 10th Department utilizes both.
Regarding surveillance and wiretapping, the 10th Department can utilize CCP’s technical department for monitoring overseas targets.
In engaging in undermining or intimidating overseas critics, the State Security Bureau 10th Department works alongside the CCP United Front Work Department, which influences overseas Chinese communities through “soft” measures (cultural activities, alumni associations, commercial contacts). The 10th Department secretly monitors and intervenes when necessary.
The author concludes that the overall evidence indicates that Chinese intelligence activities involving overseas Chinese or dissidents are mostly related to the 10th Department. Notable incidents include the case of Wang Shujun in New York, Lu Jianwang’s attempt to undermine Xiong Yan’s election campaign, and the case involving Xu Yanjun, deputy director of Jiangsu Provincial Security Department, accused of stealing aviation technology.
The 10th Department also possesses extreme capabilities such as cross-border abduction violating the laws of host countries. Feng Zheng expressed that this reflects Beijing’s top-level directive of using all means to eliminate threats.
If family members of dissidents are threatened in China, the 10th Department can collaborate with the Ministry of Public Security to apply pressure. If Canadian student groups plan protests, the 10th Department can deploy network unit hackers to attack WeChat groups while receiving reports from internal informants about the planned protests.
Feng Zheng pointed out that the State Security Bureau’s 10th Department can even directly influence foreign policy decisions. If the 10th Department reports that a foreign exile group within a certain country plans to protest against the CCP, Beijing might adjust its diplomatic strategy towards that country, exert pressure to limit dissidence, or provide economic incentives in exchange for cooperation.
Former CCP spy Eric previously disclosed some operational insights of the State Security Bureau’s 10th Department, including how the organization directly accesses user data from platforms such as WeChat, Douyin, TikTok, systematically monitoring overseas Chinese, students, and dissenters.
In a recent interview with Epoch Times, Eric stated that the 10th Department primarily handles highly sensitive political cases and enjoys priority in resource allocation.
Researcher Shen Mingshi from the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Studies told Epoch Times that in recent years, the CCP has expanded its overseas presence significantly, not only in intelligence collection but also in countering intelligence activities, similar to a counterintelligence unit that focuses mainly on foreign matters. The State Security Bureau’s 10th Department seems to be positioned above other units, indicating the expansion of its authority under Xi Jinping’s leadership.
Since CCP leader Xi Jinping’s ally, Chen Yixin, took charge of the State Security Bureau in October 2022, the previously low-key State Security Bureau began making high-profile statements, frequently discussing “national security issues” in diplomatic and economic areas within China, drawing attention.
Feng Zheng’s article indicates that multiple State Security Bureau departments often participate concurrently in cases; for example, if the 10th Department identifies overseas student activists, the 9th Department immediately monitors their domestic relatives. The 11th Department (intelligence research and analysis), represented by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, may provide research reports on overseas Chinese for the 10th Department.
The 10th Department collaborates with CCP military intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Public Security, the Central United Front Work Department, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, utilizing resources from Chinese enterprises or private institutions. Large state-owned enterprises provide cover and logistical support in countries participating in the “Belt and Road” initiative, among other activities.
Nevertheless, Shen Mingshi believes that CCP intelligence units also vie for credit and favor among themselves. “Compared to the Ministry of Public Security or other intelligence units, the 10th Department has more resources and may expand rapidly, leading to abuse. Due to vicious competition, there have been scandals that have not yet been made public.”
Shen Mingshi cited the example of former Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu’s visit to the Czech Republic, where the CCP attempted to provoke an incident that ultimately failed. This incident may be related to malicious competition among the Ministry of Public Security, State Security Bureau, and military intelligence agencies of the CCP.
During Annette Lu’s visit to the Czech Republic in March last year, she was followed by a military attaché from a CCP embassy, nearly causing a car accident. The Czech military intelligence agency confirmed monitoring CCP intelligence units attempting destructive actions against protected individuals. Czech media reported that one proposed action at the time was for a CCP official to collide with the vehicle carrying Annette Lu. Subsequently, the CCP diplomat ran a red light to continue following the Taiwanese delegation.
According to Feng Zheng’s article, the CCP’s official response to Taiwan affairs and control of military intelligence predominates, with the State Security Bureau also involved. The 10th Department may handle anti-subversion activities related to Taiwan overseas, monitoring so-called Taiwan independence movements and influencing Taiwanese nationals.
The CCP State Security Bureau has previously been accused of stoking infighting. Independent commentator Cai Shunkun told Epoch Times that the current State Security Bureau Minister, Chen Yixin, is closely associated with Xi Jinping. At 66 years old, he is eager to perform well, seek recognition, and possibly rise to a deputy ministerial level. Chen Yixin’s influence in the State Security Bureau has grown under Xi Jinping’s reliance, causing conflicts with Wang Xiaohong, who oversees the Ministry of Public Security. There is dissatisfaction within the State Security Bureau over Chen Yixin’s directives.
Feng Zheng’s article underscores that the State Security Bureau’s 10th Department is a crucial force in the CCP’s international covert operations, particularly in influencing foreign societies through Chinese overseas communities. It is an indispensable part of the CCP’s national security machinery, extending authoritarian control beyond its borders.
Australian legal scholar Yuan Hongbing told Epoch Times that Feng Zheng’s article reveals the dangers of the State Security Bureau, but the underlying threat posed by the CCP’s State Security Bureau must be examined from the fundamental nature of the CCP’s tyranny.
Yuan Hongbing expressed that from a Marxist perspective, the Communist Party is a ghost with an evil political gangster soul. Currently, the CCP’s national strategy is as proclaimed by Marx in the Communist Manifesto, aiming to achieve global dominance, specifically seeking ownership of the entire world and humanity’s destiny.
Yuan Hongbing stated that under Xi Jinping, especially after his reelection at the 20th Congress, establishing Communist totalitarian global expansion as a predominant strategy has occurred due to the ongoing comprehensive crisis facing this dictatorial regime.
Yuan Hongbing emphasized that the CCP is an enemy of the free world and humanity, with a dire fate awaiting them, for their current actions represent a frenzy leading to doomsday. “After the collapse of the CCP tyranny, those spies who committed anti-human crimes for the CCP will face the most tragic consequences.”
According to information disclosed by former CCP spy Eric, currently exiled in Australia, many within the CCP’s espionage system “have lost faith in the CCP” and wish to defect. Those who cannot leave will harbor anti-CCP sentiments, either leading a passive life pretending or facing imprisonment.