Revealing the danger of the CCP’s illegal transportation of Iranian oil in a dark oil tanker accident.

On July 19, the Chinese-owned oil tanker “Ceres I,” believed to be carrying Iranian crude oil, collided and caught fire with another tanker, the “Hafnia Nile,” in the waters off Malaysia in the South China Sea. The incident caused severe damage to both vessels and injuries to the crew. Despite the passing of more than a month since the event, the Chinese Communist Party’s covert operations using the “Ceres I” to import oil from sanctioned countries like Iran continue to draw attention. Experts warn that such practices pose dangers to international maritime vessels.

The “Ceres I” departed from Iran, unloaded cargo at the port of Ningbo in China, and then headed back to the Middle East. Tracking data shows that the “Ceres I” had made several similar round trips in the past year but failed to complete this particular journey.

Although Malaysian authorities claimed that the collision involving the “Ceres I” was due to a “technical malfunction,” the Washington Post quoted shipping and energy analysts suggesting another explanation: the vessel exhibited a false location on its maritime positioning system prior to the collision.

Operated by Shanghai Prosperity Ship Management in Shanghai, the “Ceres I” is now owned and managed by the Hong Kong-based company “Ceres Shipping Limited.” According to the Washington Post, the “Ceres I” is part of the “dark” tanker fleet, which is known for violating international regulations by transporting oil from sanctioned countries to meet China’s demand.

China, being the world’s largest oil importer, relies heavily on oil imports from countries like Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, which are under strict US sanctions.

Analysts point out that to bypass Western financial systems and shipping services, China depends on a fleet of aging and substandard tankers engaged in illegal operations, posing an increasing threat to maritime security worldwide. The “Ceres I” is a typical representative of this “dark” fleet, having been in operation since its launch in 2001, surpassing the typical operational lifespan of 15 to 20 years mandated for safety reasons by tanker operators. In the past five years, the vessel has flown four different flags, with the most recent one being from São Tomé and Príncipe, known for its lax regulations.

While China denies importing sanctioned oil, it defends its trade with countries like Iran under sanctions. The Chinese Embassy in Washington spokesperson Liu Pengyu stated, “China conducts normal energy cooperation with other countries in accordance with international law, which is legitimate.”

According to Reuters, Michelle Wiese Bockmann, the chief analyst at Lloyd’s List Intelligence, emphasized that the area where the “Ceres I” was anchored on July 19 is commonly used by the “dark” fleet to transfer Iranian oil, in violation of US sanctions. She noted that the “Ceres I” had been repeatedly involved in transferring or transporting Iranian oil in violation of US sanctions.

Maritime experts revealed that in recent years, the tanker had also been involved in transporting Venezuelan oil to China, despite Venezuela being under US sanctions.

Ian Ralby, a maritime governance senior researcher at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies, highlighted that incidents like the collision involving the “Ceres I” are not a matter of if but when they occur. Ralby warned that had the “Ceres I” not offloaded its oil before the collision, a catastrophe could have unfolded.

The Chinese owners of the “Ceres I” did not respond to the Washington Post’s requests for comments.

Vessels are required to openly disclose their accurate positions via the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to prevent collisions. However, the International Maritime Organization reported that “dark” tankers manipulate or falsify their positions on the AIS (a process known as spoofing) for illegal navigation, posing significant safety risks in national waters.

At 3:55 a.m. on July 19, the “Ceres I” ceased transmitting its location through the AIS system before colliding with the “Hafnia Nile.”

Despite Malaysian authorities claiming that the “Ceres I” had a technical issue and was anchored in international waters off the east coast of Malaysia, with the “Hafnia Nile” attempting to avoid it but failing, the Washington Post, citing three shipping analysts tracking the movement of the “Ceres I,” raised significant doubts about this explanation.

Bockmann, the chief analyst at Lloyd’s List Intelligence, questioned why the “Hafnia Nile” failed to evade the “Ceres I” if the latter had already dropped anchor and transmitted its true position. She noted that prior to the collision, the “Hafnia Nile” was sailing at 14 knots, near its maximum speed, indicating a lack of awareness of another vessel obstructing its path.

Hafnia, the owner of the “Hafnia Nile,” declined to respond to the Washington Post’s inquiries, citing an ongoing investigation. Dimitris Ampatzidis, a risk and compliance analyst at the maritime analysis company Kpler, suggested that the “Ceres I” likely continued to deceive others about its location, hampering the “Hafnia Nile’s” ability to detect it.

He pointed out that the AIS data transmitted by the “Ceres I” in the days leading up to the collision showed irregular gaps and displayed patterns consistent with deceptive behavior, including sudden turns and long linear paths within a concentrated area.