In recent months, the Chinese Communist Party’s national security department has been frequently reporting on espionage cases that were once taboo. The latest official announcement indicates that retired individuals from classified units are still engaging in activities such as failing to keep secrets, leaking classified information, and selling intelligence to overseas entities even after retirement. This signals that the authorities are extending their secrecy management measures to include retired individuals. As of November 10, 2025, at least 12 similar cases have been publicly disclosed this year.
On November 9, the Chinese National Security Department (referred to as the Ministry of State Security) issued a notice through its official WeChat account, highlighting instances of retired personnel from classified units being involved in mishandling and leaking classified information in recent years. The public was reminded that “secrecy is of utmost importance” and even after leaving their posts, individuals should “always maintain a high level of secrecy.”
The bulletin cited various common mindsets, such as “I just brought some documents home to organize, how could that lead to a leak?” and “It’s been years since retirement, these old materials are useless, why would anyone care?” The Ministry of State Security stated that these “dangerous misconceptions” serve as breeding grounds for the risk of leaks.
The report mentioned a retired individual from a classified unit, Mr. Cheng, who contacted a foreign intelligence agency several times to provide top-secret and confidential national secrets in order to assist his children in obtaining study visas. According to the report, Mr. Cheng was eventually sentenced to imprisonment for espionage and deprived of political rights by the court. This case is considered one of the typical examples this year of retired personnel selling intelligence to foreign entities.
A retired civil servant, Mr. Li, who previously worked in a central department, told reporters that some personnel from sensitive positions retain old documents and contact networks even after leaving the system. “Many people think it’s fine to keep documents at home, believing that it’s not a violation. The scrutiny has become increasingly stringent, even old documents are within the realm of classified information.” He added that current regulations stipulate that cadre-level retirees are not allowed to leave the country within three years of retirement.
Mr. Li also mentioned that senior cadres in the public security and judicial system are prohibited from leaving the country for three years after retirement, while bureau-level leaders or senior military retirees cannot apply to leave the country within eight years, and even after eight years, their departure is not guaranteed. He emphasized that these rules are enforced more strictly in practice than on paper, with many retired personnel who have dealt with classified information being continuously monitored and reviewed.
Another interviewee, Ms. Wang, who worked in a local state-owned enterprise and is well-versed in the security clearance system, noted that the scrutiny process after retirement has significantly intensified in recent years. “Previously, one could simply submit an application to go abroad, but now it requires approval from the unit, supervisory department, and then national security review. Many people end up giving up. Even family visit reasons often demand detailed itineraries, contacts, and sources of funding.” She pointed out that this extended management to retirement stages has effectively established a “lifelong confidentiality responsibility system,” including communication monitoring and regular inspections.
The National Security Department highlighted in the report that the violations of retired personnel from classified units have shown a diverse trend, including unauthorized retention of classified documents, unauthorized carrying of classified equipment, and contact with foreign entities. Some personnel have misconceptions such as “no longer restricted after retirement” and “expired documents are irrelevant,” leading to incidents of information leaks, exposing weak awareness of secrecy and regulatory gaps.
Apart from the mentioned case, this year has seen a high frequency of reports from the National Security Department. In April, there was a case involving an employee of a classified research unit carrying technical data abroad; in August, a report surfaced about a retired military industry worker storing classified data on personal computers and uploading it to the cloud; on October 8th, it was revealed that an employee of a large enterprise provided sensitive information to foreign entities out of personal grievance; and on the 12th, it was disclosed that overseas intelligence agencies were using the guise of “travel bloggers” to entice domestic personnel to collect military and geographical information. The report on November 9 unveiled the behavior of retired personnel selling top-secret information to foreign entities.
From January 2025 to November 10, the National Security Department has publicly disclosed at least 12 cases involving leaks and spy activities. These reports cover various areas such as infiltration of foreign intelligence, technological surveillance, information manipulation via social media, and violations of classified personnel, showing that the department’s governance over public opinion and information security is continuously strengthening. The scope of its contents has been gradually expanded from active personnel to corporate employees, academic groups, internet users, and retirees.
A Chinese public policy researcher, Mr. Liu Ming (pseudonym), told reporters, “One of the focal points of the national security department in recent years has been to prevent classified information from flowing out of the system. Retired personnel are seen as a potential risk group due to their frequent contact with external parties, indicating that the authorities are institutionalizing post-retirement supervision.”
In recent years, the Chinese official media has repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining confidentiality and security. Since 2024, the National Security Department has been issuing warnings about classified risks, urging government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and research institutions to establish a “list of retired personnel with classified information” system and conduct regular checks on those who have left their posts. Security management departments have also implemented pilot programs for “classified post-retirement review” in some provinces and cities, requiring individuals to complete handover of classified documents and cancel network accounts before proceeding with their retirement procedures.
Analysts point out that the intensified public disclosure of such cases is part of the systematic propaganda efforts of the Chinese Communist Party for “national security standardization,” demonstrating that the authorities are integrating secrecy management into the normal scope of social governance. While these reported cases are individual incidents, they convey the government’s high-pressure stance in dealing with classified and information security issues, shaping a political atmosphere of collective “secrecy consciousness” among the populace.