Recently, six students from Northeastern University tragically fell into a flotation tank and died during a visit to a mining plant in Inner Mongolia. This incident has once again brought attention to the ongoing workplace safety accidents in China. The tragedy not only saddened the loss of six young lives but also exposed issues such as corporate safety management loopholes, problems with university internship organizations, and deep-rooted regulatory deficiencies.
On July 23, at 10:20 in the morning, the six students from Northeastern University were visiting the Wunugutu Mountain Copper-Molybdenum Ore Dressing Plant operated by the Inner Mongolia Mining Co., Ltd. of China Gold Group. They were standing on the grid plate of the flotation tank when the entire grid suddenly detached, causing all six individuals to fall into the slurry pool below.
According to reports from mainland media, upon hearing the sound of students falling into the flotation tank, on-site workers took rescue measures. They immediately shut down the flotation machine and informed the control room to stop all equipment. One teacher managed to hold onto the bracket above the flotation tank without it falling. The workers on-site completely “lifted” the grid plate above the teacher before rescuing him.
About 38 minutes after the incident occurred, at 10:58, the company’s mine emergency team arrived at the scene. Approximately an hour later, at 12:01, the first fallen individual was rescued, followed by the last person at 12:40. Unfortunately, all six students who fell had already perished.
The victims were students from the Mineral Processing Engineering program at the School of Resources and Civil Engineering at Northeastern University. They were all third-year undergraduate students aged between 20 and 22 and were participating in an internship organized by the university.
Experts explain that flotation tanks are mainly used to separate ores from waste rocks. The slurry inside the flotation tank is typically of high density, similar to a swamp, and contains highly toxic chemicals. Once someone falls in, they must be rescued quickly as the slurry can block their airways leading to drowning. Moreover, there are impellers inside the flotation tank, posing a high risk of being hit by them if someone falls in.
A parent of one of the deceased students, using the pseudonym Hao Jin, told a news outlet that when they saw the children’s bodies at the funeral home, their appearances were well-preserved, indicating they likely suffocated in the slurry.
On the afternoon of July 25, several mainland media outlets visited the involved ore dressing plant for interviews. When asked why the emergency team arrived 38 minutes after the incident, Zhao Chunbo, the Deputy General Manager in charge of safety production at Inner Mongolia Mining, explained that the first priority was to shut down the equipment, initiate immediate rescue operations, and inform nearby workers. Following an accident, the factory manager of that level must notify the emergency team, then inform the company’s senior leadership, including the chairman, to deliberate on whether to activate a major emergency plan.
According to Zhao Chunbo, the visiting group consisted of 58 people, including 51 students, 4 teachers, and 3 staff members responsible for explanations.
In terms of rescue difficulty, experts indicate that with the presence of slurry in the flotation tank, rescue personnel need to wear professional protective gear. The difficulty in rescue operations is significant due to low visibility underwater, making manual retrieval nearly impossible.
A member of an emergency hazardous chemical rescue team, using the pseudonym Yuan, told Red Star News that the first step in an emergency is to stop the equipment operation, immediately press the emergency stop button on the flotation machine to halt the impeller’s rotation inside the tank to prevent mechanical injuries to fallen individuals. Furthermore, notifying the control room to stop the machine and then calling professional rescue teams promptly.
Yuan explained that rescue personnel must wear long-tube breathing apparatus and full-body protective gear to prevent damage from corrosive chemicals in the slurry. They should also wear safety harnesses to ensure their own safety. Special lifting equipment like small cranes and pulley sets can be used for rescue operations, with the assistance of sturdy ropes, net bags, and other tools to retrieve fallen individuals. If conditions allow, utilizing equipment like a suction pump to extract some slurry to reduce the rescue difficulty is possible but carries the risk of causing secondary harm to personnel.
Another member of the emergency hazardous chemical rescue team, using the pseudonym An, believed that the emergency rescue team arrived too late. According to regulations, upon receiving an accident report, the team should dispatch within 1 minute and be on-site within 5 minutes.
The focus of this incident was on the grid plate. Installing these openwork components was initially intended to facilitate workers’ observation of the slurry beneath.
According to mainland media reports, these steel grid plates are approximately 1 meter wide and 1.5 meters long each, arranged in a row and joined together, with trough steel cross beams supporting them, and adjacent plate edges sharing a common slot steel beam. Each square meter of these grid plates can bear about 500 kilograms. Workers mentioned that these grid plates were welded on using spot welding, and a total of five such grid plates fell during the incident.
On the afternoon of July 24, Northeastern University disclosed in a Preliminary Accident Investigation Report that the primary cause of the incident was determined to be the outdated fatigue cracks in one of the fixed angle steel welds of the steel grid plate (specification of 1.2m×3m), which failed due to concentrated loads that day, resulting in the entire grid plate flipping and falling off. Zhao Chunbo stated that the specific reasons would be subject to further investigation by the subsequent investigation team.
Li Shi, a project manager engaged in civil construction at a chemical plant, analyzed on Pengpai News that welding fatigue most likely caused the loosening of the grid plate. With cross beams supporting the framework, the grid plates are generally closely spaced together with the welds not subjected to stress. He suggested that combining the original design drawings would be necessary to determine the cause of the incident.
Another construction worker, Wang Bo, mentioned that if the grid plate’s perforations were slightly larger than the matching holes, raised a bit above the support surface, once loosened, the weight of individuals would concentrate on one side of the plate, causing uneven pressure and potentially lifting one side.
Chapter 1 of the “Steel Grid Plate” in the “Iron and Steel Industry Standard of the People’s Republic of China YB/T 4001.1-2019” explicitly states that “after the steel grid plate is installed, it must not be able to move or detach from the support frame.” One of the drafters of this industry standard, Chen Wei, told Pengpai News that the abovementioned steel grid plate mentioned in the standard was specifically designed for open industrial platforms. Open industrial platforms facilitate lighting, ventilation, and timely gas dispersion, essential designs for industrial buildings.
Chen Wei mentioned from his experience that some operational platforms with no personnel gathered during use, such as those intended solely for inspecting large industrial equipment or for simple manual operations like opening or closing valves, are possibly only designed to carry loads of 2000N/㎡, making it challenging for them to support three or four people simultaneously standing on them, let alone moving around, as compared to parts for other purposes.
Chen Wei further emphasized that between the grid plate platform designed for single-person use and the pedestrian pathway, railings should be installed to prevent personnel from inadvertently stepping onto the platform. For areas requiring loosening of the ground for maintenance where only one person should be present, protective measures should also be implemented. He pointed out that there might be design or construction issues on-site, leading to safety accidents being affected by various factors collectively.
Running parallel to the grid plate platform was a roughly 1-meter-wide pedestrian pathway, often referred to as the green visitor pathway in many reports, with a railing on one side. However, there was no railing between the pedestrian pathway and the grid plates. According to safety rules, while students were touring the flotation tanks, they should have been walking along the approximately 1-meter-wide green pathway and not standing on the grid plate.
At the scene during the incident was Li Chunshuang, the workshop director of the ore dressing plant, who recalled the details of the students’ fall in an interview with the China Voice. He mentioned that the visiting students were walking along the green visitor pathway inside the workshop, which was only about 1 meter wide, typically allowing two people to walk side by side without any issues.
That day, there were a total of 55 students in the visiting group, including 3 staff members responsible for explanations. The location where the fall occurred was about 4 meters away from where Li Chunshuang was giving explanations, significantly deviating from the green visitor pathway.
Li Chunshuang stated, “I was explaining things to the teachers and students in front, and those behind also wanted to see, so they probably went around directly from the back. Before entering, we maintained order on-site, but there wasn’t any safety order maintenance above the visitor pathway.”
The 51 students on this internship were divided into 2 classes and 11 groups, but there was no division or scheduling during the visit to the flotation workshop that day. Li Chunshuang mentioned, “Nobody told me to group them separately; everyone just gathered together and lined up. I led everyone to take a walk around the site.”
Li Chunshuang also noted that the grid plates are made of steel materials and undergo daily inspections. The area where the grid plates fell off usually has workers checking operational equipment, but prior to this large-scale student visit and learning activity, neither the company nor the university had conducted targeted safety inspections.
The accident investigation team found that the daily load-bearing signs were missing on the platform, and the number of people allowed to stand simultaneously was not specified. Moreover, the “Teaching and Internship Safety Agreement” signed between the school and the company lacked clear on-site supervision, personnel limitations, and emergency procedures.
Six young university students met their untimely demise during an internship that was meant to broaden their horizons and put their learning into practice. Their lives were abruptly cut short, leaving their families with the urgent calls for “truth seeking” and “serious accountability.”
From the fatigue welded grid plate to the unprotected operating platform; from the lack of personnel limitations at the scene to the absence of staged internship arrangements; from why students strayed from the green pathway to why there was no supervisory personnel appointed by the company, each negligence represents a crack between life and death.
On the afternoon of July 24, a family member of one student stated that their child was a third-year student majoring in Mineral Processing Engineering at Northeastern University. Upon hearing the tragic news, the family member’s hands were trembling to the point where they couldn’t communicate with others. The parents and sister of the student arrived in Manzhouli, Inner Mongolia on the 24th. The sister mentioned that the family’s sole demand is to “seek the truth and not let those responsible escape accountability.”
Presently, the Vice General Manager in charge of safety, the workshop director, and three supervision personnel present at the time have been subjected to coercive criminal measures.
Wang Kang, a lawyer and the Chairman of the Safety Production and Fire Safety Professional Committee at Hua Rang Law Firm in Beijing, stated that from the company’s perspective, if subsequent investigations determine that the grid plate itself had inherent safety hazards, but the relevant individuals at the company failed to timely detect and eliminate them, they may be deemed to be involved in a significant liability accident offense.
Individuals primarily responsible for the accident could face imprisonment for more than three to seven years; meanwhile, those secondarily responsible may incur a sentence of imprisonment for up to three years or detention.
Another responsible party is the school. Wang Kang mentioned that in this incident, if the implicated university had shortcomings in the assessment and evaluation of the internship site, failing to detect apparent issues, or did not adequately focus on student safety during the actual internship, the university may need to assume corresponding compensation responsibilities towards the families of the deceased students.
Apart from the company and the school, if the local regulatory authorities failed to fulfill their supervision responsibilities, they would also bear legal liabilities.
Chen Liang, a Senior Partner at the Guangdong Fame and Legal Law Firm, informed China News Weekly that if the safety production supervisors in charge on-location during routine inspections of the company were found to have been negligent or derelict of their duties, they might be held criminally accountable for offenses such as dereliction of duty or abuse of power.