Recently, a significant restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military branches has taken place in China. On April 19, the “Strategic Support Force,” which had been established for more than eight years, was abolished, and the “Information Support Force” directly led by the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was officially established. Military experts view this adjustment as a revision following the military reforms initiated by CCP leader Xi Jinping in 2017.
On April 19, a ceremony was held by the Chinese military to mark the establishment of the Information Support Force, with Xi Jinping, the CCP leader, presenting the military flag and delivering an address. Xi Jinping claimed that this “newly created strategic branch” is the “key support for coordinating the construction and application of the network information system,” playing a crucial role in promoting what the Chinese military calls high-quality development and winning modern warfare.
During the ceremony, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, read out the relevant orders issued by Xi Jinping, as well as the leadership appointment orders and related notices of the force.
According to the decision of the Chinese Central Military Commission, the newly established Information Support Force is directly led and commanded by the Central Military Commission. At the same time, the designation of the Strategic Support Force was revoked, and adjustments were made to the leadership and management relationships of the military space force and cyber space force.
During a special press conference held by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense on the evening of the 19th, Wu Qian, the spokesperson for the ministry, stated that after this reform, the Chinese military has overall formed a new type of military structure layout consisting of land forces, navy, air force, rocket force, military space force, cyber space force, information support force, and logistic support force under the leadership and command of the Central Military Commission.
The Strategic Support Force, established in the Chinese military reform in December 2015, was the fifth major branch after the land forces, navy, air force, and rocket force, with primary responsibilities including intelligence collection, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, network offense and defense, psychological warfare, among others. Important departments under the Strategic Support Force included the Aerospace Systems Department and the Network Systems Department.
The establishment of this force by the CCP was initially intended to integrate the so-called “new quality combat power” into a modern specialized combat force. However, over the past eight years, the results have not been significant. Besides organizational bloat, inflated ranks, and the addition of a group of generals, the force remained a “patchwork monster” because it was built through a “hodgepodge formation,” with the various components not being related.
Su Ziyun, director of Military Strategy and Industry Institute at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies, believes that the establishment of the Information Support Force by the CCP and the revocation of the Strategic Support Force designation can be seen as a correction by Xi Jinping following the military reforms initiated in 2017.
On April 21, in an interview with a journalist from Epoch Times, Su Ziyun stated that the Information Support Force primarily focuses on electronic or cyber warfare. The Chinese military has been emphasizing “electromagnetic dominance” for the past 20 years, which involves seizing electromagnetic spectrum capability on the battlefield. He believes that the CCP may have made a wrong arrangement during the first military reform by integrating aerospace, cyber, and other forces into the Strategic Support Force. Additionally, the Strategic Support Force may have become a hub of corruption. Therefore, he believes that this reorganization is first and foremost driven by military professional needs, and secondly to reduce the corrupt effects within the force.
Su Ziyun also indicated that the biggest problem with the Chinese military is not the branches or military types but that it has evolved into a modern “Party Guard.” He stated, “The culture of loyalty to a single party and individual is the biggest problem and challenge that the Communist army faces.”
Yuan Hongbing, a Chinese liberal legal scholar living in Australia, believes that the essence of this move by the Chinese authorities is not a military reform but a major political purge and new initiative within the military.
On April 22, in an interview with Epoch Times, Yuan Hongbing stated that shortly after the CCP’s 20th Congress, a major scandal erupted within the Rocket Force, spreading to the Strategic Support Force and the high-tech military industrial system of the CCP. Throughout this process, the leadership of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force underwent comprehensive purges.
Yuan Hongbing revealed that according to conscientious individuals within the CCP system, over 70% of officers in the leadership structures of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force exhibited so-called political disloyalty and widespread corruption. The Rocket Force was originally known as the PLA Second Artillery Corps, then renamed as the Rocket Force. It was impossible for the CCP to abolish traditional military branches. The Strategic Support Force was established as a new force during Xi Jinping’s tenure. He said, “Since the command structure of this force has already deteriorated, the simplest way to resolve it is to completely dismantle it. That is the background.”
According to official Chinese media reports, the first commander of the Information Support Force is Army Major General Bi Yi, and the first political commissar is Army General Li Wei.
Public information shows that Bi Yi previously served as the commander of a certain motorized infantry brigade in the former Shenyang Military Region, the military training and branch coordination director of the former Shenyang Military Region headquarters, chief of staff of the former 40th Group Army in 2013, and deputy commander of the 78th Group Army in May 2017. In May 2018, Bi Yi was promoted to commander of the Hunan Provincial Military Region; in November 2021, he was transferred to the position of deputy director of the Training and Management Department of the Central Military Commission. In August 2022, Bi Yi assumed the position of deputy commander of the Army, with a promotion to the rank of Major General, and on August 29, 2023, during the PLA’s equipment quality work meeting, footage showed Bi Yi wearing the arm patch of the Strategic Support Force.
Li Wei, 63 years old, served as the director of the political headquarters and deputy political commissar of the 47th Group Army of the former Lanzhou Military Region. He was the political commissar of the South Xinjiang Military Region in 2012, political commissar of the 21st Group Army of the former Lanzhou Military Region in 2013, and promoted to political commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region in 2014, also serving twice as a standing committee member of the Xinjiang CCP committee. In December 2020, Li Wei was promoted to Army General, making his first appearance as the political commissar of the Strategic Support Force.
It is worth noting that the CCP has not disclosed the whereabouts of the former commander of the Strategic Support Force, Ju Qiansheng, raising further concerns about his next steps. Ju Qiansheng previously appeared at a recent “Two Sessions.” According to China’s state-run media, CCTV reported that on March 3, Ju Qiansheng attended the establishment meeting of the PLA and armed police delegation at the Second Session of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress.
Since the end of July 2023, Ju Qiansheng had “disappeared” for half a year. There were rumors at the time claiming he was implicated in the Rocket Force scandal and under investigation, with some signs indicating his situation was precarious. Additionally, in January of this year, there were rumors that the Strategic Support Force might be facing restructuring.
According to Yuan Hongbing, during this military purge process, Ju Qiansheng exhibited an exceptionally cooperative attitude, “providing extensive revelations, exposing the political disloyalty and power corruption phenomenon towards Xi Jinping within the entire Strategic Support Force.”
Starting from July 2023, Xi Jinping initiated a large-scale purge within the CCP military, especially targeting senior officials in the Rocket Force. On July 31, Xi Jinping promoted newly-appointed Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin and Rocket Force Political Commissar Xu Xisheng to the rank of general. This effectively removed the former Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao and former Political Commissar Xu Zhongbo. Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng had no prior service in the Rocket Force; the former came from the navy, and the latter from the air force.
Currently, Xi Jinping’s ongoing purge of the military is targeting those he had personally promoted and trusted. However, following the CCP’s 20th Congress, a rapid emergence of a faction opposing the Xi family within the military presented a significant challenge, causing an impact likened by many within the CCP system to the challenge posed to Mao Zedong by Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution.
“This clearly indicates that Xi Jinping’s position is extremely unstable,” Yuan Hongbing stated. The major scandals within the Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force have implicated over 170 senior officers of the rank of major general or higher. Allegedly, these individuals faced two charges: political disloyalty, essentially implying disloyalty to Xi Jinping, and corruption.
Yuan Hongbing elaborated that the so-called “absolute disloyalty” to Xi Jinping primarily manifested in two aspects: senior officers of the Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force sympathized with the situation of former Air Force General Liu Yazhou, the ex-political commissar of the National Defense University of China, regarding his handling, as well as his ideas on a potential Taiwan Strait war. They believed that Xi Jinping’s intentions for a strategic decisive battle in the Taiwan Strait against the United States would lead to a major defeat for the Chinese military. On the other hand, investigators discovered during the process that in the aerospace, aviation, and other high-tech military industry sectors, there were traces of influence from the family of Jiang Zemin and Jiang Mianheng, and they wielded significant power.
Yuan Hongbing said, “Conscientious individuals within the CCP system revealed that the military high-ranking officials of the CCP, as well as the senior leadership of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force, had intricate connections with Jiang Zemin and his son Jiang Mianheng. They not only had corrupt economic interests in common but also political connections. These political ties were mainly demonstrated in various private settings where they openly mocked and criticized Xi Jinping’s incompetence in governing. Therefore, from the purges within the Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force, it is clear that Xi Jinping’s position within the military is not only precarious but he must continuously maintain his control over the military through ruthless purges.”