The ongoing civil war in Myanmar has caused instability in the region, prompting the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to conduct a three-day joint live-fire exercise on the Chinese side of the Sino-Myanmar border starting on August 27. Experts interpret this move as part of Beijing’s strategy to play a balancing act within Myanmar, exerting influence behind the scenes to protect its own interests and ensure that Myanmar does not lean towards Western countries.
According to information released by the “Southern Theater Command” on WeChat, the Chinese military stated that the joint exercise by the army and air force in the Southern Theater Command aims to test the capabilities of reconnaissance, early warning, comprehensive control, and firepower strike, in order to be prepared for various unexpected situations and maintain security and stability in the border areas.
The military announced that from the 27th to the 29th, armed border patrols and joint air-ground patrols would be conducted along the Sino-Myanmar border in Ruili and Zhenkang among other areas.
Since June and July, the conflict in northern Myanmar has escalated. The military government of Myanmar extended the state of emergency at the end of July, while the anti-government alliance, known as the “Three Brothers Alliance,” has been launching attacks in the northeast since October last year. Earlier this year, shells from Myanmar landed in Chinese territory, injuring five people in Nanjian Township, Yunnan Province.
As the situation in Myanmar worsens, the risk of Chinese involvement increases. Sun Guoxiang, a professor of international affairs and business at Nanhua University, specializing in Asia-Pacific security and international relations, believes that China’s reinforcement along the Sino-Myanmar border is primarily driven by border security concerns due to the spillover of the conflict into Chinese territory. However, China is also protecting its economic interests, given its extensive investments in Myanmar, particularly in projects like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor involving energy pipelines and infrastructure construction, which hold strategic value for China. The troop deployment and exercises serve as a demonstration of military deterrence.
Sun Guoxiang assesses that the probability of direct Chinese military intervention in the Myanmar conflict is low, as it would attract international attention and contradict Beijing’s strategic interests. He suggests that China is more likely to influence the situation in Myanmar and safeguard its interests through methods like providing intelligence, logistical support, or even covert military assistance. China aims to play a stabilizing role in Myanmar’s crisis, ensuring that the country does not align with Western nations.
Zhong Zhidong, an assistant researcher at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies, believes that China’s military exercises along the Sino-Myanmar border indicate the extreme instability within Myanmar. By showcasing its military capabilities and willingness to intervene if necessary through military exercises and troop deployments, China is also using this opportunity for military training with geopolitical considerations in mind. However, Beijing is unlikely to deploy troops unless the situation in Myanmar is completely uncontrollable or if Western countries intervene.
Under Beijing’s “mediation,” the Myanmar military and armed ethnic groups representing the Kachin, Ta’ang, and Rakhine minorities in northern Myanmar reached a ceasefire agreement in January. However, the recent escalation of hostilities indicates that Beijing’s mediation efforts have been ineffective.
In April this year, conflicts persisted between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. In June, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, part of the “Three Brothers Alliance,” launched attacks in northeastern Shan State and Mandalay regions controlled by the Myanmar government. On August 3, the United Wa State Army captured the key northern town of Muse in Shan State.
Sun Guoxiang notes that China is playing a balancing act within Myanmar, maintaining long-term cooperation with the Myanmar military government while also keeping in touch with minority ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar like the United Wa State Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. Through interactions with these armed groups, China retains a certain degree of influence and leverage in the Myanmar crisis, using these groups as cards to influence the situation.
Zhong Zhidong suggests that Beijing generally supports the Myanmar military government but still needs to maintain internal balance. Whether it is the rebels or the military government, as long as they rely on Beijing’s support, they can demonstrate Beijing’s dominant position in Myanmar.
The Myanmar military government appears to have suspicions about Beijing. During a visit to Naypyidaw, Myanmar, on August 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Myanmar military leaders. Wang Yi opposed any actions that would “sow discord in Sino-Myanmar relations.” According to Myanmar media reports, Wang Yi informed the Myanmar leaders of Beijing’s opposition to attacks in Shan State.
Before Wang Yi’s visit, Myanmar accused foreign countries of providing weapons, technology, and other assistance to militia groups. Though Myanmar did not specify the countries, it was seen as an indirect reference to Beijing.
Myanmar ended military rule in 2010, releasing Aung San Suu Kyi who had been under house arrest for over 15 years. Her party, the National League for Democracy, was allowed to register as a legal political party and participate in subsequent by-elections.
In early December 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar, becoming the first senior American official to do so in half a century. By the end of 2013, the Myanmar government released all political prisoners. However, on February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military, led by Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup and overthrew the National League for Democracy government led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
Sun Guoxiang explains that Western countries have taken measures to counter China’s influence in Myanmar and support democratic development, but their efforts have been limited due to China’s influence and the complex regional political realities. For instance, the U.S. and the EU have implemented multiple rounds of economic and financial sanctions against the Myanmar military government to cut off its financial resources and hopefully restore democracy. However, China and Russia have consistently opposed stricter sanctions at international forums like the UN Security Council, enabling the Myanmar military government to rely on China’s economic and diplomatic support to maintain its rule.
Zhong Zhidong suggests that Western influence in Myanmar is limited, with China dominating the sphere of influence. The democratization of Myanmar is not in China’s interest, as it would weaken China’s control over the country.