【Epoch Times, October 16, 2025】The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is about to convene. Many scholars interviewed pointed out that the challenges facing the CCP at this moment go beyond economic policy adjustments. It is a deep game of power structure and ruling logic.
Before the Fourth Plenary Session, the focus of attention has shifted from economic issues to political personnel: whether there will be additional members in the CCP Central Political Bureau and Central Military Commission, which may directly impact the personnel layout and power distribution of the upcoming 21st CCP National Congress.
Against the backdrop of slowing economic growth, declining social trust, and tight local finances, Beijing is enveloped in a sense of oppressive quietness. The cautious stance in official circles and the convergence of public opinion together paint a picture of a “whispering era” in politics.
An unnamed media person in Beijing, Zhang Fan, told Epoch Times, “I estimate that apart from dealing with a few individuals to be expelled from the party and the Central Committee, there won’t be major moves to maintain stability. Due to the unfavorable international situation for Xi and the CCP, they will only tie themselves up, lacking the decisive force as in the past when they cracked down on the ‘Gang of Four’.”
He believed that with significant vacancies at the Central Military Commission, it would be considered relatively good if three new members were added during the Fourth Plenary Session, but it’s difficult to predict if this will materialize. “The Central Military Commission currently has seven vacancies, with Li Shangfu and Miao Hua, two Commission members, removed from office. The Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, He Weidong, has not been seen for seven months, reportedly facing trouble as well, but the leadership refuses to disclose it. Complaints are growing at the grassroots level.”
The Central Military Commission selected from the 20th CCP National Congress has seven members, among whom Defense Minister Li Shangfu has been officially notified of suspicion of serious violations of discipline and law, expelled from the party, and transferred to judicial authorities. Commission member Miao Hua has also been dismissed from office and is under investigation. Furthermore, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong has not been seen in public since March this year, and his whereabouts have raised concerns with no official explanation given as of yet.
According to several sources within Beijing’s political circles, the Fourth Plenary Session will at least appoint two new members to the Central Military Commission to replace Li Shangfu and Miao Hua, who are under investigation for serious violations. At the same time, the whereabouts of Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, He Weidong, missing for over six months, is expected to be one of the central topics discussed behind closed doors during the meeting. If the decision to dismiss He Weidong is officially made during the meeting, a new Vice Chairman candidate will be simultaneously appointed. However, the related issues are currently in a confidential stage, and no official statements have been released regarding personnel changes.
Zhang Fan also stated that the prominent internal party fissures and unresolved issues over the past two years would be resolved during the Fourth Plenary Session: “In recent years, there have been many disagreements within the party in terms of political and economic policies, with an increasing number of dissenters. These matters that have not been resolved yet need to be deliberated and finalized during this meeting.” He believed that the general expectation is that this meeting will set the tone for personnel and policy directions for the upcoming 21st National Congress.
China at present is standing at a rare historical juncture: the inertia of economic consumption is nearing its limit, the stable pillars of society are quietly shifting, and the CCP’s political narrative is gradually shifting towards defensive language. Whether it’s the contraction of capital markets, fiscal tightening by local governments, or the pessimistic sentiment among ordinary citizens, it all highlights a political system teetering on the edge of significant change.
A former reporter of the Communist Party’s “People’s Daily,” Zhao Ren, stated that the current political state of the CCP can be described as “more guarded than confident.” He said, “In the past decade, the official narrative focused on achievements, development, and hope; now it emphasizes struggles, security, and the prevention of capital flight, official defections, insubordination by local officials, and the potential loss of control over public sentiment.”
He highlighted that this is not merely an economic issue but a systemic response. “When a system starts to view ‘not having problems’ as a goal, the issues are already substantial. The Fourth Plenary Session aims to consolidate power.”
The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled to take place from October 20 to 23. According to an official statement, on the surface, it is a meeting regarding the “14th Five-Year Plan,” but in the operational logic of the system, such meetings are not merely about economic deployment. Zhao Ren said, “Whenever politics enters a period of structural uncertainty, the plenary session becomes a ritual for re-establishing the CCP’s narrative authority and governing legitimacy.”
A dispatch released by Xinhua News Agency on September 29 stated that the plenary session would deliberate the draft proposal of the CCP Central Committee on formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, with Xi Jinping presiding over the meeting. Although the official language is concise, it hides a complex political background – the planning cycle of five years aligns perfectly with the next phase of the central leadership changeover (2026-2030), implying that every indicator and statement will serve as a reference for future personnel and policy layout.
Liu Jun, a long-time policy researcher in Beijing, believed that the so-called “plan” is more than just an economic document; it resembles a political projection. It not only outlines developmental directions but also encompasses the flow of funds, official promotions, and local competition for the next five years. He said, “The term ‘plan’ may sound technical, but it actually represents institutionalized power structure, indicating to everyone who can act, who cannot, who has resources, and who needs to step aside.”
Since July, political meetings of the CCP Central Committee and commentaries in party media have predominantly emphasized three main themes, with the frequency of “security” surpassing that of “development,” becoming a new governing focus.
An article published in the 18th issue of “Qiushi” magazine on July 15 stated, “Ensuring national security with high-quality development and supporting high-quality development with national security.” On September 30, a commentary on the People’s Daily website further underscored the need to “integrate security throughout the entire development process.”
Mr. Kang, a local policy consultant in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, expressed that the articles from Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily website are among the key emphases leading up to the Fourth Plenary Session. The frequency of “security” in official contexts has clearly eclipsed that of “development,” setting a new governance focus within the CCP.
He remarked, “While documents in the past emphasized ‘development as the top priority,’ nearly every sentence now must include ‘security.’ This isn’t just casual rhetoric but reflects a new political logic – development can slow down a bit, but stability must remain intact. The theme of the Fourth Plenary Session emphasizes security over economic development.”
Mr. Kang further pointed out that this shift in discourse is also palpable at the local level: “Officials at the provincial and municipal levels are now emphasizing ‘risk control’ and ‘political security.’ Previously, they focused on economic competition, but now it’s about who is more stable and cooperative.” He analyzed that this shift in language is highly symbolic in Chinese political history, representing the CCP’s transition from a “growth logic” to a “defensive logic.”
A political commentator in Beijing, Liu Ming, noted, “Security has been pushed to the forefront due to the diminishing trust foundation in political power. Security is the final consensus language of the central leadership.”
Peng Ling, a retired associate professor from a university in Lanzhou, Gansu Province, explained that the CCP’s notion of security is essentially about ensuring power stability: “The essence of the security logic is about control. Economic goals may be ambiguous, public opinion may be managed, but power must be predictable and centralized to ensure the Party’s unified leadership.”
A Beijing insider familiar with propaganda system operations revealed that ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session, the Central Propaganda Department has instructed major media outlets to “highlight security in the headlines” and strictly control commentaries. He said, “All reports must revolve around the theme of ‘stability.’ Even when discussing economics, security and political leadership must be addressed first. This is the current logic of propaganda.”
Leading up to the Fourth Plenary Session, party and official media have been releasing a series of commentaries and special reports, emphasizing themes such as “planning, unity, security, and development.”
He Wei Ping, a former university professor in Beijing, analyzed, “The rhetoric of party media at such times isn’t about conveying information but shaping the atmosphere. It lets everyone know that the center is solid, the direction is clear, and unquestionable.”
Multiple Chinese political observers disclosed that as the Fourth Plenary Session approaches, whether at high levels or mid-level officials, or retired veterans, they have stopped gathering since September, with even individual meetings becoming very rare: “They are concerned about being accused of forming cliques, forming factions, or reckless criticism of the center.”
Compared to economic themes, the more noticeable signs are seen in the internal adjustments of the political system. According to reports in domestic and international media, since the end of September, CCP party committees at the provincial level in Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Jiangxi, and other regions have undergone reorganization, with noticeable changes in official leadership rhythm.
Mr. Pu, a retired CCP Party School teacher in Hebei, revealed that the aforementioned situations indicate that officials at the grassroots level are experiencing a reshuffling: “I estimate that during the Fourth Plenary Session, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, besides handling a few publicly expelled party members holding positions above department level, there won’t be more significant movements as it’s unfavorable for the CCP. However, personnel changes at the local level are relatively more tractable, indicating internal preparations for high-level meetings. While the plenary session won’t directly announce personnel changes, it’s already underway behind the scenes.”
Pu believed that this round of adjustments will focus on mid-level and executive layers, labeled as the so-called “governance system improvement,” but in essence, it’s about re-concentrating power.
Irrespective of external expectations, the primary task of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP is to “maintain the central axis, stabilize expectations, and instill confidence.” In the political operational logic, such a meeting serves as a pledge for stability.
Pu expressed that China is currently facing an unprecedented crisis, with economic downturn exacerbating internal party conflicts. “Economic downturn will trigger power struggles. All current planning is merely a means to prolong power. However, with the deteriorating relations between the CCP and the United States and the West, and economic development slipping into decline, without addressing developmental issues, power struggles will only intensify.”
The Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP marks the midpoint of the party’s political cycle and may well determine the political direction for the next five years. Public opinion believes that in a backdrop of declining social trust, slowing growth, and complex international situations, the CCP endeavors to reaffirm power through a meticulously designed meeting. However, the ultimate outcome of power adjustments awaits further observation.