Recently, overseas social media platform X (formerly Twitter) has introduced a new feature for transparent account information, revealing key data such as users’ IP locations. Upon the launch of this new feature, it was exposed that several accounts claiming to be overseas Chinese were actually located within mainland China and could directly log in without the need for a VPN. Experts suggest that these accounts are likely operated by entities or individuals authorized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
X platform announced the introduction of the “About This Account” feature on November 22nd. By clicking on the join date of any account, users can view information in five categories, including the original registration date, location, username change history, and application download method.
Nikita Bier, the product manager of X, previously stated that users should be able to verify the authenticity of content on the platform, which is crucial for understanding important global events. The feature began internal testing on October 21st and officially launched after a month of trial operation.
Bier mentioned that this is an important step to ensure the integrity of global community platforms, with plans to provide more ways for users to verify content authenticity. For users in countries with restricted speech, the new feature includes a privacy switch that allows users to choose to only display their general location. However, accounts with privacy settings activated may have these settings highlighted in their profiles for transparency.
To protect privacy, data updates will be delayed and implemented randomly until before November 25th, according to Bier.
X’s new IP location display feature poses a significant threat to CCP’s official cognitive warfare propaganda networks, as analyzed by Xie Peixue, Deputy Researcher at the Cyber Security and Decision Simulation Research Institute of Taiwan’s National Defense Research Institute.
Xie mentioned that the exposure of accounts claiming to be overseas Chinese but are actually located within mainland China and can log in to X platform directly, without using VPNs, suggests that only a few authorized entities or personnel within the Chinese government have such capabilities. These accounts are likely to be utilized by CCP-arranged prison inmates engaging in sentence reduction work or authorized internet commentators directly. The revelation of this information leaves the internet army vulnerable.
Moreover, X’s new feature not only reveals the falsified localization strategies of CCP’s external propaganda networks but also disrupts the “wolf pack tactics” employed by CCP – making it easier to identify and report coordinated behaviors when multiple accounts claiming to be from different countries display IPs in the same location.
Although the feature may not entirely block internet propaganda, it significantly raises operational barriers. Xie emphasized that attribution and accountability play key roles in cognitive warfare, and X’s new feature significantly lowers the cost for other countries to identify internet army operations.
After the introduction of X’s IP display feature, the online media outlet “Truth Media” released an analysis video on X platform, unveiling the methods used to determine the account’s location.
The video highlighted that IP addresses signify the last login location or the most recent activity node. An exclamation mark next to an IP address indicates that the account has been marked by X as using a VPN or proxy server, prompting a need to inspect the connection method to ascertain the real situation.
Notably, the video identified accounts with direct displays of being in China without a VPN marker as “task accounts.” These accounts fall into three categories: official teams, internet police, and forced labor-style human resources. Many accounts previously claiming to have lived overseas for years were found to be situated within mainland China.
Taiwanese netizens commented that X’s new feature enhances the judgment against CCP’s “little pink,” internet trolls, and fake accounts.
Dr. Lin Song, a political science doctoral candidate at the University of New South Wales in Australia, expressed that X platform’s actions mark a positive beginning in combating CCP’s external propaganda, in hopes that other networking platforms would follow suit.
He mentioned that while China has strict regulations on managing online accounts with requirements for ID and phone number linkage, international platforms previously lacked similar restrictions, facilitating CCP’s utilization of Western networks for political propaganda.
Publicizing IP addresses and user name change records is a feasible practice that can disrupt online misinformation without infringing on personal privacy, according to Lin. Identifying accounts concentrated in one location within mainland China may confirm the involvement of “officially arranged prison inmates engaged in internet commentary work.”
He forecasted that the technological rivalry between the two sides would continue, with the possibility of countermeasures from the authorities but corresponding reactions from Western nations as well.
The privacy protection and the fight against fake information have sparked debates on how to balance the two issues amidst the launch of X’s IP display feature.
Xie pointed out that IP locations alone cannot accurately determine the political stance or actual identity of account users. Following the introduction of IP display on the Chinese microblog platform in 2022, many self-proclaimed domestic patriotic online personalities were discovered to have IP locations overseas, indicating that users could be located abroad for work or educational reasons.
He also warned that exposing IP locations could pose security risks for political dissenters. If IP locations are too detailed, the most affected group may not be the internet trolls but rather dissidents within mainland China using VPN to bypass censorship. Publicly available IP data compared with VPN nodes could make it easier for national security units to pinpoint the true identities of dissenters, potentially leading to consequences.
After the unveiling of X’s transparent account information feature, CCP’s internet army might employ various methods to conceal account IPs.
Xie pointed out potential strategies, such as CCP potentially hijacking overseas IoT devices to create bot networks, making internet propaganda account traffic appear similar to local real users and thus weakening IP tracing effects. Another method involves outsourcing internet propaganda activities to third-country PR agencies or local influencers with authentic identities and IPs, making it harder for platforms to combat them.
Additionally, CCP might utilize large language models to generate content fitting local cultural contexts, coupled with high-quality IP proxies, facilitating more natural interactions between accounts and local users, thereby increasing identification difficulties.
Xie believes that X’s new feature may struggle to fairly differentiate between accounts, likely screening out lower-level and lower-cost automated operation accounts. However, for higher-level cognitive warfare activities, a comprehensive judgment combining behavioral pattern analysis, posting frequency, semantic coherence, and reposting linkages will be necessary.