After the intense Battle of Lashio in the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, the resistance forces have now set their sights on Mandalay, the second largest city in Myanmar. This marks a new phase in the conflict. Meanwhile, the military exercises conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the border areas between China and Myanmar are seen as a signal of potential military intervention by the CCP.
As the Myanmar military government seeks assistance, the CCP once again conducted live-fire military exercises in the border regions. Whether the CCP will engage in military intervention remains to be seen. Analysts believe that the civil war in Myanmar is causing the CCP to lose control of the situation.
Since the “10.27 Operation” carried out by the “Three Brotherhood Alliance” (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Arakan Army) last year, the resistance forces have achieved a series of remarkable victories, pushing back government forces. Under CCP mediation, the warring parties reached a ceasefire agreement in January of this year. However, this fragile agreement was broken a few months later.
Starting from late June, the resistance forces launched offensives against government forces in multiple regions. The new operation, known as the “2nd Stage of the 10.27 Operation” or the “Diman Operation,” aimed at northern Shan State and Mandalay. The intensity of the fighting surpassed the first stage, and progress was swifter. Within a month, the resistance forces had successfully captured six towns, including Lashio in Shan State.
Lashio is the location of the Northeast Military Region Headquarters of the Myanmar government forces, considered the most powerful among the 14 military regional headquarters. They had constructed extensive defensive fortifications in advance and deployed heavy weapons. However, after a month of intense battles, the ethnic armed organization, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, declared on July 25 that they had completely taken over the Northeast Military Region Headquarters in Lashio, achieving a “historic victory.”
The fall of Lashio dealt a significant blow to the military government, further weakening the morale of the armed forces while bolstering the morale and confidence of the resistance forces. The Battle of Lashio is believed to have profound implications on the direction of the conflict in Myanmar.
During the ceasefire period of several months, there were speculations that ethnic armed groups would withdraw from broader combat and focus on consolidating their gains in newly acquired territories, with the military government acknowledging its losses and strengthening control over central Myanmar. However, the situation did not develop in this direction.
In a report released in mid-August by the non-partisan organization funded by the U.S. Congress, the United States Institute of Peace, the resistance movement sees this as a historic opportunity to overthrow military rule and establish a new political order not dominated by the military.
Currently, the resistance forces appear to be planning simultaneous advances towards Mandalay from several regions. Local skirmishes have already occurred in the jungles surrounding Mandalay.
Mandalay is the capital of Mandalay Province, the second-largest city in Myanmar, the last royal capital of the monarchy, and a major center for trade and culture in Myanmar. The government forces are expected to mount their strongest defense and view the battle for Mandalay as a matter of life and death.
The civil war in Myanmar poses risks to CCP investments. In July of this year, a Chinese-supported nickel mining project approximately 250 kilometers from Mandalay was occupied by the resistance forces.
China is Myanmar’s largest neighbor, and the CCP holds significant national interests in Myanmar, including mining, water resources, natural gas transportation pipelines, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (including the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port), with a value exceeding billions of dollars. This economic corridor enables CCP’s trade to bypass the narrow Strait of Malacca and reach the Indian Ocean directly through Myanmar.
Most ethnic groups in Myanmar have their own armed organizations and enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. The CCP maintains economic, military, and diplomatic relations with the Myanmar military government on the one hand, while providing weapons and other supplies to ethnic resistance forces on the other hand.
Zhao Lanjian, a former Chinese media person who has visited Myanmar, told the Epoch Times earlier that, to his knowledge, all ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar maintain independent connections with the CCP. Beijing seeks to ensure its significant strategic and economic interests in Myanmar by balancing its support among various factions.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which led the “10.27 Operation,” evidently receives support from the CCP. In January of this year, a video circulated on social media showing the commander-in-chief of the alliance, Peng Dejun, along with over thirty military high-ranking officials studying “Xi Jinping’s Selected Works.” A host in the video stated that Xi’s writings have four guiding implications for the “revolutionary cause” of the courageous ethnic groups.
Veteran commentator Shishan believes that although the CCP supports these opposition armed groups, it is losing control.
Shishan told the Epoch Times that Myanmar has various armed forces with CCP support, but each party seeks to secure its own interests. Currently, these opposition groups are preparing to take over Mandalay, a major city, which the CCP government absolutely does not want to see happen.
He said, “The CCP only wants to maintain its own interests and does not want chaos in the country, so it does not want these opposition armed groups to make such big moves, to capture a major city. But now, it seems that when these organizations grow to a certain extent, they become uncontrollable.”
The Myanmar military government is aware of the CCP’s support for its hostile armed groups and is extremely displeased with it.
In early August, Myanmar’s top leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, accused foreign countries of providing weapons, technology, and other aid to Myanmar militias. Although he did not specify the specific country, it was interpreted as alluding to the CCP. Proponents of the Myanmar military government had protested outside the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar.
On the other hand, during a period of disadvantage in the conflict, the military government had to turn to the CCP for help.
On June 26, former President of Myanmar and a key figure in the military government, Thein Sein, made an official visit to China. This marked the first time a senior Myanmar military figure had traveled abroad since the military took power in 2021. It was reported that Thein Sein, at the behest of Min Aung Hlaing, hoped for CCP intervention in the Myanmar situation to prevent military action in the relevant areas.
A few days later, Myanmar’s Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Soe Win, arrived in Qingdao, Shandong Province, China, on July 6 to attend the “Green Development Forum” hosted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This was also his first foreign visit in three years. At the height of the Battle of Lashio, it was speculated that he too sought CCP assistance to quell local conflicts in Myanmar.
However, the effectiveness of their visits seemed to be minimal. During the Battle of Lashio, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army had unilaterally declared two ceasefires in an attempt to alleviate pressure from the CCP, but the ultimate strategic goals remained unchanged.
With internal discontent, lowered morale, and escalating civilian resentment, the pressure on the Myanmar military government is increasing, and the likelihood of its collapse is growing.
On August 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar and met with the military government leaders. According to the Myanmar National Television (MRTV) report, Wang Yi told Min Aung Hlaing that China was actively cooperating to maintain stability and peace in Myanmar and opposed attacks by ethnic armed groups in northern Shan State controlled by the military government.
On August 30, Chinese Ambassador Ma Jia met with the media and presented China’s “Three Supports” and “Three Avoidances” principles. China supports various factions in Myanmar to engage in dialogue, supports non-interference in internal affairs, and supports efforts through the ASEAN mechanism to promote reconciliation and negotiations; while emphasizing the avoidance of continuing bloodshed, preventing improper intervention by the UN Security Council, and avoiding external forces causing chaos in Myanmar. The mention of “external forces” was interpreted by the media primarily as Western countries led by the United States.
On August 27, Chinese troops conducted a three-day live-fire military exercise in the border area between China and Myanmar. As CCP military exercises become more frequent, speculation grows about the increasing likelihood of military intervention by the CCP in Myanmar.