The Chinese Communist Party’s military is flexing its muscles in the Yellow Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, creating an imposing presence. However, within this military, a serious internal turmoil has recently erupted under the guise of anti-corruption and clearing political risks. Around the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2025, another group of military leaders led by He Weidong was ousted. This widespread purge of 79 senior generals who rose to power under CCP leader Xi Jinping is one of the biggest signs that this red regime is entering its final countdown.
In recent days, the PLA has been making strong statements towards Japan, a country that upholds universal values and is willing to share security with democratic Taiwan. On November 17th, the PLA Air Force declared, “The gun is loaded, and the sword is unsheathed!” At the same time, tensions between China and the Philippines continue in the South China Sea, with China using both diplomacy and military intimidation towards Taiwan.
However, the internal troubles within the CCP outweigh these external provocations. Just a few days ago, on November 13th, a commentary published in a CCP military newspaper revisited the handling of major cases involving He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others. The article warned, “If the troublemakers are not thoroughly removed before the gun fires, it will leave a major hidden danger to political security, and the consequences will be unimaginable when the critical moment arrives.”
Following the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2025, it was confirmed that out of the 79 senior generals promoted under Xi Jinping, nearly half of them have been officially removed or dismissed, including at least 36 individuals who were rumored to have fallen from grace. This includes Li Shangfu and others who had already been publicly removed from office in 2023, as well as He Weidong and nine other senior generals who were expelled from the party and the military in October 2025.
General Wang Wenquan, the political commissar of the Southern Theater Command who did not attend the Fourth Plenary Session, was absent from the commissioning ceremony of the Fujian aircraft carrier on November 5th, indicating that more senior generals may be involved in the ongoing turmoil.
Xi Jinping had no foundation in the military, and upon assuming office, he engaged in anti-corruption efforts while also distributing high-ranking titles to win favor. However, he has now earned the nickname “The General Slayer.” Due to the fact that senior “tigers” would have subordinates who help them buy their ranks, the number of incidents involving major generals, brigadier generals, and colonels could be numerous, as revealed by some whistleblowers.
He Weidong was the highest-ranking among these “tigers,” being the first Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to be purged during his term in nearly 60 years. The last time a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission was purged during his term was during the Cultural Revolution with He Long.
Similar to individuals like Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who were characterized as ambitious “tigers of the military,” He Weidong also came from humble origins. Despite this, he had “cleansed” his own background in the past.
He Weidong, born in May 1957 in Nanping, Fujian, actually hails from Dongtai, Jiangsu. His father, He Liangyu, enlisted in 1946, while his mother’s name is unknown. After rising to the position of Deputy Commander of the 31st Army, He Weidong once gave an interview to Zhu Yalong, former Deputy Chief Editor of the Dongtai Daily (around 2009), mentioning that his father was a cadre sent southwards. A cadre sent southwards refers to officials dispatched by the CCP to take over territories in the south towards the end of the Chinese Civil War.
During that time, He Liangyu was stationed in Fujian, where He Weidong was born. He Liangyu was later transferred to the Nanjing Army Academy as a teacher.
In December 1972, after graduating from a junior high school in Nanping County, Fujian, at the age of 15, He Weidong was conscripted into the 91st Division of the 31st Army. At that time, Miao Hua, who was born in November 1955, had already served as a soldier for three years in the 2nd Battalion, 274th Regiment of the 92nd Division of the 31st Army, also based in Fujian.
The 91st Division was stationed in the Zhangzhou area, the 92nd Division in Tong’an. The headquarters of the 31st Army and the 93rd Division were stationed on Xiamen Island. An insider revealed that He Weidong and Miao Hua met during this period at the military headquarters.
Miao Hua, due to his handsome appearance, caught the eye of Ye Hanlin, the old political commissar of the 31st Army, and ended up rapidly advancing in the military. Meanwhile, He Weidong spent over six years in the frontline of the 91st Division until he was recommended to attend the Army Command College in Pukou, Nanjing in 1978 at the age of 21.
In July 1995, Miao Hua became the political commissar of the 91st Division, becoming He Weidong’s superior. In August 1999, Miao Hua became the political commissar of the 31st Army. In 2005, Miao Hua transferred to the 12th Army of the Nanjing Military Region as the political commissar, while He Weidong was serving as a regimental commander in the Amphibious Mechanized Armor Brigade in Fujian at that time.
Xi Jinping served in Fujian from 1985 to 2002, rising from Vice Mayor of Xiamen to the Governor of Fujian Province, visiting the 31st Army 14 times during the process and having more interactions with Miao Hua, who was then serving as the political commissar of the 31st Army’s political department in Fujian. Compared to He Weidong, Miao Hua had a closer relationship with Xi Jinping.
Apart from having the support of his father-in-law, Miao Hua’s ally was Chen Bingde, a former old comrade from Jiangsu who served as a senior officer in the 12th Army of the Nanjing Military Region. Chen Bingde later rose to the position of Chief of the General Staff. With help from Chen Bingde, Miao Hua was promoted successively from being the political commissar of the 12th Army of Nanjing Military Region to the Deputy Political Commissar and Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission, and finally, the Political Commissar of Nanjing Military Region, all with the assistance of Chen Bingde. Miao Hua’s further promotion was directly arranged by Xi Jinping.
In 2015, Xi Jinping leveraged military reforms to transfer Miao Hua to become the Political Commissar of the Navy, advancing him to the rank of Admiral. Subsequently, in 2017, Miao Hua assumed the position of Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, being promoted to a member of the Military Commission, with responsibilities for personnel matters.
The first individual to promote He Weidong was Lin Bingyao from Jinjiang, Fujian, who became the Commander of the 31st Army in March 1996. From December 2000 to December 2007, he also served as the Deputy Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, holding the rank of Major General. Lin Bingyao had a close relationship with Jia Qinglin, a former official in Fujian.
General Wang Ning, the commander of the Armed Police Force, who served in the 31st Army in 1994, was the commander of the 91st Division, where He Weidong was serving. Over the years, Wang Ning supported He Weidong, promoting him to be his staff officer and eventually elevating him to the rank of Deputy Division Commander. In 2007, Wang Ning returned to the 31st Army as its commander and in 2008, promoted He Weidong to the position of Deputy Army Commander, with the rank of Brigadier General.
Former Minister of the General Logistics Department, Zhao Keshi indirectly promoted He Weidong. Zhao Keshi became the Commander of the 31st Army at the end of 2000, a time when He Weidong was still at the grassroots level within the military. In June 2004, Zhao Keshi was appointed as the Chief of Staff of the Nanjing Military Region, and in mid-2007, he became the Commander of the Nanjing Military Region. In 2012, Zhao Keshi followed Xi Jinping into the Central Military Commission, overseeing the logistics department with significant resources. Following this, the military leaders from the Nanjing Military Region began to rise.
In January 2013, He Weidong was promoted to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Nanjing Military Region, then the Commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military Region in July 2013, and later the Commander of the Shanghai Garrison Command in March 2014. In 2015, with Xi Jinping spearheading military reforms and personally selecting candidates for key positions throughout the military, He Weidong was promoted from the commander of the Shanghai Garrison Command, a secondary defense unit, to become the first Commander of the Western Theater Command, a frontline combat unit. In July 2017, he was promoted from Brigadier General to Major General.
In December 2019, at the age of 62, nearing the retirement age for Deputy Regional Commanders, He Weidong was promoted to the rank of General and appointed as the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, a move related to the recommendation from Miao Hua, who once praised He Weidong as a military “genius” in front of Xi Jinping.
In September 2022, after stepping down as the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, He Weidong quietly assumed a position at the Joint Operations Center of the Central Military Commission. Subsequently, in October 2022, He Weidong, who was not even a member or alternate member of the Central Committee, was directly promoted to the Political Bureau and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission.
Following the 19th and 20th Congress of the CCP, the official media had praised Xi Jinping for personally scrutinizing the members of the Central Committee, but it is clear to keen observers that Xi had relied on Miao Hua to help with personnel appointments within the military. However, Miao Hua was known for selling ranks, and Xi has essentially become a tyrant.
In recent years, much of the trouble has been associated with individuals who swiftly rose to higher echelons within the military following the so-called military reforms that began in 2015. Many of these individuals have connections to the 31st Army or the Nanjing Military Region. Figures like He Weidong, Miao Hua, former Deputy Political Commissar of the Military Commission He Hongjun, former Deputy Chief of the Joint Operations Command of the Military Commission Wang Xiubin, former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command Lin Xiangyang, former Political Commissar of the Army Qin Shutong, former Political Commissar of the Navy Yuan Huazhi, former Commander of the Rocket Force Wang Houbin, former Commander of the Armed Police Force Wang Chunling, along with Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Fang Yongxiang, have all been implicated. There were also reports of the former “old tigers” like Zhao Keshi being detained.
Regarding the downfall of He Weidong, the most credible version at present suggests that he clashed and lost in a power struggle with Zhang Yuxia after assuming his post, with Miao Hua being a political ally of He. However, there are also claims that He Weidong was instead taking orders from Miao Hua, similar to how Fu Zhenghua from the Political and Legal Affairs Commission attached himself to Sun Lijun, who had more power.
During Hu Jintao’s era, Jiang Zemin indirectly controlled the military through figures like Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. At that time, Jia Ting’an, the Deputy Director of the General Political Department, succeeded Zhang Shutian, becoming the leader of the Henan faction, a powerful clique within the military that fostered corruption and engaged in dirty dealings. Corrupt officials in the military, such as Wang Shouye, Gu Junshan, Yang Jinshan, Wang Yufa, were all part of the Henan faction.
When cronies control the military, loyalty appears to be paramount. However, arrogance in wielding such power fosters corruption, injustice, and harms military morale. An official magazine of the CCP, “Theory and Reform,” admitted that under Xi, the CCP’s corruption had mutated into a more concealed form, termed as “new corruption.”
In reality, the entire structure of the CCP’s military is rotten. Xi’s first term was marked by anti-corruption measures targeting nearly 200 high-ranking corrupt officials, but he did not touch Jiang Zemin, the former party leader and military commission chairman, who compromised with Jiang to safeguard the interests of the Jiang family. Xi even publicly mourned Jiang’s death after his passing, declaring his intention to inherit Jiang’s so-called “legacy,” essentially signaling to the entire party that corruption could continue, rendering any anti-corruption rhetoric meaningless.
Although Xi detained figures like Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the corrupt system they left behind in the military remained unchanged. Lower-ranking corrupt political officers continued to facilitate the promotion of corrupt individuals for Xi. Xi claimed he would carry out a self-revolution to fight corruption, which goes against common sense. People have long known that a “doctor should not operate on himself,” implying that Xi risking his own position could be suicidal.
Beyond structural or systemic issues, atheism within the CCP itself acts as a potent catalyst for corruption. Without a belief in retribution, soldiers may feel unrestrained, allowing corruption to spread rampantly without any bounds.
The appearance of numerous “military tigers” is a vivid scene pointing towards the decay of the CCP’s era. Following the downfall of figures like He Weidong and Miao Hua, the CCP’s military mouthpieces criticized them as corrupt individuals who had “lost loyalty… severely undermining the Party’s command over guns and the principle of the chairman’s responsibility for the Military Commission.” Post the Fourth Plenary Session, the military mouthpiece’s editorial rebuked He Weidong and others for betraying Xi, stating that the authorities had eradicated political risks.
All these are futile excuses because the Central Committee members were personally vetted and promoted by Xi Jinping himself. It is evident to those with discernment that Xi enabled the ascension of “big tigers” despite his failing authority, with no possibility of recovery.
In recent years, an increasing number of officials were accused of reading political banned books, a clear indication of the CCP’s internal moral decay. Xi’s staged displays of mass support during visits to local areas merely reflect the intentional orchestration by local officials. Nowadays, both officials and the public may outwardly express compliance, but behind the scenes, criticism of Xi prevails.
After the authorities announced the removal of political risks like He Weidong, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Yuxia emphasized the prevention of being “two-faced” and practicing false loyalty. Zhang Yuxia’s demand confirmed that there are indeed many “two-faced” individuals within the military, and political landmines may explode at a critical moment.
Amidst economic downturns, the CCP authorities are currently barring migrant workers from returning to their villages, fearing social unrest, which signifies a deep crisis in their regime. The recent efforts of the CCP to shift focus to foreign tensions with statements towards Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan are merely scare tactics aimed at inciting nationalist sentiments and diverting attention from their internal crisis.
However, a military plagued with corruption and “political risks” like pustules, if taken into actual combat, would not only be weak and vulnerable but could also usher in a mutiny crisis among those in power!
(dajiyuan.com exclusive)