China’s 055 fleet has embarked on a live-fire exercise in Australia, igniting fervor among some nationalistic Chinese netizens who boldly express their desire to attack Australia instead of Taiwan. This sentiment stems from the perception that Australia, with its vast land and abundant resources, could ensure the safety of the children of high-ranking officials in China. But can the dream of China, faced with overwhelming military superiority and potential U.S. intervention, actually come true?
Recently, China’s 055 destroyer fleet traveled to Australia from the South, passing through the Philippines and Indonesia, for a two-day live-fire exercise between New Zealand and Australia. This military exercise has stirred up intense emotions within China. For instance, a popular nationalistic blogger known as “Lei Ge” stated that China is delineating its sphere of influence, which encompasses South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. He asserted that attacking Australia now serves multiple purposes: settling the remnants of colonialism, expanding national living space, and confronting America’s pawn in the region. According to “Lei Ge,” the time is ripe for China to conquer Australia.
Similar sentiments can be found on platforms like “The Observer” and “Zhihu.” Some have remarked that public sentiment for “reclaiming” Australia has never been stronger and suggest a joint Chinese-Australian referendum to heed the opinions of 1.45 billion people. Others propose that Chinese people should help expel the British from Australia.
It seems that many nationalistic Chinese individuals have grand ambitions. Besides Taiwan, conquering Australia doesn’t seem far-fetched to them. They believe attacking Australia is justified for several reasons:
Australia’s vast land and abundant resources, covering an area close to 7.7 million square kilometers, comparable to the continental United States and slightly smaller than China. Despite its smaller population of only 26 million, the appeal lies in the potential land and resources that Australia could offer to mitigate China’s land and mineral deficiencies. Conquering Australia, from Canberra to Sydney, Melbourne to Adelaide, would provide ample space for construction, benefiting real estate companies massively. Moreover, Australia boasts extremely rich mineral resources, ranking highly in various ores globally. With its prolific reserves in iron, lead, aluminum, copper, gold, silver, and uranium, Australia has always been among the world’s top mineral producers.
Currently, 60% of Australia’s exports to China consist of minerals. If Australia aligns with the U.S. in imposing economic sanctions on China in the future, halting mineral exports would severely impact Chinese industry. In such a scenario, lacking resources, the Chinese industrial sector would suffer significantly, potentially leading to economic downturn. The thought of capturing Australia in advance seems like a strategic move to solve these challenges.
Another reason to target Australia is its significant Chinese population, including many offspring of high-ranking Chinese officials. Conquering Australia could serve as a protective measure for these individuals in ensuring their safety.
For many Chinese individuals with official backgrounds, immigrating to the U.S. may sound appealing. However, the political risks associated with such a move, especially in the event of a conflict with the U.S., raise concerns of possible repercussions. As a result, many Chinese officials prefer relocating to Canada and Australia, with Sydney and Vancouver being particularly popular choices where powerful Chinese elites or their relatives reside.
Take Xi Jinping, for example. Among his siblings, besides Xi Jinping, the rest hold foreign citizenship. His older sister, Qi Qiaoqiao, is in Canada, while his brother, Xi Yuanping, and another sister possess Australian citizenship. Many critics have long chastised top Chinese officials for their inconsistent actions of denouncing the U.S. while sending their families to Western countries. If Australia becomes a special administrative region of China, Xi Jinping’s siblings would automatically hold Chinese nationality, silencing many dissenters online.
Australia currently has a Chinese population of over 1.4 million, comprising 5.5% of the total population. Many of them exhibit strong support for China, even as their previous generations thrived in China. For example, Ma Yanming, whose father was arrested by the Dongying Maritime Public Security Bureau, was sent to study in Australia. Although physically in Western countries, they still consider themselves socialist successors. Recent arrests of three Chinese soldiers by the FBI, suspected of leaking U.S. military secrets to China, underscore such internal vulnerabilities within the Chinese diaspora, which could exploit and aid a potential attack on Australia.
Australia’s military strength is relatively weak. Currently, the Australian Army consists of only 17,000 personnel, organized into four brigades. Among them, the Darwin-based First Brigade, Townsville’s Third Brigade, and Brisbane’s Seventh Motorized Brigade are the only units deemed combat-ready.
Comparatively, the Chinese Army boasts over a hundred brigades, with 29 dedicated to heavy combined forces alone. Setting aside these heavy formations, even China’s airborne troops could potentially overwhelm Australia. With a total of 40,000 personnel spread across six brigades equipped with advanced vehicles like the “Meritorious Assault Vehicle,” “Mountain Cat Assault Vehicle,” and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, China’s airborne capability alone could overshadow Australia’s land forces. In such a scenario, the Australian Army would face significant challenges.
Australia’s air force and navy maintain some combat capacity, with two Canberra-class amphibious assault ships, three Hobart-class destroyers, and seven Anzac-class frigates. However, China presently operates two aircraft carriers, four Type 075 landing helicopter docks, 8 Type 055 heavy destroyers, and 26 in-service Type 052D destroyers, allowing the formation of multiple aircraft carrier strike groups, amphibious assault ship groups, effectively overwhelming Australia’s naval defenses.
Attacking Australia would not only establish a foothold in the country but could also expand China’s influence across the entire South Pacific region, effectively bringing New Zealand, the Philippines, and Indonesia under China’s sway. As one netizen remarked, future Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan could signify Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, Australia, and the Blue House in South Korea, facilitating the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere akin to Japan’s ambitions during World War II.
Critics may argue that the U.S. would intervene if China attacked Australia, similar to Taiwan. However, given the similar risks and consequences involved in targeting both territories, why not pursue an assault on Australia for potentially greater benefits?
Many Chinese netizens may entertain these thoughts, akin to the aspirations of Japanese during World War II, envisioning a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere across the Western Pacific from Australia to Hawaii. Yet, the reality starkly contrasts these fantasies. The feasibility of China attacking Australia is virtually nil. The fundamental logistical challenge lies in the immense supply line spanning over 4,000 kilometers between China and Australia—highlighting significant operational constraints for China’s navy.
Given China’s limited active replenishment ships, each supporting merely three warships on such long voyages, only about forty warships could potentially be deployed. While China boasts a navy of 300 vessels, the practical capability to engage Australia remains restricted to maintaining around 30 to 40 warships.
Moreover, Australia and the U.S. are bound in a military alliance by the Pacific Security Treaty signed post-World War II among Australia, the U.S., and New Zealand. Any attack on a signatory member mandates a collective response from treaty members. In case of Chinese aggression against Australia, the U.S. would inevitably intervene. This intervention would place Chinese naval, air, and ground forces at significant risk. With U.S. involvement, only a fraction of American submarine forces, not requiring air or naval assets, could effectively neutralize the Chinese fleet without a direct confrontation.
The distance between China and Australia, approximately 4,000 kilometers, has been meticulously calculated for naval movements. Illustratively, the Chinese fleet traverses the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait on February 3, reaches the northern regions of Australia by February 11, and arrives at the eastern coast by February 19. This implies that in normal circumstances, a Chinese fleet departing from southern China may take up to two weeks to reach the densely populated eastern coast of Australia. With the U.S. Navy’s formidable submarine capabilities, the Chinese fleet may never even catch sight of the Australian coastline, succumbing to submarine attacks long before reaching Australian shores.
The U.S. possesses the most robust and extensive nuclear submarine fleet globally, with over forty nuclear-powered attack submarines, including advanced vessels like the Seawolf-class, 19 advanced Virginia-class submarines, and 24 Los Angeles-class submarines. The swift and stealth capabilities of the U.S. submarines offer unmatched offensive potential against adversary fleets. In contrast, China’s limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities, primarily reliant on the less effective 4-ton-class Z-9 helicopters for submarine hunting, represent a stark contrast.
Australia, despite its modest ground forces and navy strength, boasts a formidable air force. The country has ordered 72 F-35A fighter jets from the U.S., with deliveries slated until 2024. Presently, the Royal Australian Air Force operates 72 F-35 fighters, 24 F/A-18 Super Hornets, and 6 E-7 Early Warning Jets. While the quantity may seem limited, the technology ensures world-class combat capabilities.
Moreover, China’s aircraft carrier task forces focus on long-duration operations, limiting the deployment of the J-20 stealth fighter, and the mass production of the J-35 remains on hold. A significant operational challenge lies in the absence of fixed-wing early warning aircraft from Chinese carrier groups. China’s naval aviation primarily relies on the J-15 for carrier-based operations. The two Chinese aircraft carriers can carry up to 60 J-15 fighters, making them inferior to the F-35As in the Australian Air Force. The F-35’s stealth features and advanced electro-optical systems enable engagements at 100 kilometers without radar, portraying a formidable challenge for the Chinese J-15. Moreover, China’s carriers lack fixed-wing airborne early warning aircraft, a critical shortcoming in maritime operations.
In summary, while Australia’s land forces may be comparatively weaker, the navy retains some power, and the air force is well-equipped. If China ventures into open conflict, Australian forces alone may likely repel the Chinese navy effectively. Therefore, from a military standpoint, assaulting Australia as per the aspirations of Chinese nationalists would encounter insurmountable challenges, constrained by logistical issues and countered by the superior capabilities of the Australian Air Force and submarine units, supported by the extensive U.S. submarine fleet. The audacious dream of establishing dominance over Australia seems utopian and incompatible with the stark realities of military capabilities and strategic alliances.