After the conclusion of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, government departments across the country have successively received notices from higher Party committees, requesting them to organize study meetings to write their reflections and insights. Several local grassroots officials disclosed that the learning tasks have expanded to the community level since last weekend, with street office personnel already familiar with such political tasks, mostly treating them as routine and often resorting to superficial completion, leading to a prevalent practice of going through the motions.
In recent days, Party and government agencies in various parts of mainland China have convened special study sessions or Party member meetings following the notifications, with some units requiring cadre sign-ins, photo documentation, and submission of written reflections. Many grassroots workers told reporters that these meetings tend to stick to the script, focusing more on “completing the task” rather than substantive discussions. A district-level propaganda official revealed that superiors have explicitly demanded that “evidence of learning must be left behind,” but in reality, most individuals merely copy materials from newspapers or official statements to fill in their thoughts as a formality to pass inspection.
According to local officials speaking off the record, in relation to these “learning activities,” some regions have mandated the production of “learning profiles” or “insights display boards” to serve as evidence of implementation. One interviewee described it as, “Everyone knows the key is to leave a trace, not to have content.”
The propaganda official told the reporter that from the city to the district level, there are supervisory teams randomly checking learning records, but they are not concerned with the content; as long as the paperwork is complete and documents are uploaded, it is regarded as done. He stated, “Units without reports or photos will be questioned about why they did not learn, and being too serious might be seen as missing the point.”
Ms. Sun, a street office staff member in Chaoyang District, Beijing, informed the reporter that last Saturday (25th), the District Committee sent a text message directing the street office to convey and learn the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Party, emphasizing the need to understand President Xi Jinping’s work report at the session. The street office was tasked with conveying this mission to each neighborhood committee, where everyone was required to share their learning reflections. She added, “Everyone knows it’s just a formality, but not participating is not an option.”
On the closing day of the Fourth Plenary Session, official Chinese media extensively reported on President Xi Jinping’s work report at the meeting. Official news agencies and local media have also published learning reviews.
Reviewing related reports, it was found that these reviews mainly feature political slogans such as “striving toward the second centennial goal” and “vigorously composing the Liaoning chapter of China’s modernization,” without delving into specific policies or constructive measures. Rarely, accounts of praise and homage were found under official media platforms, with most focusing on issues like business closures, unemployment, and mortgage pressures, indicating a discrepancy between the public’s concerns and official propaganda directions.
Mr. Deng, a retired official from Taiyuan, Shanxi, commented that these learning activities essentially serve as displays of loyalty. He mentioned that after each major meeting, there is always an emphasis on understanding the spirit of the event, but the content often repeats political declarations. “We have to learn the reports from the two sessions every year, even more so from Xi Jinping’s speeches; these articles are all similar, and grassroots have long been familiar with this format.”
A resident Ms. Liu from Guangxi also mentioned that community grid members were informed this week to participate in learning sessions on the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session. She said she asked one member whether they were a Party member, and the response was they were a probationary member, casually brushing off the matter. Liu believed that the symbolic meaning of such activities had long been understood by the public.
Political researcher Wu Qinghua in Beijing pointed out that after every Party Congress or Plenary Session, the Chinese Communist Party requires grassroots governments to “learn” and “express opinions,” with the main purpose not being ideological education, but political control. This learning mechanism actually functions as part of the test for political loyalty, checking the alignment of cadres’ attitudes and actions with central decisions.
He analyzed that from the Rectification Movement in Yan’an to the “learning documents” post-Cultural Revolution, the CCP has established an ideological unification mechanism under the guise of learning. The grassroots “study meetings” and “exchange of insights” are essentially processes for conveying political signals, where Party members and cadres at every level are required to demonstrate loyalty in written or verbal forms, or else risk being seen as having an improper political stance.
Wu Qinghua believes that this institutional design persists to this day and has been strengthened with the centralization trend in the era of Xi Jinping. “Today’s learning is not about acquiring knowledge but about stating one’s position. It’s not about understanding the content but about proving obedience.”