According to reports from mainland Chinese media, Russian President Putin visited China on May 16th to 17th, and on the 17th, he attended the Russia-China Expo in Harbin and laid flowers at the “Soviet Martyrs Monument” in Harbin. The “Soviet Martyrs Monument” was built by the Soviet Red Army headquarters in 1945 to commemorate the Soviet soldiers who died in combat against Japan. Similar monuments or memorials exist in the provincial capitals of Shenyang and Changchun in Northeast China. The question remains, do the deceased Soviet soldiers deserve to be commemorated by the Chinese people?
So far, many Chinese people are unaware of the historical truth that the liberation of Northeast China was not directly related to the Soviet army, and that the Soviet forces committed crimes such as looting Chinese property and raping Chinese women during their presence in Northeast China.
Soviet Troops Entering Northeast China
In the later stages of World War II, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, tentatively discussed the political conditions of the Soviet army’s entry into Northeast China and ultimately signed the “Yalta Agreement”.
According to the agreement, within two or three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the European war, the Soviet Union would join the Allied forces against Japan. The conditions were to maintain the status quo of Mongolia (People’s Republic of Mongolia), obtain the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, and control Dalian and Lushun ports in China, as well as two railway lines in Northeast China.
After the signing of the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union gradually transported troops to Northeast China. According to an article in the mainland magazine “Century Tide” in 2005, the trans-Siberian railway became a major artery for the Soviet Union to transport troops to Northeast China. The total number of troops transported exceeded 1.5 million.
On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan by reading the declaration to the Japanese ambassador in the Soviet Union, Sato. Despite the rejection of the Potsdam Declaration by Japan, the U.S. dropped the first atomic bomb on August 6. This led to Japan’s inclination to accept the Potsdam Declaration and unconditional surrender. As Japan was on the brink of defeat, the Soviet Union decided to advance into Northeast China ahead of schedule.
On August 9, the Soviet Red Army launched a surprise attack on the Japanese Kwantung Army from three directions, crossing the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders on a front stretching over 4,000 kilometers. Various fronts of the Far East Soviet Army, divided into the Baikal rear, Far East First, and Far East Second Army, advanced towards key cities in Northeast China.
At the time, General Yamada was still enjoying a Japanese dance performance. In the morning, the order for full-scale operation was issued.
Due to the weakened combat capability of the Japanese Kwantung Army at that time, the Soviet forces did not face fierce resistance. The 17th Group Army of the Baikal rear front advanced 70 kilometers on August 9 to reach the Chifeng area in Inner Mongolia; the 39th Group Army bypassed Harlen Arshan’s fortifications and advanced 60 kilometers; the elite tank 6th Group Army advanced 150 kilometers towards Changchun. Similar progress was made by other army groups. The Soviet Union admitted in “The History of World War II” that they did not encounter the main Japanese forces. The Soviet soldiers mainly dealt with challenges from roads, rivers, climate, and logistics.
On August 14, the Soviet troops continued to advance into Northeast China’s hinterland. On the same day, the Japanese government sent a notice of surrender to the governments of the U.S., U.K., Soviet Union, and China. On August 15, the Emperor of Japan issued a surrender decree, but the resistance of the Kwantung Army did not cease.
The Soviet troops’ positions in Northeast China at that time extended from west to east, including Keshiketeng Banner (about 150 kilometers northwest of Chifeng) – Tuquan – Taonan – Hinggan League – Hailar – Sunwu – Baoqing – Linkou – Mudanjiang. It is evident that on the day Japan announced its surrender, all major cities in Northeast China, including Qiqihar, Harbin, Mudanjiang, Changchun, Shenyang, and Tongliao, were not occupied by the Soviet forces; the main Japanese forces were still there.
On August 16, following orders from the Japanese headquarters to the Kwantung Army, combat ceased and negotiations with the Soviet forces began, leading to the Japanese surrender. On the afternoon of the 19th, Soviet troops entered Shenyang and captured the last emperor, Puyi, who was subsequently taken to the Soviet Union for detention. On the 22nd, the Japanese army in Harbin surrendered to the Soviet forces. On the same day, the Soviet forces entered Dalian. However, a few Japanese stronghold units engaged in combat with the Soviet forces due to the loss of communication with the outside world.
It can be said that the direct cause of the liberation of Northeast China was the dropping of atomic bombs by the United States on Japan’s mainland, allowing the Soviet forces to enter Northeast China almost effortlessly and occupy major cities – merely reaping the fruits of victory.
With the characteristics of the Communist Party in mind, the Soviet Union also exaggerated its military accomplishments, boasting in “World War II History” of capturing 594,000 Japanese soldiers, killing 83,737, and seizing 686 tanks, while Japan’s official statistics reported around 40,000 casualties in the Far East battles (including deaths through suicide and disappearance of 21,000, with the remainder wounded or sick), with 575,000 Japanese sent to the Soviet Union, some of whom were later released locally.
One question arises: should surrendered Japanese soldiers be considered achievements of the Soviet forces? According to conventional research practices in military history, achievements should refer to causing casualties, captures, and surrenders among enemy forces during combat, not including institutional surrenders due to national defeat. Obviously, the Soviet Union was embellishing its own achievements.
Regarding Soviet losses, the Soviet Union’s statistics showed 12,103 deaths (including all irrecoverable losses) and 24,550 injuries.
But were the deaths of over 10,000 Soviet soldiers truly from engagements with Japanese forces? How many were killed by Chinese forces?
Soviet Atrocities in Northeast China
After entering Northeast China, the Soviet troops not only retaliated brutally against Japanese military and civilians, raping women, looting property, but also looted Chinese belongings and raped Chinese women. To this day, the memory of the atrocities committed by the “Russian bastards” (note: northeast Chinese derogatory term for Soviets) lingers among the elderly in Northeast China.
According to recollections from some Northeastern Chinese, in major cities of Northeast China, scattered Soviet soldiers would rob pedestrians, chase women, sometimes even entering homes at night. An internet user recalled stories from the elderly about Soviet soldiers groping women’s chests during ticket checks at Dehui train station, and in some cases even raping them in houses. As a result, Chinese women dared not go out at night, and men did not wear watches or leather coats out of fear. Many heavily intoxicated Soviet soldiers would sprawl on the roadside, causing onlookers’ discomfort.
In the book “Travels in Japan, Go Further in China” published in 2010, a story was revealed by Guo Jiazhou and Zhou Jianzhang from Dehui County, Jilin Province. A Soviet soldier raped a local woman, prompting the furious populace to kill him. This action provoked the Soviet army, who brought in artillery to shell Guo’s hometown, leading the villagers to flee.
Article 9 of the “Century Tide” in 1999, titled “The First Person in the Party to Resist Soviet Great Power Chauvinism,” recounted an incident involving Liu Shunyuan, Vice Secretary, Second Secretary, and Deputy Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Office, who witnessed Soviet soldiers’ misconduct on the train. Apart from loaded trains with rails, machinery, and other materials bound north, Soviet soldiers in the compartments, upon seeing young Chinese women, whistled, shouted greetings inappropriately, and even went over to embrace Chinese women, groping and harassing them. Liu Shunyuan couldn’t help but criticize them, calling them “What kind of Red Army is this? They are scoundrels!”
Liu Shunyuan soon learned that when the Soviet Red Army’s airborne division entered Northeast China on August 22, there was initially a warm welcome from the locals. However, the enthusiasm swiftly turned sour as some Soviet soldiers accosted young Chinese women, engaging in indecent acts in public spaces. Instances of Soviet soldiers raping Chinese women and looting from residents occurred, causing disillusionment among the locals of the various cities. Liu Shunyuan had reported Soviet discipline issues to the Red Army Command, but nothing changed.
Taiwanese writer Lung Yingtai, in her book “Big River, Big Sea – 1949,” also recounted details of Soviet soldiers raping Chinese women provided by eyewitnesses: “In the winter of 1945, Yu Heng was in Changchun. He witnessed that wherever the Soviet army went, women were raped, belongings were plundered, houses were set on fire.” Both Chinese and Japanese women had to shave their heads and wear male attire to avoid going outside. The so-called “liberators” were actually a terrorizing mob. Despite that, people dared not speak out against them and even lined up at their memorials to pay respects.
According to Zhou Shuling, who participated in the anti-Japanese resistance in Northeast China, in Baoqing County, Heilongjiang Province, she once sternly stopped Soviet soldiers about to rape women, saying, “What are you doing? You are here to liberate, not harm the Chinese people! I will call Stalin for you!”
Dong Wenqi, who later became the Mayor of Shenyang after the war, mentioned in his oral history that in 1946, he ordered the restoration of order in various aspects of Shenyang. During the cleanup of roadside garbage, over a thousand Soviet soldier corpses were discovered. Behind the killing of these more than a thousand Soviet troops by the people of Shenyang, there must have been numerous atrocities. Dong Wenqi believed that these bodies were likely of Soviet soldiers killed and buried in snowdrifts by locals while engaging in rapes and robberies in homes. Their bodies were found after the snow melted and later cremated by the riverside.
Dong also stated that after gathering information from various sources, he confirmed the following atrocities committed by Soviet forces in Northeast China, with the main offense being raping women. The Soviet army entered major cities in Northeast China, first raping Japanese women, then Korean women, and eventually Chinese women. As a result, young women from Japan, Korea, and China all shaved their heads and donned male clothing, afraid to go outside. Shops and homes were sealed shut to prevent Soviet soldiers from causing harm.
Amidst Soviet soldiers’ depraved behavior, a story emerged from the telegram sent by the Eighth Route Army, which was the first batch of troops to enter Northeast China against the Japanese. The Eighth Route Army stationed in Shenyang tactfully telegraphed the central government, reporting the Soviet army with “tattered clothes, lacking discipline,” and also voiced their grievances to the Soviet army. However, the Soviet army justified their behavior as borne out of hatred for the fascists. The question arises, were the Chinese residents who were looted and raped considered fascists? Even if they hated the Japanese fascists, could their monstrous acts be justified?
Compared to the Soviet army’s atrocities, an elderly person from Northeast China mentioned that Japanese forces very rarely raped women in Northeast China.
Moreover, due to the Soviet army’s lax discipline, Lu Dongsheng, Deputy Commander of the Songjiang Military Region in December 1945 in Harbin, was killed by Soviet soldiers during a robbery.
Soviet Plunder in Northeast China
Dong Wenqi also mentioned in his oral history the massive plunder committed by the Soviet forces in Northeast China, including:
1. Looting of supplies – During the late stages of the war, Japan planned to have a decisive battle with the U.S. on its home soil, intending to relocate Emperor Hirohito to Northeast China. Consequently, large stockpiles of military supplies and raw materials were stored in Northeast China, enough for a year’s use. Upon the Soviet entry into Northeast China, they plundered the warehouses extensively to transport back to Russia.
2. Bank robbery – After occupying Northeast China, the Soviet forces issued non-redeemable Red Army notes totaling two billion yuan, and openly looted cash and foreign currencies from public and private banks, with the looting of the Central Bank reaching a staggering seventy billion.
3. Factory relocation – After seizing control of Northeast China, the Soviet forces immediately brought in over 3,000 technicians to forcibly relocate factories, resulting in the destruction of the industrial essence of Northeast China. Former industrial cities, once shrouded in smoke and clouds, mostly became ruins, with factories left with walls standing, more than half of the machinery damaged… Following investigations by American and Japanese experts into various major mining and industrial equipment that were dismantled and lost, it was found that significant losses occurred: electricity about sixty percent, coal mines about eighty percent, steel around eighty percent, railways about seventy-five percent, machinery around sixty-eight percent, chemicals about fifty percent, cement about fifty-four percent, textiles about fifty percent, telecommunications about thirty percent, totaling an estimated value of over $1.23 billion.
4. Issuance of Red Army notes – Upon entering Northeast China, the Soviet forces immediately introduced Red Army notes, coercing the population to use them. Subsequent investigations estimated the issuance of Red Army notes to be over twenty billion yuan. The Soviet Union used these Red Army notes to buy private property, engaging in pseudo transactions for looting under the guise of trade, resulting in extensive exploitation of private savings under the gunpoint of Soviet forces, causing starvation, horrors, and unspeakable suffering.
The material plunder by Soviet troops in Northeast China, the heavy blow to Northeast’s heavy industry, and the consequential difficulties reflected in people’s lives stemmed from the greed and shamelessness of the Soviet Communist Party.
Conclusion
Despite the atrocities committed by the Soviet forces in Northeast China, the communist party, which claims to represent the people, turned a blind eye, even agreeing to the construction of Soviet military memorials in Northeast China. Naturally, the reasons behind this are self-evident. Without Soviet assistance, the Communist Party could not swiftly occupy resource-rich Northeast China and could not have gained victory in the civil war.
Historical records reveal that the Soviet Union’s greatest gift to the Communist Party was: 100,000 Japanese firearms, thousands of cannons, ammunition, fabric, and countless food supplies – along with the 200,000 troops of the Manchukuo army. With such a gift, the Communist Party that received it naturally did not care about the cries of tens of thousands of Chinese people.
Regrettably, to this day, Northeast China has not dismantled the memorials to the Soviet forces that have not liberated but harmed the people of Northeast China. Instead, they still openly welcome Russians to pay their respects. What kind of psychological state does this reflect? If the people of Northeast China knew the historical truth of the past, how would they react?
Editor: Putushan