The establishment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Information Support Forces marks a new height in the Party’s information warfare strategy. Japan has long been vigilant against CCP’s information and cognitive warfare and has incorporated counterstrategies into its defense “Strategic Three Documents.” While there are still many challenges to be addressed in intelligence and defense, Japan is strengthening its intelligence foundation and actively confronting the CCP alongside its allies.
On April 25, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met with former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and his delegation at the Prime Minister’s Office, accepting their strategic recommendations and expressing a commitment to thorough consideration and implementation.
Itsunori Onodera currently serves as the Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party Lawmakers Alliance for “Promoting Strengthening of Defense Industry Foundation and Overseas Weapons Equipment Export,” which suggests that the Japanese government formulate a medium to long-term strategy for defense industry foundation and overseas weapons equipment export.
The recommendations state that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the importance of Japan aligning its defense equipment research and production with allied and like-minded countries has increased. Consequently, Europe and the United States have successively enacted relevant strategies for the defense industry.
Itsunori Onodera pointed out, “The process of formulating a strategy can reveal shortcomings, loopholes, and institutional problems, and lead to promoting investment and technological innovation.”
At this juncture of significant international changes, the cornerstone of Japan’s defense policy is to counter communist forces, with a core focus on containment and confrontation of the CCP. Furthermore, the strategic emphasis on counteraction is gradually shifting from defense equipment and deployment to a comprehensive approach encompassing weapons equipment, defense deployment, alliance cooperation, intelligence, networks, and space.
On April 19, the CCP announced the establishment of the Information Support Forces. The CCP leader stated at the inaugural meeting that this force is a strategically new type of military branch, critical to coordinating the construction and utilization of the network information system. This force plays a crucial role in promoting military development and ensuring victory in modern warfare, highlighting its significant position and responsibilities.
The next day, a commentator in the CCP’s military newspaper published an article stating that modern warfare is about the confrontation and competition between systems. Whoever holds the information advantage gains the initiative in war. The article also emphasized the importance of coordinating the construction and utilization of the network information system, stating that the establishment of this force will enhance the CCP’s joint operational capabilities and full-spectrum combat capabilities based on the network information system.
The Gulf War in 1991 opened the CCP’s eyes to the deficiencies in its military equipment, weakness in military strength, and obsolescence in strategic tactics, prompting the CCP to start studying and imitating the U.S.’s military strategies.
In 1999, the CCP abandoned its previous “Three Hits and Three Defenses” strategy (targeting tanks, aircraft, paratroopers; defense against nuclear, chemical, biological weapons) and began implementing the new “Three Hits and Three Defenses” strategy (targeting stealth fighters, cruise missiles, helicopters; defense against electronic warfare, precision strikes, reconnaissance surveillance).
Since then, the CCP has attached importance to intelligence information, expanding and applying it to information warfare and cognitive warfare. Today, the CCP has elevated information to unprecedented strategic heights, positioning it as the key support in system construction.
Japan’s understanding of CCP’s information and cognitive warfare is comprehensive, and it has taken corresponding strategic deployments earlier.
On December 16, 2022, the Japanese Cabinet approved the “Strategic Three Documents” that define Japan’s defense policy (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Defense Capability Buildup Plan). The emergence of the “Strategic Three Documents” signifies a monumental shift in Japan’s defense strategy, aiming to maintain strategic synchronization with partners like the U.S. while constructing an independent defense system to enhance autonomous defense capabilities.
The Strategic Three Documents highlight the need to enhance defense capabilities through bolstering comprehensive security capacities in diplomacy, economy, technology, intelligence, among others.
In the National Security Strategy, intelligence warfare, including in the cognitive domain, is prioritized as a strategic policy Japan must implement, with a focus on intensifying efforts to enhance Japan’s security information capabilities to address challenges like the dissemination of false information and cognitive domain warfare. Japan’s relevant government departments actively maintain strategic communication and are establishing new systems to cooperate better with non-governmental organizations.
The National Defense Strategy stipulates the development of capabilities to address hybrid warfare and cognitive domain intelligence warfare by 2027. Furthermore, to effectively counter information warfare, including the spread of false information, Japan will significantly enhance the related systems and functions of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces and conduct joint training with allied nations.
The Defense Capability Buildup Plan also incorporates intelligence warfare as one of the missions of the Self-Defense Forces, aiming to establish a system and posture capable of responding to intelligence warfare by 2027 and creating a favorable security environment for Japan.
In 1997, Japan established the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, serving as the central intelligence agency for the Self-Defense Forces and the country’s largest intelligence agency. As of the end of 2023, the agency had a staff of 2,608 people, including 1,936 Self-Defense Forces officers and 672 civilian staff. The agency is directly overseen by the Prime Minister and Defense Minister.
In March 2022, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ Cyber Defense Unit was officially upgraded from its previously established structure and now consists of 540 personnel, forming a legitimate cyber force.
However, compared to China’s 175,000 cyber warfare personnel and North Korea’s 6,800 cyber unit members, Japan still faces significant disparities.
Last year, Japan’s Cyber Defense Unit expanded to 2,230 personnel. The unit is required to increase its personnel to 4,000 by 2027, including system management and operational personnel, with an estimated total force of 20,000 individuals, and further expansions are expected.
Simultaneously, the former Ground Self-Defense Force Communication School has been transformed into the “Ground Self-Defense Force Communication System and Network School” to cultivate specialized talents.
The Japanese Ministry of Defense has published strategic materials on its website regarding the response to information warfare in the cognitive domain. The documents acknowledge that some countries have made the dissemination of false information a focus of information warfare to disrupt foreign countries, improve their own reputation, or denigrate other nations. Japan avows not to manipulate public opinion or spread false information but must be fully prepared to combat information warfare.
The materials cite examples of two countries engaging in information warfare: Russia and the CCP. Russia’s information warfare aims to sow discord within Ukraine, while CCP’s objectives include boosting the regime’s image and causing disruption in foreign countries’ perceptions through disinformation campaigns.
As illustrative examples, Japan’s Ministry of Defense chose to highlight incidents related to the U.S. to present a more objective and representative perspective, as opposed to listing Japan-specific instances.
Although Japan has made extensive efforts in intelligence in recent years, defense experts believe there are still areas that need improvement.
For instance, cyber attacks from entities such as the CCP have increasingly targeted critical infrastructure beyond theft of funds, technology, and classified information, aiming to disrupt essential life systems with the potential to cause societal chaos and political upheaval in the event of conflict.
In June last year, Japanese government-related websites and the Meteorological Agency’s website experienced suspected attacks from hacker organizations associated with the CCP. In July, Nagoya Port’s container management system fell victim to a cyberattack, resulting in a two-day halt in container handling. Furthermore, CCP hackers attempted to steal intelligence during the 2022 Japanese Senate elections.
Experts suggest that in addition to enhancing technical measures to prevent cyber attacks, Japan should also establish robust legal frameworks. Currently, Japan faces challenges in taking countermeasures against large-scale foreign cyberattacks within its existing legal framework.
According to international law, proving a country’s involvement in a cyberattack is necessary to deploy countermeasures. However, Japan’s laws prohibit intercepting communications related to attacks and initiating reverse reconnaissance against attackers, making it challenging to identify perpetrators.
Experts recommend that Japan emulate the U.K. and the U.S. by allowing the government to determine and implement measures against significant security-related cyberattacks through prosecuting and sanctioning aggressors. Additionally, experts suggest that the Japanese government adopt an assertive “active cyber defense” policy similar to that of the U.S.