In recent years, there has been a notable personnel shift in the Chinese Communist Party’s diplomatic system. More officials with business management experience have been deployed as ambassadors to foreign countries, indicating a potential move in preparation for future engagements.
On May 9th of this year, the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced the appointment of Zhao Zhiyuan as an assistant minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chinese media have highlighted this appointment with the uncommon title of a “diplomat who changed careers halfway.”
At 56 years old, Zhao Zhiyuan, a native of Penglai, Shandong, previously served as assistant general manager of Weihai International Trust Investment Company. He later held positions such as Deputy Secretary of the Zoucheng City Committee of Shandong Province, Mayor of Gaomi City, Assistant Mayor of Weifang City, Secretary of the Party Working Committee and Director of the Management Committee of Weifang High-tech Industrial Development Zone, member of the Weifang City Committee, and Director of the Management Committee of Weifang High-tech Industrial Development Zone.
After a three-year stint in Tibet, Zhao Zhiyuan was transferred back to Shandong and appointed as the Mayor of Dongying in 2016. In 2020, he was appointed as the Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, and on May 5, 2024, he completed his term and returned to China.
In recent years, a number of non-diplomatic system officials have been appointed as envoys abroad by the Chinese Communist Party. These individuals typically have backgrounds in business management. Zhao Zhiyuan is one such example, quickly rising through the ranks following his appointment.
In 2022 alone, several commercial cadres from the CCP were appointed as envoys abroad. For example, Wei Huaxiang, former Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of the Shandong Agricultural Development Credit Guarantee Corporation, was appointed as the Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Huang Shifang, who served as the Director of International Cooperation at the Planning and Construction Commission of the Northern Gulf (Guangxi) Economic Zone and the Director of the Management Committee of the Dongxing Border Economic Cooperation Zone, was appointed as the Consul General in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia.
Other appointments include Han Chunlin, former Deputy Director of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau, Director of the Commerce Department of Shanxi Province, and Deputy Secretary of the Changzhi Municipal Party Committee, who became the Chinese Ambassador to Romania. Chen Daojiang, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and General Manager of Shandong Land Development Group, was appointed as the Chinese Ambassador to Jamaica. Wang Xuekun, a longtime inspector in the General Office of the Ministry of Commerce, was sent to Rwanda.
The influence of communist red descendants has long dominated the diplomatic system, leading to a complex web of relationships. However, with the increasing number of diplomats with different academic backgrounds, such as those from Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing International Studies University, Beijing Language University, and Shanghai International Studies University, new factional forces have emerged, including the influence of the Beijing International Studies University faction led by Wang Yi.
In 2020, the diplomatic system was criticized by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for its narrow selection and employment perspectives. The influx of non-diplomatic system commercial cadres in recent years is seen as a move by Xi Jinping to introduce a disruptive element into the system.
The sudden deployment of numerous officials with business management experience as ambassadors abroad by the CCP appears to be a strategical arrangement related to preparations for potential conflicts. This unusual phenomenon could reflect an international strategy, possibly even involving covert actions related to Taiwan.
On May 15, 2022, the self-media outlet Ludew Society exclusively revealed an alleged recording of a secret meeting of high-level officials in Guangdong Province discussing “overseas mobilization” for the Taiwan conflict:
“Fully leverage the advantages of the large number of overseas Chinese residing in our province, the numerous state-owned and private enterprises going abroad, and the extensive economic and trade cooperation with countries along the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. Follow the strategies of recruiting civilians for the military, assisting the military with civilians, acquiring high-end precision machinery, special materials, and other scarce domestic resources, as well as bulk strategic reserves of oil, food, minerals, and other commodities to break through the blockade of strategic resources by the United States and its Western allies during wartime.”
Drawing lessons from the sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine, the CCP aims to preemptively overcome blockades for a potential attack on Taiwan. In a scenario where the CCP initiates overseas mobilization during an attack on Taiwan, embassies abroad would serve as mobilization bases, especially in coordinating resource procurement.
The aforementioned ambassadors with business backgrounds serving in Vietnam, Malaysia, Romania, Jamaica, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and other countries are all key partners in China’s Belt and Road initiative.
Chinese embassies worldwide have been involved in procuring goods through international entities and individuals. This practice was first observed during the initial outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in Wuhan at the beginning of 2020.
A report by Canada’s Global News revealed that in mid-January 2020, Chinese government missions in Canada and globally discreetly issued emergency notifications for a large quantity of imported personal protective equipment. Prior to the Wuhan lockdown due to the virus outbreak, the Chinese government had already started purchasing PPE globally, leading to severe shortages in various countries during the global pandemic.
Australian media reported on Chinese companies in Australia rushing to aid Wuhan by purchasing large quantities of medical masks, gloves, and disinfectants, causing shortages of epidemic prevention materials in the local area. Feedback from various countries’ social networks indicated that Chinese institutions and overseas Chinese had already hoarded masks from countries including the UK, Thailand, and South Korea. In Kenya alone, it was reported that nearly 400,000 masks were purchased by local Chinese groups and sent back to China. These situations were facilitated by the discreet operations of Chinese embassies.
With this history, the sudden appointment of multiple officials with business management experience as ambassadors abroad by the CCP could indeed be a particular arrangement related to military preparedness.
However, the CCP itself is facing economic challenges, while politically, the personnel reshuffling following Xi Jinping’s military reforms is in disarray, with recent crackdowns and arrests. Despite the saber-rattling for preparedness, it may all be a show of force.
Furthermore, due to the limitations of Beijing’s reach, Chinese diplomatic institutions (including embassies and Chinese-funded companies) have become havens for corrupt officials. As the CCP pushes its Belt and Road Initiative, reports of Chinese officials or their proxies bribing foreign dignitaries have been frequently exposed, especially in the areas of foreign aid, investment, and business cooperation, making embassies a focal point for such corrupt practices.
At the end of last year, the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection criticized the diplomatic system for failing to fully implement Xi Jinping’s directives, highlighting risks of leaks, infiltration, and defection, ultimately confirming deep-rooted issues within the CCP’s diplomatic system.
The South China Morning Post recently reported that the monthly salary of Chinese diplomats abroad has been uniformly increased by $1,000. This move may not only aim to combat corruption but also to reduce the likelihood of diplomats selling information due to financial strains. However, with the increasing greed among CCP officials, this may not be an effective deterrent.
Diplomats coming from business backgrounds in China are already familiar with the hidden rules of corruption in domestic business circles, making them susceptible to further exploitation in distant territories. Should they choose to trade information with other countries, Beijing authorities will face challenges in preventing such actions.
Moreover, recent defections of Chinese spies to Australia have exposed the dark practices of entrapping dissidents by the CCP. With Xi Jinping becoming increasingly authoritarian and suspicious, discontent among officials and the public alike coupled with ongoing purges and crackdowns may lead to more internal betrayals within the CCP. This uncertainty extends to the military rank and file as well, with continued purges causing destabilization. In light of these factors, Xi’s plan to attack Taiwan may face obstacles and setbacks.
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