The central office of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the Central Office), under the leadership of Cai Qi, released a learning document known as the “Central Eight Regulations” yesterday (17th), commonly referred to as the “Eight Central Regulations.” On the same day, the Communist Party leader Xi Jinping went to Guizhou for an inspection, accompanied by Cai Qi and Xu Lin, the Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee. Prior to the Central Office’s announcement, the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee had already issued relevant documents, seen as an attempt to get ahead and potentially related to ambitions for advancement. Experts believe that the Party’s internal rectification movement initiated by Cai Qi before the Beidaihe Conference may be related to power struggles leading up to the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party.
On March 17, the Central Office issued a document on “implementing the Central Eight Regulations” for learning throughout the party, with the learning education expected to be completed by the end of July 2025.
Following the conclusion of the Two Sessions, Cai Qi, as the leader of the Central Party Building Leadership Group, chaired a meeting on the 12th to lay out the nationwide campaign to study the “Eight Central Regulations” and delivered a speech.
A Taiwanese scholar, Hong Yaonan, stated in an article published by “Newtalk News” that Xi Jinping’s confidant and Director of the Central Office, Cai Qi, immediately announced a months-long “Party Building Rectification” following the Two Sessions, interpreted by the outside world as a replica of the “Two Whatevers” back in the days of Hua Guofeng – reinforcing power by pledging support to Mao Zedong’s decisions and instructions. Comparably, Cai Qi is now emphasizing Xi Jinping’s old “Eight Regulations,” seemingly showing loyalty while pointing fingers at potential opposition within the party.
Hong Yaonan believes that this rectification is not indefinite but has a specific deadline by the end of July. This timing is crucial as it precedes the Beidaihe Conference, with the 4th Plenary Session of the 21st National Congress likely to be convened afterward.
The Beidaihe Conference has historically been a forum for internal discussions within the Communist Party on major political issues, touching on sensitive matters such as power balance among party elders and personnel arrangements. Typically, the main agenda of the 4th Plenary Session revolves around Party building or high-level personnel changes, suggesting that this year’s session will likely focus on solidifying Xi Jinping’s core position and setting the stage for the 21st National Congress – purging potential opposition forces to ensure a smooth transition for Xi Jinping’s successor.
However, commentator Zhou Xiaohui wrote in Minghui that this Party rectification movement appears unusual. Notably, on April 3 of last year, Cai Qi and Li Xi participated in a Party Building Work Leadership Group meeting, focusing on studying and implementing Xi Jinping’s speeches on Party discipline education. This year, the meeting was requested by the “Central Party,” going beyond Cai Qi’s influence, unlike last year when Cai Qi personally initiated the meeting.
The article mentions that this year’s official reports stated that the “Central Party decided” to carry out this education, while last year’s reports indicated it was done “with the approval of the Central Party,” conducting Party discipline education across the entire party from April to July 2024. The difference between “Central Party decision” and “with the approval of the Central Party” highlights the collective leadership’s will from the top down in instructing Cai Qi, as opposed to Cai Qi’s initiative being approved from bottom to top.
So, is the “Central Party” ordering Cai Qi’s actions the Xi leadership or the long-standing “Central Party” managed by Communist Party elders that practices collective leadership? Zhou Xiaohui believes the latter is more likely. One reason is the diminished emphasis in this year’s reporting on phrases like “strictly ensure the party’s conscious unity under the core of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at the core, and unity of thought and action” and “loyalty.” Cai Qi’s speech also lacked excessive praise for Xi. If it were still the Xi-centered Central Party, Cai Qi’s praise would have been more emphatic rather than toned down.
Zhou Xiaohui also points out another anomaly that could indicate a waning of Xi’s power. According to official statements, Party Building Work Leadership Group meetings are typically convened in two circumstances: to discuss and arrange “major strategic deployments for party building” or when the country faces significant events requiring strong Party leadership. Given the current internal and external challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party, the decision to convene this meeting should fall under the latter category.
According to the Guizhou Daily on March 15, on the 14th, the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee and the Provincial Party Building Leadership Group held a meeting and approved the implementation plan for studying and applying the “Central Eight Regulations” across the province. Xu Lin presided over the meeting, emphasizing the need to “effectively unify thoughts and actions with the Party Central Committee’s decisions and deployments.”
Commentator “Jintao Paitang” wrote in “Seeing China” that Xu Lin has taken the lead in defending the “Eight Central Regulations.” According to the regulations within the Communist Party, important documents passed by provincial Party committees must be reviewed by the Central Office promptly. From an outsider’s perspective, Xu Lin’s actions suggest political maneuvering for gains.
Xu Lin, a close ally of Xi, served as the Shanghai Agricultural Committee Director before his current role. In a public introduction back in 2007 when Xi was the Shanghai Party Secretary, Xu Lin was praised as the youngest member of leadership and someone who had worked in Tibet.
“Jintao Paitang” stated that Xu Lin, born in 1963, was positioned in Guizhou after the 19th National Congress, likely preparing for entry into the Political Bureau at the next congress. He is also known for his human rights suppression work as the head of the Internet Information Office. His preemptive move this time likely aimed to garner Xi’s favor.
According to official Chinese media reports, Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour in Qiandongnan, Guizhou, on March 17 – his third visit to Guizhou since taking office. Photos released by official media showed Xi accompanied by Central Secretary Cai Qi, Vice Premier He Lifeng, NDRC Director Zheng Zhajie, and Guizhou Provincial Party Secretary Xu Lin.
Current affairs commentator Li Linyi told Dajiyuan that Guizhou is considered a political high ground within the CCP and has seen numerous senior leaders at the vice-ministerial level or higher. Xi’s recent visit may be to support his ally Xu Lin but could also indicate challenges to his power, prompting a strategic countermove at the local level. However, internal fights within Xi’s camp are intense, especially with the upcoming 21st National Congress on the horizon, making it possible for Xu Lin to fall from favor before then.
Liberal scholar Yuan Hongbing, currently in Australia, revealed to Dajiyuan that a fierce struggle for the next Political Bureau members and Standing Committee of the 21st National Congress within the CCP is underway. Xi Jinping naturally aims to seek re-election by 2027. However, many of Xi’s original plans have hit stumbling blocks. For instance, Xi intended to have Central Military Commission member Miao Hua succeed Zhang Youxia as Vice Chairman of the commission at the 21st National Congress, but Miao Hua’s apparent lack of political loyalty led to his downfall, greatly affecting Xi.
Yuan previously disclosed to Dajiyuan that Second-Generation Reds believe Xi Jinping should not be re-elected at the 21st National Congress. They fear that if Xi were to stay in power, the entire Communist Party regime could be overthrown, leading to the demise of all communist party families. Based on this consensus, they are employing various tactics to pressure Xi and prevent his re-election.
On January 16th of this year, senior contributor to Nikkei Asia, Nakazawa Kei Ni, wrote about the escalating factional struggles within the Chinese Communist Party. With the next leadership lineup largely determined this year, a political storm is likely to erupt in Beijing soon.