Hello Friends from Clean World and YOUTUBE, welcome to “Insightful Critiques,” I am Tang Jingyuan. Remember to subscribe to our channel to support us, and please watch the entire video because there is very important information at the end that might surprise you.
Today’s focus: What did Xi Jinping whisper to Putin in a sudden hug, a chaotic brawl in Taiwan’s legislature related to Xi’s secret command, and how a gas pipeline stirred the China-Russia axis?
Yesterday evening, after the formal talks between Xi Jinping and Putin ended, the two leaders, accompanied only by interpreters, strolled in Zhongnanhai and had a confidential conversation. Later in the evening, Xi Jinping himself escorted Putin to the car. At the moment of parting handshake, Xi Jinping, known for his reserved demeanor and deliberate portrayal as a “world leader,” suddenly opened his arms to hug Putin. This unexpected display of warmth caught Putin by surprise, leaving him momentarily stunned for a full 3 seconds before responding to Xi Jinping’s hug, which left everyone bewildered.
This scene has become one of the most viral videos in English-speaking social media circles, leaving everyone speculating on what Xi Jinping and Putin discussed. Why did Xi openly show such affection for Putin in front of the cameras? What message did this gesture convey?
Today, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan erupted in intense physical clashes with several lawmakers being hospitalized, making headlines across major media outlets as today’s hottest news. How did this conflict unfold? Is it related to a secret directive issued by Xi Jinping months ago?
The rare scene of Xi Jinping night-walking in Zhongnanhai and hugging Putin was publicly released by major media outlets including CCTV and Reuters, but the Reuters and AFP videos provided additional context, noting that the footage was provided by the Russian side. During the Xi-Putin hug, there appeared to be whispered conversations between the two leaders, but all background audio was removed from the Russian-sourced video. Media observers have noted that among all videos of Putin’s visit to China, only this segment was muted. Even in CCTV’s version, the original sound was entirely covered with music and voice-over narration.
It’s hard not to recall February 21 last year, when after Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow concluded with Xi-Putin talks, Putin escorted Xi to the hall’s entrance. As they shook hands and bid farewell, photographers caught their parting words. Xi Jinping was filled with confidence, stating, “This is also part of the century’s change, which we push together.” Putin responded, “I agree,” and they bid each other farewell before departing.
This dialogue became major international news at the time because it was seen as Xi Jinping’s ambition to unite with Putin to overturn the international order, a bold move that seemed unstoppable. This time, both China and Russia have clearly learned lessons, which indicates that the Xi-Putin whispered conversation might again involve contents unsuitable for public disclosure.
Returning to our previous question, what does this all signify?
To discuss this issue, we need to understand some important background first. Just today, while Putin continues his visit to Harbin, the Russian side couldn’t wait to announce that China and Russia have reached a basic agreement on the “Siberian Power No. 2” natural gas pipeline project connecting the two countries and will sign the contract “in the near future.”
The leak came from Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who is in charge of oil and gas projects in the visiting Putin delegation. He stated yesterday that Russia is preparing to complete the review and signing of this gas pipeline project “very soon.”
The “Power of Siberia No. 2” natural gas pipeline project began designing over a decade ago and has been in recurring turmoil until now, primarily due to its interest to both China and Russia. The main reason for the delay is that the Chinese Communist Party has been reluctant to sign. Why is that?
The “Power of Siberia No. 2” pipeline is 3550 km long, with 950 km crossing Mongolian territory (see Map 2). For over a decade, Putin has seen this pipeline as a priority in China-Russia relations. However, China has been hesitant. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe significantly limited natural gas imports from Russia, causing Putin, in urgent need of war funds, to hope for “losses outside to be compensated inside,” speeding up the implementation of this pipeline. According to design standards, once the “Power of Siberia No. 2” pipeline is completed, it will transport 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from Russia through Mongolia to China, equivalent to the gas volume of the previously destroyed Nord Stream 1 pipeline.
Why has the Chinese Communist Party continually delayed its decision? Essentially, for two reasons: 1. China is unwilling to over-rely on a single source for such a crucial energy issue. Currently, there is the “Power of Siberia No. 1” pipeline between China and Russia since 2019, soon reaching a full load capacity of 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. Additionally, China has signed significant gas cooperation agreements with Turkmenistan and Qatar, so there is no urgent need for this “Power of Siberia No. 2” pipeline, and China naturally doesn’t want to be vulnerable to Putin.
2. The Russian-proposed design plan includes the pipeline passing through Mongolia into China, not only for economic cost reduction but also for political leverage with Mongolia. However, Sino-Mongolian relations have been strained, especially with Mongolia’s recent robust development of ties with the US and Japan, cooperation in rare earth resources, breaking China’s grip using rare earths as leverage against the West. China worries about the risk of the pipeline passing through Mongolia being manipulated, apprehensive that two potential opponents could exploit this substantial investment project, making it a concern for China. This means that at least for now, this pipeline bears more political significance for China than security and economic considerations. Yet, intriguingly, Russia has consistently insisted on adopting the route through Mongolia.
Considering these aspects, it becomes clear that the prolonged delay in the “Power of Siberia No. 2” pipeline’s approval stems significantly from mutual distrust between China and Russia, each side wanting to retain an alternative card, escalating the pipeline beyond its ordinary energy trade significance, becoming a barometer of geopolitical maneuvers between China and Russia.
Coming back to our earlier question, what does the finalization of the “Power of Siberia No. 2” project, following the route through Mongolia into China, convey? It suggests Xi Jinping has made a significant concession. Perhaps Putin offered concessions in gas prices or other aspects, but Xi Jinping is willing to sacrifice significant geopolitical interests to secure this pipeline, providing immediate financial support to Putin. The only coherent explanation is that Xi Jinping believes he has obtained something more valuable or a promise in return.
In my personal estimation, besides significant interests related to Taiwan, I cannot think of anything else valuable that Putin could offer in exchange. He wants to use this pipeline to tie a significant deal with Putin.
In other words, Xi Jinping has sacrificed major national interests to deal with Taiwan. From this perspective, the internet’s mockery of Xi Jinping hugging Putin as a “father and son embrace” does hold some truth.
Of course, there is another interpretation of this China-Russia relationship barometer project: Reuters reported that in the past, out of consideration for helping Russia, China would first advance all funds required for projects to Russia to pay for pipeline construction. But this time, China was not willing to continue this practice and instead requested Russia to make advance payments while also demanding further reductions in natural gas prices. Putin was displeased but had to agree due to being under China’s roof.
In essence, Xi Jinping took advantage of Putin’s vulnerability, pushing him to comply while Putin may have silently been keeping score. This interpretation is plausible, but personally, I lean towards the former possibility because the Taiwan issue weighs heavily on Xi Jinping, and he is willing to make any sacrifice to annex Taiwan by any means necessary.
If we delve into the Taiwan issue, let’s discuss the severe physical clash that made headlines across major media outlets today in Taiwan’s legislature.
Today, the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan carried out the third reading procedure for five legislative reform bills proposed by the opposition blue and white camps (comprising the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party). The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opposed these bills, but due to the numerical advantage of the blue and white camps, they had occupied the parliament gates two days early, holding the chamber overnight. On the day of the vote, lawmakers from both camps engaged in a severe scuffle at the entrance, resulting in a violent push, and eventually escalating into a serious physical confrontation even on the Legislative Yuan podium, causing multiple injuries and hospitalizations, a highly explosive scene.
According to DPP caucus chief Wu Si-yao, four DPP legislators and one KMT legislator were injured and hospitalized during the conflict. Qiu Zhiwei and Shen Boyang suffered minor concussions, Zhong Jiabin had bruised ribs, and under intense emotion, DPP caucus secretary Zhuang Ruixiong experienced angina. Additionally, Guo Guowen was pushed off the podium and sent to the Taipei Veterans General Hospital where he was diagnosed with a fractured coccyx.
Even more grievous was when KMT legislator Hsu Cai-xin was caught on camera attempting to strangle DPP legislator Wang Meihui, sparking widespread media attention.
On the KMT side, there were complaints that their female legislator Chen Jinghui was thrown and knocked down by DPP male legislator Zhong Jiabin, while Taiwan People’s Party caucus convener Huang Guochang claimed he was struck in the face by DPP legislator Guo Guowen. Guo Guowen later even snatched the Legislative Yuan Secretary-General Zhou Wanlai’s agenda book.
The public’s attention is currently fixated on the chaotic battle scene on the Legislative Yuan podium. Chinese state media is ecstatic, highlighting how Taiwan’s democracy appears chaotic, and lawmakers behave rudely and uncivilized. However, many fail to grasp the real issue: why such aggressive clashes erupted over legislative reform bills and why these bills were presented for a vote just three days before Lai Ching-te’s inauguration?
The intense scuffle in the Legislative Yuan has left numerous netizens puzzled about the underlying reasons. Today, Taipei City Councilor Miao Boya stepped forward to explain the spark that ignited the conflict. Miao Boya emphasized that although she does not support violence in the legislature, if they don’t resist, allowing the two contentious bills to pass, she cannot accept such results. Therefore, she expressed that though fighting is a terrible method, if no better alternative exists, they are left with no choice but to endure this.
Which bills sparked such intense clashes? The first bill was a large-scale transportation infrastructure bill proposed by KMT caucus leader Fu Kun-chi. The bill’s primary focus is to connect the central mountain range in Taiwan, construct a circular high-speed rail, and complete within ten years.
The controversy around this bill lies in the projected total investment as high as NTD 2 trillion. With such a significant investment project, the lack of feasibility assessment, environmental assessment, no committee review, and a discussion process that lasted merely 11 minutes before the blue and white camps directly pushed for secondary reading. If the scuffle had not erupted, this project with enormous risks could have been swiftly approved, and the consequences are unknown.
The second bill pertains to parliamentary reform. According to Miao Boya, the blue and white camps successively presented over 20 versions of parliamentary reform, without undergoing detailed committee deliberation on each provision, aiming to lump the entire package for negotiation based on numerical advantage. Due to the green camp’s inferior seating, their parliamentary reform version was stuck at the committee.
The root cause of the erupting conflict was that the blue and white camps hastily developed a new version of the parliamentary reform bill, aiming for direct secondary and tertiary reading passage. However, in an absurd twist, the content of the new version was not distributed to each legislator, nor was it publicly announced on any website for public knowledge. This means only those who drafted the bill from the blue and white camps know the content, leaving others in the dark. Whether it was about reform or empowerment, no one knew.
Miao Boya posed a critical question: now ask those supporting the blue and white version, “What content is in the version you want to pass? Is the finalized version available for download on the legislative website?” She guarantees they can’t answer.
Frankly, my understanding of Taiwan’s internal affairs doesn’t extend into so many details that would allow for commentary on the specific bill content. However, if Miao Boya’s assertions are true, I can only express one feeling: surprised, yet unsurprised. Why do I say this?
I’m surprised because while we may not understand the specifics of the bill, there’s a basic understanding that any major infrastructure project must undergo comprehensive evaluation and rigorous questioning. Such large-scale projects have irreversible consequences, and a wrong decision can lead to catastrophic effects. It’s akin to China’s Three Gorges Dam project, where we see the severe consequences, and even if the dam is demolished now, the damage and losses are irreversible.
Regarding the parliamentary reform bill, it’s a crucial piece related to the principle of the separation of powers, and whether rational or not, public disclosure and scrutiny of all bill contents by the legislature and even the general public are non-negotiable requirements. The essence of democracy is to ensure transparent decision-making authority and checks and balances, not to facilitate shadow operations based on a majority of seats. Han Kuo-yu’s assumption of the legislature’s helm has led to such significant conflict, suggesting that its roots are beyond a mere whim.
On the other hand, I’m unsurprised because after Taiwan’s election last year, there were revelations from insiders through overseas media, indicating Xi Jinping instructed Wang Huning and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao to seize the timing of Han Kuo-yu and Fu Kun-chi’s appointments in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. They were strategically pressing in with a unified strategic attack on Taiwan’s legislative hill, creating a breakthrough within Taiwan’s power structure for completing the unity enterprise.
Subsequently, Song Tao swiftly submitted a report to Xi Jinping and Wang Huning on January 27 titled “Key Points of the United Front Strategy to Occupy the Legislative Hill in Taiwan,” outlining four measures for Taiwan’s united front division and dissolution:
1. Encourage Han Kuo-yu, Fu Kun-chi, through various means, to investigate the Taiwan submarine national construction case in the name of investigating bribery, addressing corruption to strike at Taiwan’s independent defense strategy.
2. Interact with Han Kuo-yu and the Kuomintang to shape the “1992 Consensus” as the predominant ideology in Taiwan’s society.
3. This is particularly crucial, listen carefully. Encourage Han Kuo-yu to utilize parliamentary reform in the name of granting the Legislative Yuan investigatory power, the President’s interrogation rights, anti-Taiwan independence laws, and other bills. Even if the bills are hard to pass, using this to create Legislative Yuan chaos or even paralysis to effectively combat the DPP administration’s governance efficiency.
4. Seize the opportunity of Han Kuo-yu heading the Taiwan Democracy Foundation to vigorously invite worldwide Chinese supporters of unification, enhancing a new wave of global anti-independence and pro-unification momentum.
This document has now been distributed to the first-level cadres of the United Front Department, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the regional Taiwan Offices in various provinces and autonomous regions. This news was exposed in early February this year, and now when we look back, what feelings emerge among all of you? Feel free to leave comments and share your thoughts.
The production team of “Insightful Critiques”