On April 30th, multiple organizations including Taiwan Public Interest and Taiwan Think Tank jointly held a seminar to discuss the topic of “China’s Patriotic Sentiments and Paranoid Delusions,” inviting scholars and experts to analyze how these emotions impact cross-strait relations. The analysis pointed out that the current younger generation shows curiosity towards China, while the patriotic sentiments manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party often come with exclusion and hatred towards foreign powers, reflecting the CCP’s high-pressure governance and the influence of ideology on the Chinese people.
During the seminar, the host and Assistant Professor at Tamkang University’s Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Ma Junwei, shared observations from the campus, noting that the youth’s sentiments towards China are unique. It is neither the historical enmity between the Nationalists and Communists nor a push for Taiwan independence, but rather a display of young people’s curiosity about China. Ma Junwei mentioned that while patriotism is not unusual, the CCP’s infiltration-based origins have brought about insecurities in both internal and external environments, leading to a blanket rejection of “foreign forces” to prevent infiltration.
Researcher at Taiwan Think Tank, Hu Hanwen, pointed out that during China’s National Day, online discourse is filled with patriotic slogans and collective expressions of Hong Kong and Taiwan artists, reflecting the dominant national narrative of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Patriotism is normal in all countries, but in China, it turns into a witch-hunt where those who do not disseminate patriotic messages are targeted, leading to attacks by the so-called “little pinks.” This problem is not about patriotism but rather about the refusal to accept dissent, discussion, and engaging in a strange competition of vigilantly monitoring “who is not patriotic.”
Hu Hanwen further highlighted that on the issues of cross-strait relations and Hong Kong, Beijing often uses the accusation of “colluding with external Western forces” to discredit voices inside and outside the country advocating different opinions. This rationalizes internal high-pressure control and external political attacks, showcasing a deep-seated ideological consciousness under CCP rule that does not allow and cannot tolerate opposing voices.
Regarding recent events such as the “Fight Dictatorship” rally in Taiwan and the deletion of posts by China’s CTi News on Weibo, which underscored the profound lack of understanding in Taiwanese society regarding Chinese censorship and authoritarianism. He emphasized that in face of the CCP’s authoritarian regime and its manipulation of public opinion, Taiwan must deepen its understanding of its operational system to avoid falling into oversimplified and mistaken assumptions.
Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, Shen Youzhong, who could not attend the event due to urgent matters, stated through a prepared speech that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the CCP has experienced two extremes. One is extreme expansionist nationalism, and the other is extreme centralized leadership. This expansionist nationalism links “patriotism” with “sorrow,” and “hatred,” seeking scapegoats as enemies to unite and as targets for emotional venting.
Thus, according to Shen Youzhong, loving the country must entail hating America and Japan. Not hating America and Japan equates to not loving the country. To prove one’s patriotism, there must be objects of “opposition” and “hatred,” without which there cannot be self-evident patriotism, leading to a vicious cycle of escalating negative emotions. This vicious cycle poses challenges to cross-strait exchanges and serves as a tool that reinforces Xi Jinping’s centralized leadership.
Dong Liwen, the Executive Director of the Asia-Pacific Peace Research Foundation, bluntly stated that within the CCP, an internal crisis of distrust emerged in the 1980s, pushing them to use nationalism and patriotism as a rogue’s last refuge. In the 1990s, the party emphasized historical humiliations and incited anti-Japanese sentiments, constructing a party-state nationalism where “loving the people = loving the country = loving the party.” Regarding Taiwan policy, the CCP categorizes cross-strait relations as a matter of reunification or independence. In reality, as long as Taiwan remains not unified under the People’s Republic of China, it is a form of Taiwan independence, further expanding the definition through the 22 measures against Taiwan independence.
Dong Liwen advocated that while national identity can be constructed by the state, it should also be a matter of personal free will. Taiwan’s and China’s identities should be mutually respected, but the definition of a Chinese person should not be dictated by the party-state and enforced, similarly defining a Taiwanese person.
Xiao Duyuan, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the Chinese Culture University, expressed that China’s paranoid delusions stem from a lack of confidence in the system. To address internal confidence crises, Xi Jinping established the National Security Committee upon assuming office, integrating national security into all affairs and actively promoting patriotic education. Examining the interaction between patriotic sentiments and paranoid delusions, Xiao pointed out that following the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong and the implementation of the National Security Law, China displayed a defensive form of nationalism and a high level of mistrust when facing internal and external challenges.
Xiao Duyuan indicated that in this context, patriotic sentiments are evoked as a defensive response: supporting the National Security Law is considered patriotic, while opposing it is viewed as selling out or betraying one’s country. Western sanctions against Hong Kong have unwittingly reinforced the sense of persecution. He analyzed that the enforcement of the Hong Kong National Security Law demonstrates the mutual reinforcement of China’s patriotic sentiments and paranoid delusions, further propelling the CCP towards a more closed, defensive, and confrontational mindset.
Following the panel discussion, the host and young participants raised questions such as “Can one continue to be patriotic amidst China’s economic downturn?” and “The impact of constructing patriotism on academic elites.” The panelists delved into each question, providing in-depth analyses and responses.