Taipei District Court handed down heavy sentences on four former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) party workers involved in espionage activities this week. Experts have issued warnings that the Chinese Communist Party’s infiltration in Taiwan has expanded from the military to the core of political parties, using political and business interests as well as high-tech methods to gather intelligence, with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s relationship with the United States and weakening social cohesion in Taiwan. They collectively urge Taiwan to enhance national security protection and legal measures.
The Taipei District Court announced a major espionage case verdict on September 25, sparking social attention. Four former DPP party workers were sentenced to four to ten years in prison for allegedly leaking Taiwan’s diplomatic and national secrets to the Chinese Communist Party, in violation of the National Security Information Protection Act.
The court determined that this case not only threatens national security but also aids the Chinese Communist Party’s “three wars” strategy of “legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare,” causing serious disruptions to Taiwan’s diplomatic situation.
The four individuals sentenced are: DPP New Taipei City councilor’s assistant Huang Chirong, sentenced to ten years; former assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ho Renjie, sentenced to eight years and two months; former deputy director of the DPP’s Democratic Studies Institute, Qiu Shiyuan, sentenced to six years and two months; and former presidential advisory Wu Shangyu, sentenced to four years.
Regarding the severity of this case, Shen Mingshi, a researcher at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security, told The Epoch Times that the Chinese Communist Party’s spy network is almost “everywhere,” ranging from retired officials, active-duty military personnel to party assistants, and penetrating core institutions such as the Foreign Ministry, National Security Council, and the Presidential Office.
He emphasized, “The exposure of this espionage case demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party is eager to obtain relevant information about Taiwan’s ruling party, proving that the infiltration situation is becoming increasingly severe.”
Shen explained that the Chinese Communist Party’s recruitment of retired military personnel is relatively easy; many retired soldiers who failed in business on the mainland and faced economic difficulties easily become targets for recruitment. However, for active-duty military personnel, due to the military’s “Justice Project,” any contact is immediately reported, resulting in a lower success rate in infiltration. Beijing has thus shifted its focus to party assistants.
These assistants, with uncertain political futures and significant economic pressures, become ideal targets for infiltration. As they take up positions in high-level institutions such as the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Office, it allows the Chinese Communist Party to access critical information.
Shen analyzed that the Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence units gather this information primarily to assess the timing of a military attack on Taiwan, understand the attitudes of Taiwan’s top officials toward China, and at the same time, divide Taiwan-U.S. relations and weaken social cohesion in Taiwan.
“If Taiwan becomes chaotic due to internal infiltration and division, even in the event of a small-scale conflict in the future, Taiwan’s will to resist may collapse,” warned Shen Mingshi.
Shen further pointed out that previous espionage cases typically resulted in sentences of only two to three years, which have now been raised to seven to eight years, yet remain inadequate. He suggested amending relevant national security laws regulations, adopting a “swift trial and severe punishment” mechanism, and strengthening preventive and countermeasures.
He emphasized, “Chinese Communist Party intelligence and military units are constantly looking for opportunities to infiltrate Taiwan; we cannot afford to be complacent.”
According to the earlier investigation report by the prosecutors, Huang Chirong was recruited by the mainland Chinese intelligence department as early as 2017 when he was doing business in China. After returning to Taiwan, he began to gather political and diplomatic intelligence and gradually established an infiltration network.
He first approached Qiu Shiyuan, then, through Qiu, obtained information on President’s and Vice President’s travel schedules from Wu Shangyu, and further acquired the Foreign Minister’s itinerary and other crucial diplomatic information through Wu and Ho Renjie.
Huang Chirong mixed public information with confidential intelligence, compiled analytical reports, and used encrypted software to transmit them to Chinese Communist Party agents.
On June 10 of this year, the prosecutors charged the four individuals under the National Security Law and the National Security Information Protection Act, pointing out that the leaked information included highly sensitive details such as the former Vice President Lai Ching-de’s travel itinerary, and requested the court to hand down severe sentences. At the same time, they also applied for the court to confiscate more than 8.28 million yuan (approximately 280,000 USD) in criminal proceeds from Huang and Qiu.
Regarding this case, the Presidential Office spokesperson emphasized after the court’s verdict that Taiwan is a democratic and rule-of-law country, and the government respects judicial decisions, as well as continuing to strengthen national security protection to prevent similar incidents from happening again.
National Security Bureau statistics reveal that the number of individuals prosecuted for leaking secrets to the Chinese Communist Party has been steadily rising in recent years. In 2022, 10 people were prosecuted, in 2023, it surged to 48 people, and in 2024, it further rose to 64 people, with many being retired or active-duty military personnel.
According to Agence France-Presse, analysts reported that Beijing and Taipei have been monitoring each other for decades, but experts believe that the threats faced by Taiwan are intensifying.
Su Ziyun, Director of Strategy and Resources at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security, commented that compared to cyber espionage, these human spies pose a greater threat because they can penetrate every aspect. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen legal systems, counterintelligence measures, and future audits for sensitive personnel.
Canadian commentator and editor-in-chief of “China Spring,” Sheng Xue, stated that data shows the number of espionage cases continuously rising from 2022 to 2024, and these are only the cases that have been “discovered and exposed,” the actual situation is likely more severe.
She bluntly stated, “Beijing is no longer satisfied with peripheral infiltration; they are now directly infiltrating the Presidential Office, National Security Council, and the diplomatic system in Taiwan, significantly intensifying intelligence efforts.”
Sheng Xue analyzed to The Epoch Times reporter that the Chinese Communist Party’s infiltration strategy no longer relies solely on money but combines political and business interests, personal relationships, benefits transfers, and even utilizes big data and artificial intelligence to create layered infiltration chains.
She noted that in the case of Huang Chirong, they first recruited him, then successively absorbed Qiu Shiyuan, Wu Shangyu, and Ho Renjie, forming a complete spy network. “This is a multi-level, multi-domain integrated infiltration strategy.”
Sheng Xue pointed out that the strategic goal of the Chinese Communist Party is not only to obtain diplomatic secrets and leader schedules but also to align with “unrestricted warfare” encompassing legal, public opinion, and psychological tactics, intending to internally destabilize the government in Taiwan and create tension and division in society.
“Spies are not only found within the Kuomintang or the military; now even the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has cases of being bribed, showing that any political party, any institution could be infiltrated,” said Sheng Xue.
She also warned that Taiwan’s biggest challenge lies in effectively responding to the Chinese Communist Party’s all-encompassing espionage warfare while preserving democracy, freedom, and human rights.
She mentioned that during the era of the Nationalist government, strict social controls were implemented to prevent infiltration, leading to human rights controversies. With Taiwan still not completely healed from that historical trauma, facing a new relentless Chinese infiltration offensive. “If countermeasures are mishandled, it could escalate societal tensions, playing right into the hands of Chinese Communist Party’s division tactics.”
Therefore, she urged Taiwan to establish effective mechanisms for detection, tracking, and prevention, while enhancing the self-defense capabilities of democratic society.
“This is a severe test, but only by maintaining the foundation of democratic openness and strengthening defenses can Taiwan thwart the Chinese Communist Party’s conspiracies,” Sheng Xue concluded.