Former Chinese spy Eric recently revealed the inner workings of the CCP’s State Security Bureau, revealing how the agency directly accesses user data from platforms such as WeChat, Douyin, and TikTok, implementing systematic monitoring of overseas Chinese, students, and dissidents. Experts point out that this goes beyond simple intelligence gathering, employing a three-dimensional approach of technical monitoring, human penetration, and psychological pressure to manipulate the perceptions of global Chinese communities and threaten the spiritual independence of democratic societies.
The State Security Bureau’s Tenth Bureau, officially known as the “Foreign Protection and Counterintelligence Bureau,” has functions far beyond traditional intelligence agencies. Eric stated to Epoch Times that the bureau has a dual mission: to prevent ideological “contamination” or defection among Chinese personnel abroad and to conduct comprehensive monitoring of overseas Chinese communities, overseas Chinese associations, and student groups.
Eric emphasized, “The meaning of the term ‘intelligence’ is far more than its literal definition.” The Tenth Bureau is not only passive in surveillance but also takes proactive measures to disrupt identified “anti-Communist subversive activities.” This dual approach has given the bureau a unique position within the CCP’s overseas intelligence system.
Due to handling highly sensitive political cases, the Tenth Bureau enjoys priority in resource allocation. Eric revealed that when it comes to cases involving anti-Communist political activities, other departments usually cooperate fully. This case-oriented collaborative mechanism allows the Tenth Bureau to integrate various resources within and outside the national security system.
The most alarming capability of the Tenth Bureau lies in its direct access to Chinese digital platforms. Eric disclosed that applications like WeChat, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu have become the bureau’s “intelligence and operational infrastructure.” While specific operational procedures remain undisclosed, the vulnerabilities in privacy protection of these platforms are no secret.
The CCP utilizes technological barriers to make it difficult for foreign software to be used within China, forcing people to rely on domestic applications. Eric pointed out, “By setting various technical obstacles, the majority of people are forced to use these domestic apps.” This compulsory digital ecosystem has enabled the Tenth Bureau to establish a global surveillance network.
Moreover, this surveillance goes beyond content censorship to include deep data mining and behavioral analysis. By systematically collecting user data, the Tenth Bureau can precisely map the social networks, behavioral patterns, and ideological tendencies of target individuals, providing intelligence support for subsequent actions.
The operational tactics of the Tenth Bureau exhibit multi-layered and three-dimensional features. In addition to traditional agents and informants, the agency extensively utilizes technological surveillance resources. In the online space, its activities encompass data theft, cyber-attacks, coercion, division, provocation, and shape public perception through propaganda warfare.
Psychological pressure is one of the key tactics of the Tenth Bureau. Although detailed documents are lacking, numerous victims have provided feedback online. Eric mentioned that some target individuals receive harassment messages designed to exploit their vulnerabilities: “For example, if someone likes cats, they may receive content depicting cruelty to cats.” Such psychological torture methods are evident within various Chinese communities worldwide.
This systematic monitoring is directly linked to cases of overseas students being detained or disappearing upon returning to China. Eric analyzed that since overseas surveillance is a core task of the Tenth Bureau, “logically speaking, a considerable proportion of cases must be related to the bureau.” The organization has a comprehensive target assessment and decision-making process internally to determine the priority and means of actions against targets.
Noted Canadian Chinese writer and democracy activist Sheng Xue offered a deeper interpretation of the nature of the Tenth Bureau. She told Epoch Times that this is not merely about information warfare or espionage but a “cognitive enslavement project aimed at all global Chinese.” Through a three-dimensional approach of technology, human resources, and psychology, the Tenth Bureau systematically controls global Chinese communities.
Sheng Xue particularly emphasized the pivotal role of Chinese digital platforms. WeChat, as the most widely used social platform, facilitates the CCP’s comprehensive profiling of user information. “It knows your social relationships, circle of friends, preferences, lifestyle, shopping habits—everything,” she added. Based on this data, the Tenth Bureau can precisely analyze and target individuals.
For ordinary Chinese individuals, this surveillance also has broad implications. Sheng Xue pointed out that the Tenth Bureau has constructed a vast surveillance network within overseas Chinese communities by assessing positions, monitoring thoughts, and investigating social circles. Many individuals develop self-censorship and fear that their words and actions overseas may lead to repercussions upon returning to China.
The concept of “transnational repression” has been fully realized within the operations of the Tenth Bureau. Sheng Xue stressed that the CCP’s transnational repression is not a myth, stating that “its iron arm reaches wherever fear is brought.” From cross-border abductions in Southeast Asia to global-scale network monitoring, the activities of the Tenth Bureau know no geographical boundaries.
Even more concerning is that the targets of repression have expanded beyond traditional dissidents to broader groups. Sheng Xue warned, “It persecutes not only dissidents but targets individuals from Mongolian, Uighur, Tibetan, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese regions systematically, destroying the freedom space of our lives.” This systematic destruction directly targets the spiritual independence and value systems of the free world.
Faced with this threat, Sheng Xue urged overseas Chinese to raise awareness of protection, use alternative software as much as possible in democratic countries, and implement encryption measures. She noted that many may lack vigilance until they experience direct persecution, at which point they realize they are already completely within its control.
Eric suggested that overseas Chinese should enhance their security awareness comprehensively, pay attention to unusual circumstances, rather than focusing solely on specific agencies. He emphasized that the CCP’s departments engaged in similar activities overseas are numerous, including within the State Security Bureau and its various bureaus and offices. Only by raising vigilance comprehensively can effective measures be taken.
The exposure of the Tenth Bureau is just the tip of the iceberg of the CCP’s overseas monitoring system. With the development of digital technology and the expansion of CCP’s economic power, this monitoring activity has become more active and sophisticated than ever before. While the international community has recognized the severity of the issue, the response measures still appear inadequate.
Experts believe that for overseas Chinese, understanding the nature and scope of this threat and taking necessary protective measures has become a crucial choice in safeguarding personal safety and spiritual independence in the free world. The surveillance war in the digital age has begun, and everyone’s data security and freedom of thought could become battlegrounds in this war.