Recently, a former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spy revealed that approximately 1200 CCP spies are active in Australia. This revelation may not come as a surprise to the local diaspora, as it has long been an open secret in the community.
The former CCP spy, who goes by the pseudonym “Eric,” disclosed at the “Defending Australia” forum held in Canberra at the end of May that CCP spies and collaborators come in different categories.
The first category includes CCP-appointed officials at various levels, such as diplomatic officials, whose clear purpose is to serve Beijing’s interests.
A recent case involved the Chinese Consulate in New South Wales sending emails to 11 Australian members of Parliament, criticizing their participation in celebrations related to the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president, Tsai Ing-wen.
When this email incident was exposed, CCP officials expressed dissatisfaction, seemingly considering such bullying of weaker parties as an acceptable diplomatic practice.
CCP diplomats have no authority to prohibit Australian MPs (both state and federal) from attending events, making the content of the email unacceptable.
The extent of interference in Australian affairs is visibly apparent.
Furthermore, known consulate officials and other mysterious agents from China continue to interfere persistently in Australian affairs.
These activities include constant monitoring of Chinese students at universities and other higher education institutions.
These activities are not limited to Australia but occur globally.
In fact, in the past week, reports from Germany indicated that Chinese citizens studying at universities across various European countries are under surveillance.
In the UK, some parliamentary employees have been accused of espionage-related offenses.
In addition to surveillance, Chinese consulate officials provide material support such as buses for demonstration marches and help arrange protest activities.
Overseas students in Australia are also aware that their actions are under constant surveillance.
According to former CCP spy “Eric,” approximately 200 professional agents are active in Australia; some are officials of the central regime in Beijing, while others are employed by provincial authorities.
They operate under various identities, including as business people.
The third category of surveillance targets pro-CCP Australian residents, especially Chinese nationals and overseas Chinese. A prominent example is a Chinese expatriate convicted last year for attempting to illegally influence a federal MP.
For years, the CCP Central United Front Work Department and its various local-level united front organizations have engaged in various forms of espionage activities overseas, a practice well known to the international community.
In the academic realm, prominent Australian scholar Clive Hamilton, in his works “Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia” (2018) and “Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World” (2020), systematically revealed CCP’s overseas influence and surveillance network.
CCP leader Xi Jinping has consistently emphasized that the united front is an important institution of the CCP government.
Considering the vast scale of the Chinese and overseas Chinese population in Australia, as well as the number of electoral districts with sizable Chinese populations, the figure of only 1200 spies assisting the CCP appears to be conservative. The actual situation may be even more surprising.
Apart from “Eric’s” remarks at the forum last week, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) has also mentioned this issue on various occasions.
In the recent annual assessment, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess highlighted domestic terrorism threats as the agency’s top priority. This assessment considers the increased likelihood of terrorist incidents in the current global landscape, particularly amidst the deteriorating situation in the Middle East.
For years, ASIO has prioritized foreign espionage activities.
In the coming years, both domestic and foreign espionage activities will continue to be prominent concerns for security agencies. Neither will disappear.
At the same time, “Eric’s” testimony serves as the latest reminder of the threats facing Australia.
As the CCP intensifies its cyber warfare against Western countries, including Australia, CCP surveillance of Australians remains an ongoing challenge.
Many Australians may feel angry upon learning of foreign spies among them, but this is a harsh reality that must be acknowledged.
Denying the existence of foreign spies accomplishes nothing; it is crucial to recognize that Australia is facing a real threat from CCP’s multifaceted war against the Western world.
Acknowledging the presence of foreign agents is the first step to addressing the issue. Ensuring that security agencies have sufficient resources to uncover and combat foreign espionage activities is the next step.
Restoring the ASIO and Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) heads as formal members of the National Security Committee (NSC) is an urgent action the government under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should take.
Ensuring regular involvement of ASIO and ASIS heads in discussions about Australian national security is critical. Continued isolation of these heads from regular forums discussing national security issues will only jeopardize freedom and democracy.
About the Author:
Kevin Andrews served in the Australian Parliament for over thirty years from 1991 to 2022, holding various cabinet positions including Minister for Defence.
Original Title:
The 3 Types of CCP Spies in Australia Now
Published in the English edition of Epoch Times.
This article reflects the author’s personal views and does not necessarily represent the position of the Epoch Times.