The just concluded third plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party seems to signal current party leader Xi Jinping’s intention to seek reelection for a fourth term. Experts believe that the authorities’ so-called reforms are not the main focus, with everything now revolving around Xi Jinping maintaining power for a fourth term, while also worrying about dissent within the party.
The official Chinese state media, Xinhua News Agency, released a communique on July 18th regarding the third plenary session, mentioning the passage of a document titled “Further Comprehensive Reform and Promotion of China’s Modernization.” The communique highlighted the goal of enhancing the CCP’s “long-term governance capacity,” continuing to push forward reforms, and completing the proposed “reform tasks” by the 80th anniversary of the CCP’s founding, a statement that has caught the attention of observers. No specific time frame was set in the communique from the third plenary session ten years ago.
Researcher at the Taiwan Cross-Strait Policy Association and consulting member of a Taiwanese think tank, Wu Se, expressed to Epoch Times on July 19th that the document from the third plenary session sets 2029 as the deadline for completing these so-called reform tasks, as the 21st National Congress will be held in 2027. “The main point of this communique is to make it clear that Xi Jinping is intending to step into a fourth term.”
Wu Se further analyzed that the communique from the third plenary session mentions enhancing long-term governance capacity. From Xi Jinping’s perspective, the authorities proclaiming to have 300 reform policies are not the focus. “How to use the third plenary session to announce a goal for Xi Jinping’s fourth term, and how the Party Central Committee will then support Xi Jinping’s entry into the fourth term, that is the most crucial point.”
However, Wu Se believes that it is very difficult for the CCP itself to reach that stage. At present, proposing reforms under crisis conditions, such as financial and fiscal reforms which are very challenging, along with issues of local government debt and fiscal imbalance, are hard to resolve.
He believes that under the mechanism of party-led governance, it is very difficult for the CCP to achieve the goal of developing a modern China. In the end, it will likely resort to sophistry or having countermeasures in place to hastily conclude the matter.
The communique from the third plenary session also raised the issue of “strengthening the guidance of public opinion.” Wu Se mentioned that Xi Jinping does not want too many challenges to his position from public discourse. For example, during the third plenary session, the Party media praised Xi Jinping as a reformer, then removed the content afterwards. It is evident that Xi Jinping wants to elevate his historical position but is also concerned about internal dissenting voices.
A report by the British media outlet BBC on July 18th also focused on the timeframe of 2029 as outlined in the communique from the third plenary session. The report quoted the view of Song Wendie, a lecturer at the Australian National University’s Asia-Pacific Institute, who believed that the communique indicates Xi Jinping’s intention to seek a fourth term, implying that Xi Jinping will lead reforms during his fourth term in 2029.
Back in October 2016, after establishing the “core” position of Xi at the sixth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, Hong Kong’s media outlet “Frontline” reported in its November 2016 issue, citing information allegedly from Xi’s trusted aides, that Xi had four “five-year plans,” with the first and second terms aimed at consolidating power through anti-corruption measures and purging different factional forces.
On October 31, 2016, Deng Maosheng, an inspector at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, stated during a media symposium that the rumored rule of senior age limits for CCP Politburo Standing Committee members being “seven up, eight down” was just a popular saying and not entirely reliable. The selection of Political Bureau Standing Committee members would be flexibly handled based on real circumstances. This official stance at the time was seen as indirectly paving the way for Xi Jinping’s long-term tenure.
However, after the massive anti-corruption campaigns and military reforms in Xi Jinping’s first two terms, wherein he personally promoted a large number of high-ranking officials within the party and military, several high-ranking officials have been brought down during his third term in the past year, including former Minister of Defense Li Shangfu. It is believed that this has severely impacted Xi’s authority.
Associate Professor Chen Shimin from the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University expressed to Epoch Times before the third plenary session that the lower Xi Jinping presses the non-Xi factions, it is like a spring – the more he pushes them down, the higher they will bounce back once they have the opportunity. “Especially in 2027, it is obvious that Xi Jinping is seeking reelection for a fourth term and wants to establish his authority. But whether the military or the entire party truly completely submits to Xi Jinping is worth observing.”
Director of the Strategic and Resource Institute at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Studies, Su Ziyun, told Epoch Times on July 5 that there may be surprises around this time. Because there are people within the CCP engaging in “low red, high black” tactics, ostensibly paving the way for Xi’s fourth term, yet actually leading Xi to dig his own pit without informing him of the real dangers. The real excitement will likely come in 2027.