Some media have been focusing on the ethnic backgrounds of Chinese communist spies, but this is a misconception. The individuals most vulnerable to being co-opted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are those influenced by the tactic of “elite capture,” which mostly includes non-Chinese leaders in the business and political sectors in many countries.
Linda Sun was accused of representing the Chinese regime to influence the New York governor’s office in exchange for benefits worth millions of dollars. Sun is a member of the American Chinese immigrant community and a naturalized American citizen. For Sun, her racial background is far less important than the benefits she received, which according to Department of Justice documents, include a $4.1 million apartment on Long Island in New York, a $2.1 million ocean view apartment in Honolulu, and a 2024 Ferrari reportedly purchased with money laundered from the CCP.
I doubt whether the CCP authorities would be willing to pay such a huge sum, especially if they know – which they do – that this money would raise alarms with the FBI on multiple fronts.
Some in the media accuse the CCP of recruiting spies among overseas Chinese, engaging in espionage and influence operations. A report in The New York Times states, “Analysts say secret operations often follow a pattern—the CCP recruits ethnic Chinese to penetrate power centers or suppress Chinese dissidents and other critics of the CCP.” The New York Times describes the case of Linda Sun in New York state and provides anecdotal evidence of three other cases where ethnic Chinese individuals were accused of engaging in spy activities or influence operations in Canada, Germany, and the UK.
Anecdotal evidence is a type of evidence for common phenomena that is less certain, but for certain exceptional cases, anecdotal evidence is often widely accepted.
Others who may benefit from influence or espionage activities are nowhere near the level of rewards given to Sun. Thus, they may be more susceptible to racial factors. I have personally witnessed anecdotal evidence of CCP intelligence personnel selectively recruiting Chinese American individuals.
However, there are many other reasons why people engage in espionage for the CCP. There are many cases of non-Chinese individuals engaging in influence operations, espionage, and technology theft for the CCP that are more serious than the anecdotes mentioned in the article. Some U.S. companies claim to be “forced technology transfer,” but in reality, it’s not coercion; they choose to exchange American technology for access to the Chinese market and hefty profits. Although this is extremely detrimental to the U.S. economy and national security, there are no laws prohibiting these technology exchanges. Such actions have caused us to lose billions of dollars in business revenue and risk war as the Chinese military becomes stronger through stolen American technology.
In fact, some non-Chinese individuals who profit for the CCP are former government officials who, after leaving office, serve as “advisers,” benefiting the CCP without registering as foreign agents. Some have access to national leaders or ministers even after leaving their official positions.
The late former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has had unparalleled access to officials in Beijing and Washington for decades. Isaac Stone Fish, founder and CEO of Strategy Risks consulting firm and author of “America Second: How American Elites Helped China Gain Global Dominance,” writes that as early as 1989, Kissinger was suspected of “cofounding a $75 million Chinese venture capital fund with a Chinese state-owned enterprise.” It is alleged that Kissinger has maintained contact with Xi Jinping, Joe Biden, Donald Trump, and several former U.S. presidents.
Non-Chinese agents of the CCP can operate within legal limits, facing less scrutiny, making them potentially more harmful to the overall U.S. and democratic integrity. Strong arguments suggest that the CCP’s racial bias in selecting lower-level spies should not overly influence our understanding of higher-level threats, should not affect law enforcement efforts in identifying and prosecuting spies, or alertness in detecting traditional and non-traditional means of CCP influence on our democracy, including what Washington and academic literature referred to as “elite capture.”
According to The Heritage Foundation, “Elite capture is a form of political warfare used by the CCP, aimed at controlling the behavior of political, academic, business, and cultural leaders outside China for its benefit.” The CCP employs “means of control such as economic rewards, financial dependency or compromise, commercial disputes, promises of market access to China, ideological attractions, even blackmail.”
Appealing to a common national or ethnic identity may be one of the CCP’s methods in recruiting spies or elites. However, this is just one of many tactics, and merely scratching the surface. The CCP is akin to throwing spaghetti on the wall to see what sticks. It doesn’t truly care about a person’s skin color; all that matters is whether the individual can bring benefits to the regime. In fact, the CCP’s appeal to racial identity should be offensive to Chinese Americans rather than be a reason for them to serve Beijing. More discreet and effective incentives like money and ideology are equally applicable to any ethnicity.
End.