Chung Yuan: What Did Lee Sang-fu, Wei Feng, and Reveal in Reported Disclosure?

On June 27th, the official Chinese Communist Party media Xinhua News Agency issued a notice regarding the handling of Li Shangfu and Wei Feng, trying to downplay their issues as mere corruption. However, it also mentioned that their actions had caused “extensive damage” to the “military construction” and “image of senior leadership,” with “particularly huge harm.” Before the Third Plenary Session of the Twentieth Central Committee, the CCP had to report the problems of these two individuals, but it was difficult to reduce the impact, unintentionally revealing more information.

The notice stated that on August 31, 2023, Li Shangfu was placed under investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations,” and on September 21, 2023, Wei Fenghe was also under investigation for similar reasons. The notice mentioned that both individuals were “resisting organizational review.”

The term “resisting organizational review” likely refers to the individuals not admitting to the issues under investigation, possibly colluding in secret, forming alliances, or providing false testimony. The notice stated that Li Shangfu had “received huge sums of money, suspected of bribery.” If Li Shangfu continues to “resist organizational review,” he may not be willing to admit to receiving bribes. After Li Shangfu is removed, he is likely to lose his personal freedom quickly and may not be able to collude with others anymore, but instead steadfastly deny the allegations.

The notice also mentioned that Li Shangfu was investigated because “problematic clues” were discovered during investigations conducted by the Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervisory Commission of the Military Commission. In other words, Li Shangfu may have been implicated in bribery by others, but he refused to admit it, which was referred to as “resisting organizational review.”

Li Shangfu began serving as the director of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center of the General Equipment Department in December 2003, and his involvement in bribery activities likely started around that time. He continued to climb the ranks, holding various positions within the military, providing ample opportunities for bribery. Most of his tenure was spent in the Equipment Department, which was a coveted position within the military, making it highly plausible for him to accept significant bribes. If individuals implicate him for bribery, resisting the investigation would likely be futile for Li Shangfu.

In July 2023, the CCP issued a notice regarding irregularities and violations in equipment procurement bidding evaluations since October 2017. Before Li Shangfu was officially investigated in August 2023, the CCP leader had ordered the collection of bribery clues related to Li Shangfu and his subordinates in advance.

Many bribe givers do not voluntarily expose their own corrupt practices, and investigators usually only have access to a small number of witnesses and evidence. Although Li Shangfu likely possessed significant assets gained through illicit means, he may refuse to disclose their sources, which could be seen as “resisting organizational review.” However, the disciplinary methods used by the Military Commission are estimated to be more severe, making it difficult for Li Shangfu to resist, leading to the possibility of being forced to confess to more issues and implicate others in return, resulting in a failed attempt at resisting the investigation.

Wei Fenghe was also implicated for bribery. Wei Fenghe had served in various positions within the Second Artillery Corps and the Rocket Force, which are arms of the military known for potential corruption opportunities. It is likely that Wei Fenghe was implicated by other fallen Rocket Force generals. Wei Fenghe also attempted to “resist organizational review,” which ultimately may result in him revealing more issues and implicating more individuals.

The notice regarding Li Shangfu also mentioned that he had “provided money to others for seeking undue benefits, suspected of bribery.”

As Li Shangfu continued to advance in his career, apart from demonstrating loyalty to Xi Jinping and senior military officials, he also needed to provide monetary contributions upwards. Buying and selling of military ranks were rampant within the CCP, and this culture persisted even after ten years of anti-corruption efforts. Li Shangfu may not have dared to bribe Xi Jinping directly but likely engaged in bribery with other individuals from the Military Commission to secure promotions and seek more financial gains.

The Xichang Satellite Launch Center was once a directly affiliated unit of the General Equipment Department of the CCP military, and Li Shangfu likely bribed officials within the General Equipment Department to assume the position of director in 2003. He then may have initiated corrupt practices, promoting officers who provided him with bribes and continuing this cycle upwards. Most of the military officials within the General Equipment Department during that period were heavily involved in illicit financial activities and many of them have either retired or fallen from power.

In September 2013, Li Shangfu entered the General Equipment Department, serving as the Chief of Staff, Deputy Minister, and later as the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Strategic Support Force. He subsequently held positions as the Minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission in September 2017. During this period, Li Shangfu likely engaged in bribery with members of the Military Commission to secure his promotions.

The members of the Eighteenth Central Military Commission of the CCP (2012-2017) included Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice Chairmen Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang, as well as members Chang Wanquan, Fang Fenghui, Zhang Yang, Zhao Keshi, Zhang Youxia, Wu Shengli, Ma Xiaotian, and Wei Fenghe.

Many of them have since retired, with Fang Fenghui falling from power, Zhang Yang committing suicide, Wu Shengli being investigated in 2020, and Wei Fenghe now facing sanctions. Only Zhang Youxia remains in his position.

In October 2012, Zhang Youxia served as the Minister of the General Equipment Department and became a member of the Military Commission, serving as Li Shangfu’s superior. Li Shangfu held various positions directly assisting Zhang Youxia before assuming leadership roles. If Li Shangfu had engaged in bribery with these individuals, he would likely be pressured to confess. However, aside from Wei Fenghe, no other problems have been reported at this time. Therefore, the public disclosure of bribery-related issues in the notice may not extend to other members of the Military Commission.

In addition to bribery issues, Wei Fenghe was also accused of “collapsed faith” and “disloyalty.” However, Li Shangfu’s notice did not include similar statements about his loyalty.

Although Li Shangfu was involved in both receiving and providing bribes, theoretically making his offenses more severe than those of Wei Fenghe, the notice did not indicate any loyalty-related problems for Li Shangfu. While Wei Fenghe was only implicated for bribery without any mention of providing bribes, the addition of “disloyalty” to his case suggests a deliberate choice of wording in the CCP notice to avoid more controversial allegations that could implicate senior leaders.

In previous cases of fallen officials, they were commonly labeled as “disloyal,” “two-faced,” “hypocritical,” “disrespectful,” as well as being accused of having “inflated political ambitions,” forming “cliques,” and “conspiring to control key departments.” These individuals were generally not personally selected by Xi Jinping, making them easy targets for removal after being labeled as “poisonous remnants.”

Xi Jinping places great importance on the military. His tenure has seen significant purges, with a focus on promoting those deemed loyal and without ulterior motives. The downfall of both Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, who held positions of great responsibility, indicates a failure in the CCP’s leadership selection processes, for which the rest of the Military Commission members may also be held accountable. Despite Defense Ministers holding nominal power, they maintain a certain level of prestige. Xi Jinping, who has been in power for a decade, cannot afford such glaring issues within the military. Labeling these two individuals as “disloyal” or “two-faced” in the public eye would be a significant blow to the CCP’s image.

The issues regarding Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were only the beginning. It is estimated that in July, more rumors will be confirmed, potentially leading to unexpected revelations. Despite the CCP’s attempts to downplay the situation, as more revelations unfold, the chaos within the CCP military and political landscape will become increasingly difficult to conceal, perhaps signaling the party’s impending downfall.

The qualification of being a Central Committee member for Li Shangfu likely will be revoked during the Third Plenary Session.

Li Yuchao, a former Rocket Force Commander, is also a Central Committee member who is currently missing and not publicly reported. However, he may face a report and have his Central Committee membership revoked during the Third Plenary Session.

Xu Zhongbo, the former Rocket Force Commander, is a Central Committee member who appeared at the People’s Congress in March without news of any violations. It remains to be seen if Xu Zhongbo will lose his Central Committee membership.

Ju Qiansheng, the former Commander of the Strategic Support Force, is also a Central Committee member. While the Strategic Support Force has been disbanded, although still publicly visible, Ju Qiansheng’s current position is uncertain, and it remains unclear if he will retain his Central Committee membership.

Li Wei, the former Political Commissar of the Strategic Support Force, has been transferred to the newly established Information Support Force as the Political Commissar. He is likely to retain his Central Committee membership.

Qin Gang’s whereabouts are of great interest to the public. His issues remain unreported as of now. If he appears at the Third Plenary Session, it would be significant news. If he does not appear, he is likely to lose his Central Committee membership.

Rumors of Tang Renjian, the Secretary of the Party Committee and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, being investigated in May have not been publicly reported. However, indications may emerge during the Third Plenary Session.

The notices for Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe are just the beginning, and it is expected that more rumors will be confirmed in July, leading to potentially unforeseen developments. The CCP is attempting to portray a facade of normalcy, but as more information surfaces one by one, the chaotic situation within the CCP military and political landscape will be harder to conceal, bringing the CCP closer to its downfall.