The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) stated that on Monday morning of August 11, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel collided with a Chinese Navy frigate near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea during a high-speed pursuit of a PCG vessel. The collision resulted in damage to the frigate’s bow and severe damage to the PCG vessel’s bow, rendering it almost incapable of navigation. The Chinese authorities have reportedly censored the incident domestically. Experts suggest that the incident demonstrates poor coordination between the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard and may disturb the ongoing North Beach talks.
On August 11, near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, the Chinese Coast Guard vessel with registration number 3104 collided with the Chinese Navy frigate named “Guilin.” Video footage released by the Philippine military shows the damage to the frigate’s bow after the collision. Following the collision, the 3104 seemed to lose power and awaited rescue at the scene, as recorded by nearby Philippine Coast Guard personnel.
Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the Philippine Coast Guard, stated on social media platform X that at the time of the incident, the Philippine vessel was delivering supplies to Filipino fishermen in the waters near Scarborough Shoal when Chinese Coast Guard vessels engaged in dangerous interception maneuvers using high-pressure water cannons, although they did not hit the Philippine vessel. During the pursuit, the Chinese Coast Guard vessel abruptly turned and collided violently with its own large navy vessel. In a subsequent press conference, Tarriela mentioned that moments before the collision, the smaller Chinese vessel (Coast Guard vessel 3104) was still visible with crew members on the foredeck, with uncertainty about casualties. He also mentioned that the Chinese crew “never responded” to the Philippine vessel’s offer of assistance.
Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Su Ziyun told Epoch Times that if the vessels involved in the collision had been Filipino, it would have immediately escalated tensions in the South China Sea. The incident also highlights the failure of China’s tactical maneuvers in the region.
Su Ziyun stated that whether in the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, or Taiwan Strait, China has employed such risky and unprofessional tactics to carry out so-called missions, as evidenced by previous incidents involving Australian, American, Korean, or Canadian military planes threatened by Chinese military aircraft. U.S. warships in the South China Sea have also experienced China’s dangerous maneuvers. “For nearly 11 years, China has been violating international rules. Today, causing damage to its own vessels confirms that its bullying tactics are wrong.”
Hong Zijie, Director of the Institute of Strategic and Resource Studies at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense, told Epoch Times that in recent years, the Chinese Coast Guard has frequently engaged in similar actions, such as using water cannons, tracking, interception, and ramming Filipino vessels intentionally. This collision between the Chinese Coast Guard and Navy not only resulted in loss of face for China but also highlighted communication issues between different units.
Researcher Shen Mingshi from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research also expressed to Epoch Times that the incident underscores a lack of coordination between the Coast Guard and Navy vessels and reveals shortcomings in handling emergency situations.
On social media platform X, users ridiculed the Chinese military, saying, “They wanted to collide with others, but ended up colliding with each other, causing harm to themselves. Their combat capability is truly shoddy, and their equipment is probably substandard.” Another user commented on teamwork issues within the Chinese military, highlighting deficiencies in their methods of positioning and distance measurement.
Public records show that the Chinese Coast Guard Bureau absorbed vessels from the Maritime Safety Administration, Fishery Administration, and Customs in 2013. Since 2018, the Coast Guard has been under the jurisdiction of the People’s Armed Police, which, in turn, reports to the Central Military Commission and no longer falls under the State Council sequence. The People’s Armed Police forces are not part of the Chinese military sequence but have taken on tasks related to maritime law enforcement. By the end of 2023, the Chinese Coast Guard claimed to have over 120 vessels over a thousand tons for public law enforcement.
In recent years, the activities of the Chinese Coast Guard in the waters of East Asia and Southeast Asia have significantly increased, attempting to establish its sovereignty claims in disputed areas through aggressive means. This trend not only affects Taiwan but also involves countries like Japan and the Philippines, raising the risk of conflict among various parties.
Shen Mingshi suggested that the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard may even have coordination issues in joint operations, let alone joint combat. There is a need to be vigilant as China may exploit such collisions in the Taiwan Strait to escalate conflicts, leading to a regional war.
Scarborough Shoal is situated in a strategic location in the South China Sea, 100 nautical miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines and 500 nautical miles from Hainan Island. Since 2012, it has been effectively controlled by China. Apart from China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan also claim some rights in the region. In 2016, the International Tribunal ruled that Beijing’s sovereignty assertion over the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea had no basis in international law, but China refused to accept the ruling. This collision incident is the latest in a series of recent standoffs between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
On August 11, the Chinese Coast Guard Bureau issued a statement through spokesperson Gan Yu, confirming the “expulsion” of a Philippine fleet from the area, accusing them of “illegally entering Chinese waters” but making no mention of the collision involving Chinese vessels.
A user on X platform, Lens on Asia, commented, “The announcement of the Chinese Coast Guard is like losing face but refusing to admit the collision. They emphasize their ‘professional and normative on-site operations,’ implying the Chinese Navy is unprofessional and non-standard, suggesting the Navy should take full responsibility for the accident.”
As of the publication of this article on August 12, the Chinese Ministry of Defense and the Southern Theater Command of the Chinese military have not made any statements.
During the routine press conference at the Chinese Foreign Ministry on August 11, when asked by Agence France-Press about the incident, spokesperson Lin Jian neither confirmed nor denied the collision, and the related question was deleted from the press conference transcript released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The transcript only retained the questions from a journalist of Bloomberg, with Lin Jian urging the Philippines to immediately stop provocative acts of infringement.
Su Ziyun stated that the Chinese official response would not involve self-examination but instead maintain a hegemonic attitude, shifting blame for all maritime incidents and relying on verbal prowess in diplomacy while using dangerous means in military deployment, resulting in self-inflicted consequences.
A screenshot circulating online shows that Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, posted on social media on the night of August 11, suggesting that if reports of collisions between two Chinese law enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal were true, blame should be pinned on the Philippines to retaliate and make them pay a price. However, this post was subsequently deleted.
In response to Hu Xijin’s article, Shen Mingshi stated that while the article seems to take a nationalist stance by condemning the Philippines and speaking favorably of the Chinese military, there may also be political motives behind his criticism of the Navy or Coast Guard.
On August 12, searches on Weibo by Epoch Times reporters found scattered indirect mentions of the collision incident by netizens. The Weibo account “Military Weapons Rant” said, “Even facing the Philippines is so embarrassing, causing ourselves harm. Really incomprehensible.”
Another netizen commented, “Maybe we are too lenient with them, resulting in our own people colliding with each other… too frustrating.” “How unprofessional.” “It’s a disgrace, truly.”
Su Ziyun noted that in democratic countries, even in Russia, when faced with unfavorable military situations, internal social media platforms would undergo self-examination. However, under the Chinese system, only the greatness of the Chinese military is promoted, which is unhealthy. Those loyal to the regime who come across information like this on blocked platforms and voice dissatisfaction can have negative repercussions. Initially, they supported the Chinese military but now are questioning official propaganda.
Shen Mingshi suggested that the collision event coincided with the secret North Beach talks and could have political implications.
He analyzed that the interception or expulsion of the Philippine supply vessel by the Chinese Coast Guard, typically carried out through water spray to drive them away, not direct collision, reflects high controversy, indicating potential pressure on the Navy and Coast Guard from higher authorities. It cannot be ruled out that a few senior officers may seek to escalate conflicts through collision events to influence the progress or Xi Jinping’s control over military factions during the North Beach talks.
Shen Mingshi added that the Chinese military has been under severe scrutiny in recent years, contributing to unstable military morale. In light of this incident, there is a possibility of significant pressure on the Navy’s internal structure or the senior officials of the South Sea Fleet. The authorities’ censorship of information and the deletion of articles like Hu Xijin’s could be part of a stability maintenance measure by Beijing to prevent it from evolving into a political incident, potentially disrupting the ongoing North Beach talks.
The North Beach talks held over the years are considered a battleground for high-level retired officials. It is expected that this year’s talks will address the final disposition of former Central Military Commission Political Work Department Director Miao Hua and how to handle the disappearance of Deputy Chairman of the Military Commission He Weidong since his disappearance after the National People’s Congress in March this year. Both individuals are confidants of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Although the Chinese military appears formidable on the surface, internal power struggles have severely affected the military, currently experiencing severe leadership confusion. Since 2023, dozens of senior military officers and executives have been investigated. Among the seven positions in the Central Military Commission responsible for leading the military, three are essentially vacant due to some members being arrested or missing.
The Chinese Navy has been a focal point of the recent crackdown. Formerly fallen Miao Hua was a vice admiral in the Navy, having served as the Political Commissar of the Chinese Navy before being promoted to head the Military Commission’s Personnel Department.
Exiled liberal legal scholar Yuan Hongbing disclosed to Epoch Times that after Miao Hua’s arrest, a significant number of Chinese officers were identified, causing great panic within the Chinese military.
At the National Day Celebration held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on July 31, at least seven incumbent generals were “disappeared” compared to last year’s event, including Admiral Yuan Huazhi, the Political Commissar of the Navy.
Li Pengcheng, the commander of the Southern Theater Command of the Chinese Navy responsible for the South China Sea, was arrested in December 2024.
On June 27 this year, Li Hanjun, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Navy, was confirmed under investigation. He was previously appointed by Miao Hua to head the Naval Command College.
