Following nearly two years of internal power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party’s military, there are rumors circulating about a planned “military uprising.” The CCP Central Military Commission recently issued a directive calling for enhanced “military education,” emphasizing the need for “ideological transformation” among a “key minority” within the military. Simultaneously, the authorities released the “Regulations on the Management of Military Information Dissemination on the Internet,” sparking concern. Analysts believe that these two actions indicate a state of tension within the authorities, responding to a crisis of deteriorating morale within the Chinese military.
The Chinese military newspaper reported on February 4th that the CCP Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department recently issued a notice stating plans for significant annual military education, emphasizing the study of “Xi Jinping’s Strong Military Thinking” and highlighting the need for intensified learning and ideological transformation among the “key minority.”
In the CCP context, “key minority” refers to high-ranking officials.
Political commentator Li Lin told Dajiyuan that the CCP has always been concerned with controlling the so-called “key minority” within the political regime. Now, with specific requirements directed towards the military for “ideological transformation” among these individuals, it indicates that these figures have developed their own independent thoughts, beyond the control of the top CCP leadership. However, such methods of ideological transformation could lead to conflict and have counterproductive effects.
Furthermore, in recent days, ten departments including the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the National Security Bureau, the CCP Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, and the Central Military Commission Political and Legal Committee jointly issued the “Regulations on the Management of Military Information Dissemination on the Internet,” which will come into effect on March 1, 2025.
The regulations prohibit denigrating the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and the system of the Military Commission Chairman’s responsibility, spreading notions of “depoliticization and denationalization of the military,” among others.
Former Chinese media personality Zhao Lanjian told NTD that in recent years, CCP leader Xi Jinping has carried out large-scale purges within the military. Some military personnel and their families have leaked certain information to the public, tarnishing the image of Xi and the CCP government and military. Therefore, to avoid public scrutiny, the CCP is silencing dissent.
Li Lin believes that the CCP’s aforementioned actions reflect a nervous state regarding the potential loss of military control, suspecting a correlation between these actions and renewed calls for “militarization of the military.” This relates to the recent large-scale purges within the military, rumors of military uprisings, and the growing discontent among many military personnel who access foreign websites surreptitiously.
From 2023 to 2024, Xi Jinping’s regime’s primary anti-corruption target was the military, including several senior military commanders and the military-industrial complex, resulting in mass purges and implications for many others.
Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan’s “Up Daily” on January 22 that the armed rebellion of the CCP military is the regime’s greatest fear. One of his friends in Guangdong revealed that the loyalty in the army is unstable, with rampant corruption where officials are appointed based on bribery. Both former Directors of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, Zhang Yang and Miao Hua, have been disgraced. Discontent among ideologically-minded grassroots military officers and soldiers is mounting, with some officers considering emulating the Wuchang Uprising and planning for action.
Former Chinese Navy Colonel Yao Cheng recently stated on a television program that based on the feedback from the military, especially with Xi Jinping’s chaotic anti-corruption campaigns targeting the military, the troops have become disillusioned. The CCP’s current military actions are met with strong dissent from the armed forces.
Before the 20th National Congress of the CCP, there was a protest incident at Sihui Bridge in Beijing where Pang Zaizhou hung banners opposing Xi and the CCP. According to rumors, Pang Zaizhou’s online propaganda materials called for nationwide military and police uprisings, advocating the need to provoke them to participate in civil protests as a shortcut to overthrowing authoritarian rulers, seeking to replicate figures like Cai E and collectively remove the dictator.
Pang’s materials also mentioned militarization of the military: “If loyal to the Party, they are the Party’s armed forces; if loyal to individuals, they become thugs. In today’s world, the military of any democratic country does not pledge allegiance to a party or individual…”
Despite the CCP’s efforts to suppress information, details about the Pang Zaizhou incident continue to circulate secretly within mainland China.
On December 23, 2024, the Chinese military newspaper published an article discussing the management of grassroots officers and soldiers, highlighting issues of lax control and discipline, and emphasizing the need to crackdown on violations involving accessing foreign websites. This is seen as a reflection of the prevalence of military personnel “climbing over the wall” to browse foreign websites.
Since the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, Xi Jinping’s influence within the CCP military system has been continuously weakened, as evidenced by his declining stature coinciding with the rising prominence of the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Yuxia. Persistent rumors suggest that Zhang Yuxia has received backing from CCP elders, resulting in Xi Jinping’s loss of practical power within the military.
In December last year, Xi Jinping and the remaining four members of the Central Military Commission inspected the newly established Information Support Force, emphasizing the need for the unit’s “absolute loyalty, purity, and reliability.” However, the official reports did not mention the system of the Military Commission Chairman’s responsibility, and the Information Support Force did not proclaim slogans such as “resolutely obey Chairman Xi’s commands and be accountable to Chairman Xi, allowing Chairman Xi to rest assured.” Concurrently, the CCP military media published numerous articles advocating for “adherence to collective leadership” and being “exemplary in upholding democratic centralism.”
It wasn’t until early 2025 that the Chinese military newspaper reiterated the notion of the “Military Commission Chairman’s Responsibility System,” but prioritized the “Party Central,” and the Central Military Commission. An article on January 9 stated the ongoing need to “maintain high consistency with the Party Central, Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.”
On January 10, Xi’s confidante and Vice Chairman of the CCP Military Commission, He Weidong, reiterated the call for the military to uphold loyalty to the Party Central and enforce the Military Commission Chairman’s responsibility.
Former disciplinary inspector Wang Youqun wrote in Dajiyuan that since Xi’s rise to power twelve years ago, using the anti-corruption campaign as a tool to eliminate political enemies, dissent towards Xi has grown over time. Around the time of the 7th Plenary Session in July last year, with the support of some veteran leaders, various anti-Xi factions coalesced under the leadership of the First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Yuxia, dealing a significant blow to Xi’s supremacy. The military newspaper repeatedly emphasized “collective leadership” and downplayed the “Military Commission Chairman’s responsibility system.” Leading figures among Xi’s loyalists, including critical senior military commanders, were reassigned, removed, or disappeared one after another. Xi Jinping naturally resents his diminishing power and is unwilling to lose control. As long as there is room for maneuvering, he will continue to do so.