In the backdrop of continuous economic downturn in China, youth unemployment has become one of the most sensitive issues in society. Official statistics have long been “technically disappearing”, while a hidden storm is brewing among the public: millions of young people are losing their jobs, giving up on their dreams, returning to their hometowns, or being forced into “flexible employment”. For many families, youth unemployment means imbalance for the entire household, where parents’ hopes, debts, and dignity are all rolled into an uncertain future.
“I sent out over 300 resumes, but only got responses from two companies,” said 24-year-old Zhang Nan (pseudonym), who graduated from the Finance Department of Shandong University’s Economics College. Introduced by a senior from the same department who graduated a few years ago, Zhang Nan spoke with Epoch Times on September 12. She told the reporter that despite her rich internship experience, she expected to land a job in a bank or brokerage firm. However, “I check job platforms daily, but the companies either have a hiring freeze or offer ridiculously low salaries.”
She added, “Last year, most seniors went to internet companies or foreign companies, but now there are no jobs left, as the companies have shut down.”
When asked about her future plans, Zhang Nan said, “Finding a job is so difficult now. Many of my classmates’ parents are trying to send their children abroad, even if it’s just to study or work in Hong Kong. I feel truly hopeless; I have no plans and no hope for the future.”
The National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party stopped publishing the youth unemployment rate between ages 16 to 24 from July 17, 2024, without explanation. A report by Hong Kong’s Economic Daily on August 22, 2024, titled “China’s Youth Unemployment Rate May Exceed 25%: Internal Assessment Data from the National Academy of Social Sciences Exposed,” cited an internal briefing from the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, revealing that by the end of the second quarter of 2024, the actual youth unemployment rate might exceed 25%.
At the same time, the Ministry of Education of the Chinese Communist Party issued the “Notice on Employment Arrangements for the 2025 Graduates of Higher Education” on January 5, 2025, predicting that the scale of graduates for the 2025 academic year will reach 11.87 million, setting a new historical high.
On Weibo and Xiaohongshu, tens of thousands of young people under tags like “unemployed youth” and “jobless diary” are recording their life after unemployment through text and short videos: some are setting up stalls, some are returning to their hometowns, and some are simply “lying flat” at home.
Zhang Nan’s father, Zhang Jian (pseudonym), is a driver in Qingdao. Regarding his daughter’s unemployment, he expressed some bitterness, saying, “Our generation believed that as long as the children studied well, they would succeed. Now, after studying for more than ten years, she’s back home selling drinks.” He mentioned that his daughter couldn’t find a job after graduation, so she could only help out at a small shop owned by relatives, earning less than 100 yuan (RMB) per day.
On Xiaohongshu, a young netizen in his thirties said, “When I first became unemployed this year, I didn’t want to do anything. I had insomnia till 4 a.m. that day and absentmindedly opened WeChat Moments, where I saw a photo posted by a former colleague who took over the jobs of several of us, with the caption ‘Continuing to work hard at 4 a.m.’. I didn’t like the post or need to; it just made me feel suffocated.”
Comments from netizens on Douyin also reflect the struggle many face with making money. A Bachelor’s Degree graduate from Zhengzhou, Henan, named Wu Hao (pseudonym), has become a “new farmer”. He was originally a human resources assistant at a company in Shanghai but began making short videos and selling agricultural products after returning home due to company downsizing.
Hao told Epoch Times, “It was refreshing at first, but a few months later, it was hardly profitable.” Many young returnees like him are trying to make ends meet through short videos, with many broadcasting in plazas and parks at night, hoping to earn some income from traffic, but it’s becoming increasingly difficult to monetize views.
From cities to households, the manifestations of unemployment have become more concealed. In many cities, officials refer to unemployment as “flexible employment” or “slow employment” using alternative expressions. Journalists have observed numerous job postings on social platforms in cities like Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Chengdu, where some claim to be “freelance consultants”, “content planners”, or “online operators”, yet their actual monthly income is less than 2,000 yuan.
In response, a netizen from Beijing commented in a forum, “I take micro tasks at home every day and can earn two to three thousand yuan a month. My friends call me ‘free’, but in reality, I’m just unemployed.”
Many young people unable to find work mockingly refer to themselves as “graduate equals unemployment”. Mr. Cheng, a retired resident of Guangzhou, explained that many neighbors’ children with undergraduate or graduate degrees have mostly become delivery workers: “Some deliver food to have social security, others to avoid being called ‘moochers’ by their families.” He sighed, saying, “People say the internet provides opportunities, but in reality, we’ve only changed platforms and are still being controlled.”
In this new form of labor, young people seem to have a “job” on the surface but lack stable income and social security. As one scholar put it, “Flexible employment is not real employment; it’s a state of floating life.”
Beijing HR consultant Gao Yixiang (pseudonym) stated that youth unemployment is not merely a cyclical phenomenon; it results from the closure of many enterprises mainly due to industrial contraction: “Industrial contraction leads to a narrowing job market, with new job openings far fewer than the number of graduates. Many companies are cutting labor costs, opting for AI automation over hiring new employees, such as in roles like customer service and content moderation.”
He added, “The number of university graduates is increasing each year, with recent graduates still unemployed from the past years joining the workforce. If they can’t find positions in private companies, they turn to taking civil service exams or seeking employment in state-owned enterprises. Each year, millions apply for the national civil service exam, but the chances of being admitted are slim.”
Reports indicate that in 2025, the Communist Party Central Authorities and its affiliated institutions planned to recruit 39,700 individuals, but over 3.4 million applicants passed the qualification review, resulting in a ratio of 86:1 for those accepted versus the recruitment plan.
According to a report in the Beijing News in January 2025 on “National Examination Registration Data Tracking,” a position for “Director and below” attracted 16,702 applicants despite only recruiting one person. Additionally, both Beijing and Guangdong had more than 250,000 applicants, with the most intense competition occurring in Tibet, where the ratio was nearly 150:1.
In the summer of 2023, China’s youth unemployment rate had surged to over 21% at one point. Following that, the National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese Communist Party stopped publishing related data. It wasn’t until the end of the same year that official data was reissued citing “statistical adjustments”, revealing a youth unemployment rate of 14.9% in December.
Beijing economist Shao Feng (pseudonym) analyzed, “The contraction of the manufacturing industry, sluggish service sector, and difficulties in financing for private enterprises have resulted in a reduced capacity to create new positions. Young people are left in a dilemma: civil service exams are challenging, and entrepreneurship is equally difficult.”
He remarked, “The issue of youth employment actually reflects a crisis of trust – they don’t believe hard work will yield results, which is the most perilous situation.”
In Chengdu, Mrs. Liu, a 50-year-old mother, shared that her son graduated from the University of Electronic Science and Technology majoring in automation but is now helping relatives manage a fruit wholesale business at home. She said, “He had always performed well, and we borrowed money back then for him to take supplementary classes and the IELTS exam. Now, he talks about studying abroad for a master’s degree, but we truly don’t have the funds anymore.” Her voice trembled as she said, “Our children’s dreams have turned into risks.”
Many respondents expressed that their biggest fear is not temporary unemployment of their children, but rather the feeling of being directionless. Mr. Zhang from Jiaozhou, Shandong, said, “My son stays in his room playing games all day and refuses to go out, saying there’s no point outside. Watching him, I feel like our generation might have placed our hopes in the wrong place.”
Li Xin, a sociologist from Fudan University in Shanghai, pointed out that the fundamental reason for youth unemployment in China lies in the disconnect between education and industrial structure. He stated, “The education system is outputting a large number of liberal arts and management majors, but the market demands technical workers and grassroots positions.”
He believes that the authorities’ long-standing emphasis on pursuing higher education has led to an imbalance in the young labor market, and parents invest substantial resources in their children, only to witness them still face unemployment, which deals a severe blow to families.
Li Xin further noted, “This generation of young people grew up during a period of high economic growth, with excessively high expectations for the future. Now, facing a sharp economic downturn, they feel a profound sense of powerlessness. This is not just a temporary emotion but an overall societal decline in morale. Anxiety often starts within families.”
A Master of Science graduate in material engineering, Liu Zihan, who returned from studying abroad, shared her experience. After pursuing studies in materials engineering in Canada, she returned and applied for nearly a hundred positions, only receiving an interview notice from a new energy company. She told the reporter, “I’ve lost confidence in applying again. I had an interview at a new energy company, and they said the hiring process was delayed due to budget freezes.” “If I had known how things were in China, I wouldn’t have come back. My parents said there are more opportunities domestically, but they just wanted me to be with them. I have to find a job abroad and be independent.”
Liu Zihan’s father, a retired engineer, admitted he had misled his daughter. He told the reporter, “I thought with forty years of reform and opening up, society had stabilized. I asked her to return once the pandemic was over, never expecting her life would be tougher than ours. I agreed to her going overseas, the farther, the better. This society is just too disappointing.”
On September 10, 2025, the State Council Office of the Chinese Communist Party issued the “Action Plan for Youth Employment Promotion” (国办发〔2025〕24号), stating it would provide 2 million public internships positions and “flexible employment subsidies”, while requiring local governments to “prioritize guaranteeing employment for college graduates”. However, many graduates from various universities reported that the so-called positions mostly entailed temporary administrative assistant roles or grassroots promoters, with monthly salaries ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 yuan and no social benefits.
In Guangdong, Jiangsu, Sichuan, and other regions, labels like “fake employment” and “internship as work” have emerged on social platforms. According to a report on the Southern Metropolis Daily website in September 2025, most “intern positions” involve three-month contracts that do not form part of formal labor relations, leading netizens to joke, “This isn’t employment; it’s exploitation.”
Zhang Nan is still on the lookout for a job. Every morning, she opens her phone to send out resumes, studies in the library in the afternoon, and helps with accounting at a friend’s shop in the evening. “I don’t want to be seen as ‘lying flat’, but it seems like no matter how hard I try, it’s futile. I used to think not working was laziness, but now I realize there’s nowhere to go.” she said.