Amid pervasive crises within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), official measures have been issued regarding the handling of “unqualified party members,” aiming to consolidate existing methods for dealing with such cases into a specific document, purportedly to ensure the “purity” of the Party. Experts suggest that this move is a reactive measure by the authorities in response to a wave of party withdrawals, serving as a final struggle before the Party’s demise.
Xi Jinping came to power, and in August 2014, the CCP had issued a notice on dealing with unqualified party members. In May 2019, regulations on the education and management of CCP members were introduced.
According to Xinhua News Agency, on August 29, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued the “Methods for Dealing with Unqualified CCP Members.”
A journalist from Dajiyuan discovered that the new document simply reorganizes previous regulations, outlining methods for dealing with so-called “unqualified party members,” including corrective actions, persuading them to resign from the Party, and expulsion. For instance, failure to attend party activities for six consecutive months without valid reasons, failure to pay dues, or refusal to undertake assigned tasks would result in expulsion, as stipulated in the past regulations.
On August 29, the Organization Department of the CCP held a Q&A session, stating that the release of these methods was due to the previous lack of a complete definition of concepts. Official statements mentioned that dealing with unqualified party members is necessary to uphold the Party’s “advanced nature and purity.”
Chinese affairs expert Wang He told Dajiyuan that the CCP functions akin to a Leninist political party, emphasizing strict discipline which essentially mirrors gang rules. Joining the Party post the CCP’s seizure of power was primarily for career advancement and wealth accumulation, rendering the Party highly corrupt. Xi Jinping’s efforts to maintain the Party’s integrity involve tightening the criteria for party membership to pursue Party “purity.”
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign aims to eradicate corruption within the Party. The official Party member count, which had been growing at an average rate of 2.4% during the Hu Jintao era, reversed during Xi Jinping’s first five years in office, declining annually, with an average growth rate of only 1%.
In June last year, the CCP announced that by the end of 2022, the net increase in the number of Party members decreased to 1.329 million, marking the first decline in net Party member growth since 2018. Before July 1 this year, the CCP claimed that the party membership had reached 99.185 million by the end of 2023, with a net increase of 1.144 million over the previous year, a growth rate of 1.2%. Despite the increase in Party members, the net increase has declined for the second consecutive year.
Wang He pointed out that the decline in Party member increase is also attributed to Xi Jinping’s desire for politically loyal members, hence raising the standards for Party admission. The recent issuance of the document aims to reinforce organizational control over Party members.
However, Wang He believes that a more critical reason lies in the awakening of people’s consciousness. Some individuals, especially those outside the system, gradually refrain from paying dues or participating in CCP activities, essentially dissociating themselves from the Party. Others are unwilling to join the Party even when persuaded, as they comprehend the true nature of the Communist Party and its inherent corruption.
The backdrop for the CCP’s introduction of measures to deal with “unqualified party members” lies in the overall situation where the Party faces a decline. In the past two decades, China has witnessed a significant wave of party withdrawals, with millions of individuals using their real or pseudonymous identities to disassociate from the Party network, marking a movement of awakened conscience. Those declaring withdrawal from the Party include individuals who still possess apparent party membership. This situation has caused anxiety within the CCP, prompting its counteractions.
The article also references Dajiyuan’s publication of the “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party” series in November 2004, resulting in over 435 million people globally declaring their withdrawal from all CCP organizations on Dajiyuan’s withdrawal website.
Xi Jinping once emphasized to young cadres at the Central Party School the importance of fortifying ideological convictions, highlighting the potential tragic outcome akin to the “East European upheaval, the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union” if individuals within the Party no longer adhere to Marxism, communism, or fail to promote Chinese socialism with characteristics.
It raised eyebrows when the CCP leader used a poem by the Southern Tang Dynasty monarch Li Yu to instruct cadres, evoking ironic responses.
Wang He contends that the CCP cannot truly control individuals’ thoughts, fostering a climate of duplicity. As the Communist Party relies on material benefits to attract members, those without material gains would not join the Party. With waning belief in Marxism and the facade of belief displayed, all CCP members become double-faced, holding one stance privately while projecting another publicly. Therefore, Wang He argues that the CCP’s emphasis on maintaining purity and not forgetting its original intent is self-deception. Essentially, the Communist Party has already spiritually collapsed, with only remnants of material power still operational on the surface.