In a recent development following the downfall of a group of “military tigers” represented by He Weidong and Miao Hua, the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party has issued a set of “supplementary provisions” to amend the disciplinary regulations for enforcing the Party’s discipline in the military. These new provisions address issues such as the lack of implementation of the responsibility system under the chairmanship of the military commission and combat effectiveness counterfeiting. Analysts believe that this confirms the existence of these problems within the Chinese Communist Party’s military.
According to a report by the Chinese Communist Party’s military newspaper on November 30th, the newly revised “supplementary provisions” for implementing the disciplinary regulations of the Chinese Communist Party in the military will take effect from January 1, 2026.
The “supplementary provisions” claim to prioritize “strict political discipline and political rules” and specify and adjust violations related to inadequate implementation of the chairman’s responsibility system, dissemination of erroneous political views and inappropriate speech, and insufficient implementation of decisions made by the Central Military Commission. They also lay out clear disciplinary requirements regarding combat effectiveness and combating fraud.
The military newspaper stated that these “supplementary provisions” also cover key areas such as personnel selection and employment, engaging in profit-making activities, and explicitly list disciplinary violations related to unauthorized banquets involving alcohol consumption and violations of regulations on military-civilian interactions.
During the Fourth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party in October, a major case involving “military tigers” like former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong was disclosed. The Chinese Communist Party’s military media criticized individuals like He Weidong as corrupt elements who were “disloyal,” “seriously undermining the principle of the Party commanding the gun and the chairman’s responsibility system,” and fermenting variations of corruption instigated by Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou.
Taiwan’s Director of Defense Strategy and Resources Institute, Su Ziyun, told Epoch Times that the issuance of these supplementary provisions by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission specifically regarding the disciplinary regulations of the Party is an attempt to demonstrate that it exercises Party control over the military. Furthermore, it is noted that the Chinese Communist Party tends to raise issues that are lacking, such as establishing civilized units to indicate widespread lack of civility. This move to introduce supplementary provisions confirms that these problems, including corruption and violations related to alcohol consumption, are prevalent within the Chinese military.
Gong Xiangsheng, Deputy Researcher at the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security, expressed to Epoch Times that the release of these “supplementary provisions” indicates that the issue of inadequate combat readiness or the problem of pulling in different directions within the Chinese military has not been thoroughly resolved since the military reform in 2015. Moreover, the continued emphasis on engaging in profit-making activities by the Chinese military indicates that the issue of the military’s institutional and non-institutional “slush funds” persists, indicating a serious disciplinary crisis that is difficult to confront in the face of vested interests.
Researcher at the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security, Shen Mingshi, believes that the issuance of these provisions by the Chinese Communist Party is primarily aimed at supplementing articles related to the “Party commanding the gun,” attempting to enhance the authority of disciplinary measures or responding to increased discussions within the Chinese military on the nationalization of the military.
The emphasis on clear disciplinary requirements regarding combat effectiveness, combating fraud, and other aspects in these “supplementary provisions” by the Chinese military draws attention.
Among the two former Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Yuxia was in charge of military affairs, including equipment development and training management, while He Weidong oversaw political work, including military discipline, personnel matters, and propaganda. Independent commentator Du Zheng previously analyzed that after assuming office, He Weidong’s ambition began to swell, leading to conflicts with Zhang Yuxia, accusing the department overseen by Zhang Yuxia of purchasing flawed equipment and dishonest behaviors during training.
During the “Two Sessions” of the Chinese Communist Party in March 2024, He Weidong made remarks at a military representative meeting aiming to combat the “false combat capabilities” of the military. An article by the South China Morning Post on March 9, 2024, reported on this incident, claiming to have obtained the minutes of the meeting.
Gong Xiangsheng believes that the issues of combat effectiveness counterfeiting and corruption are two sides of the same coin, indicating that the money that should have been spent on improving combat effectiveness was misused by high-ranking officials like He Weidong, resulting in Zhang Yuxia recently criticizing “double-faced people” in an article published by the party’s media.
Su Ziyun expressed that mainland Chinese economists have already proven that China’s GDP growth is falsified, making it less surprising that the closed-off military also engages in falsification. The release of these supplementary provisions by Zhang Yuxia to combat military capacity counterfeiting seems somewhat sensationalized.
Current affairs commentator Li Linyi told Epoch Times that when He Weidong accused Zhang Yuxia of “false combat capabilities,” he was unsuccessful. By introducing new military regulations to combat falsification of combat effectiveness, Zhang Yuxia essentially forces He Weidong, who previously criticized him for “training falsification,” to take the blame, following a common practice in power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party.