Recently, the General Office of the Communist Party of China issued a notice announcing a three-month Party discipline education campaign from April to July, emphasizing the need to deepen understanding of disciplinary regulations and achieve a level of internalization known as “entering the brain and heart”. Scholars analyze this as a new round of rectification and brainwashing movement, which is unlikely to be effective and highlights Xi Jinping’s strong sense of governance crisis.
Associate Professor Feng Chongyi from the University of Technology Sydney told Epoch Times, “The propaganda department, organization department, and discipline inspection commission need to demonstrate their presence and seek credit from the top, including Xi Jinping. Through this rectification, Xi Jinping will establish his ideology and leadership position.”
He said, “The centralized party constantly consolidates power and expands authority through rectification and purges. Xi Jinping wants to learn from Mao, constantly organizing rectifications. Now, his sense of crisis is even stronger, making him more sensitive. This is the gene and systemic problem of the CCP.”
In the history of the CCP, rectification movements have been continuous, ranging from the Yan’an Rectification, closed-door indoctrination activities, to smaller-scale movements such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represent Represents Movement” and Hu Jintao’s Communist Party “Staying Fresh” movement.
“But with Xi Jinping, it’s relatively more severe, tied to legal punishment and anti-corruption, blood-curdling,” Feng Chongyi said.
During the three-month Party discipline education campaign, there is an emphasis on resolutely opposing formalism, preventing superficial “red” actions and hidden “black” behaviors.
Feng Chongyi stated, “Party discipline education is nothing but formalism, and people are no longer convinced.”
He said, “The hidden ‘black’ refers to actions that seem to praise someone but in reality, it turns them into absurd figures, treated as a joke. People should rise up against it, but lacking the courage, they resort to humor instead.”
“Engaging in rectifications and studying sessions, all modeled after Xi Jinping, is formalism. I am against formalism. Some people may chuckle knowingly, realizing it’s another wave of formalism, with calls to counter formalism ultimately leading to new forms of formalism. This is a classic case of superficial “red” and hidden “black.”
“Nowadays, CCP officials are weak and mediocre, but by using formalism to deceive Xi Jinping and protect their positions,” Feng Chongyi added.
“Xi Jinping’s sense of crisis is strong, but the problem is, no one is rising against him. Instead, they treat him as a joke, but his threats and actions are real. The greater his sense of crisis, the more aggressive he becomes,” Feng Chongyi concluded.
Legal expert and independent commentator Yu Ping told Epoch Times that rectification has always been a part of the CCP’s party building efforts.
“The CCP advocates for unified thinking, and rectifications aim to align the views of party members with the central leadership and promote discipline obedience. Historically, the CCP has conducted numerous such movements, including those prior to Xi Jinping’s tenure,” Yu Ping said.
In September 2018, during Xi Jinping’s tenure, the CCP Central Political Bureau introduced the political slogan of “Two Upholds”: “Resolutely uphold Xi Jinping’s core position within the Party Central Committee and in the entire party, resolutely uphold the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership.”
Yu Ping said, “For the CCP and its members, there is not a high level of allegiance to Xi Jinping, particularly among senior officials. Hence, it is necessary to periodically correct the behaviors and ideologies of the entire party, especially high-ranking internal party members.”
In the past year, there have been several significant events within the top ranks of the CCP. In July 2023, former commander of the Rocket Force, Li Yuchao, was dismissed from his position. On October 24th, Li Shangfu was removed from his positions as State Councilor and Minister of National Defense. On July 25th, Qin Gang was relieved of his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the same year’s October 24th, he was removed as State Councilor.
Yu Ping believes that these incidents may have prompted Xi to initiate the current rectification and brainwashing movements.
He said, “Unlike a country governed by the rule of law, where stability is maintained through legal means, this kind of organizational behavior in the CCP is akin to gang activities to conduct purges.”
Yu Ping noted that in Xi’s over a decade-long tenure, there have been numerous rectification movements, including party building efforts. The current campaign signals that previous measures were not fully implemented or faced setbacks, leading to defiance among party members.
“It can be said that in recent years, especially after the COVID-19 outbreak, Xi Jinping’s authority has suffered immense damage,” Yu Ping explained. “The strict ‘Zero-COVID’ policy has led to economic downturns, and the destructive impact has placed China in a challenging position internationally.”
After the end of Xi’s “Zero-COVID” measures, the Chinese economy did not rebound as expected, with most economic indicators such as the Consumer Price Index, consumption, service industry investment, real estate investment, and imports/exports performing below expectations. The term “lack of confidence” has been frequently mentioned over the past year, and the phrases used during the December 2023 CCP Central Economic Work Conference confirmed the existing economic challenges.
“Thus, the views of these party members towards Xi Jinping have significantly changed, necessitating another round of brainwashing campaigns,” Yu Ping said.
“Whether through rectification, study sessions, inspections, self-examination, or numerous party-centric slogans, all these activities serve to control people’s thoughts,” Yu Ping stated.
He added, “Repeating these actions too frequently diminishes their efficacy. Human tolerance for the same belief is low. By continuing such methods, people may outwardly comply but inwardly reject them.”
Yu Ping explained that during Mao’s era, rectifications were conducted in a closed environment, with fear preventing individuals from openly expressing doubts.
In contrast, Xi Jinping operates in a different social environment, unable to completely isolate the Chinese people. Despite CCP measures to control information, individuals can circumvent restrictions through the internet, undermining Xi’s grasp on knowledge elite and senior officials. As a result, people’s resistance to these rectification movements will increase, diminishing their effectiveness over time.
“Xi does not particularly concern himself with grassroots perspectives. The majority of common people are focused on their daily needs and less on national management matters unless their interests are directly affected. Hence, these rectifications primarily target party members and those implementing Xi’s policies,” Yu Ping affirmed.
Yu Ping highlighted Xi’s heightened sense of political crisis, leading to the creation of a comprehensive national security concept.
“He defines national security as preserving the Communist Party’s regime security, which differs from traditional international views of national security primarily concerning external threats. Xi perceives any threat to the regime, whether internal or external, as a national security issue,” Yu Ping elucidated.
“Furthermore, he regards Hong Kong as a threat to the Communist Party’s regime. He irrationally exaggerates ordinary citizens’ grievances or localized incidents into threats to the regime,” Yu Ping elaborated.
Despite Xi’s intentions to revive the economy by promoting openness, in February, the Hunan CCP Committee issued a notice for a “Discussion on Liberating Thought” campaign, likely aimed at enticing Western investors.
However, Yu Ping stated that Western investors are aware of China’s actual situation and are not easily deceived. Some investors find it difficult to withdraw their investments from China, not due to unwillingness, but due to legal constraints. They have invested for years and need to recoup these investments before reconsidering future investments. Therefore, promoting economic openness akin to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms is virtually impossible without relinquishing control, abandoning the one-party autocracy.
“In this regard, for Xi to reenact Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up policy is absolutely unattainable unless he renounces his position, abandons the Communist Party, and relinquishes one-party rule,” Yu Ping concluded.