After the United Nations reinstated sanctions against Iran at the end of September, Western intelligence agencies have revealed that Iran is accelerating the purchase of a large amount of missile fuel material, sodium chlorate, from China in an attempt to rebuild depleted stockpiles due to wars. Scholars interviewed pointed out that this is an extension of the long-term strategic cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and Iran, which has evolved into a disruption of the international order, making it difficult to enforce UN sanctions.
CNN reported that since September 29, more than 2,000 tons of the chemical have been shipped from ports in China such as Zhuhai, Gaoqiao, and Liuheng to the southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. These vessels have been shuttling back and forth between China and Iran, frequently shutting off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) during voyages to conceal their whereabouts.
Western intelligence units have identified the Chinese entities involved in the transportation as shell companies, connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) procurement network. Some of these businesses are located in Dalian, China, and were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department as early as April for “procuring components for Iran’s ballistic missile propellant.”
This operation has been labeled a “Dark Fleet” by the intelligence community, operating a secretive supply chain that continuously exports sensitive materials to Iran under the guise of vague trade names.
Su Ziyun, director of the Strategic and Resource Institute for National Security at the Taiwan Institute of Defense and Security, told Dajiyuan that China has been transporting missile fuel for many years. “Sodium chlorate and sodium chlorate are precursors to solid missile fuels, with China exporting them under the guise of ‘agricultural use’ while they are actually dual-use chemicals.”
He emphasized that Beijing is “utilizing gray zone support to enhance Iran’s military capabilities in exchange for cheap oil,” forming a mechanism of “exchange of interests.”
In January of this year, a British think tank and media outlets traced the shipment of such chemicals. Su Ziyun mentioned that on April 27, a fatal explosion occurred at Shahid Rajee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iran, which was attributed by Iranian military officers to improper storage of solid fuel components like “sodium chlorate” imported from China. The explosion resulted in at least 40 deaths and over a thousand injuries, with the orange smoke on-site being recognized by experts as characteristic of the burning of high-chlorate and nitrate salts.
Su Ziyun criticized China for consistently using vague purposes to evade accountability: if Iran claims the chemicals are for agricultural or fertilizer purposes, Beijing can shrug it off and claim that the change in use is not its responsibility, thus evading international obligations. “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China, instead of upholding international sanctions, is leading in exploiting loopholes and challenging the international sanctions system.”
Xie Peixue, a decision-making simulation scholar at the Taiwan Institute of Defense Studies, told Dajiyuan that the provision of missile fuel-related materials by China to Iran this time is not just a trade behavior, but a manifestation of deepening long-term strategic cooperation.
He pointed out that “the strategic cooperation between China and Iran is not a short-term event, but a continuation of long-term interaction.” As early as 2021, the two countries signed a 25-year comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement worth $400 billion, covering energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, and defense fields.
In June of this year, Israel launched airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, prompting strong criticism from China towards the United States and Israel for violating the UN Charter. Xi Jinping met with the Iranian president before the military parade on September 2, emphasizing the need to “accelerate the implementation of cooperation.”
Xie Peixue believes that this signifies Beijing seeing Iran as a “strategic point of resistance against the United States” and jointly emphasizing “a multipolar order” and “resisting Western-dominated international rules” under the narrative of the “global south.”
He said that after the UN reinstated sanctions on September 27, Iran has accelerated the purchase of sodium chlorate and other materials from China. Xie emphasized that the timing is crucial: it’s not a case of transportation before sanctions, but rather after the sanctions are reinstated, Iran urgently needs to replenish its stock, leading to a closer cooperation between China and Iran.
Furthermore, although the chemicals have military uses as a key ingredient in solid rocket propellants, they can also be used as agricultural and industrial oxidants, which is why they are not included in the stringent list of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
“This provides Chinese companies with legal gray areas and compliance justifications,” Xie said, adding that this ambiguity is rendering the international sanctions system virtually ineffective.
Xie Peixue analyzed that Iran and China have formed a “sanctioned community” in the sanction environment: “Iran needs China’s economic lifeline and diplomatic protection; while China uses the sanctions as a bargaining chip to obtain strategic resources, especially oil.” He pointed out that despite repeated warnings and sanctions by the U.S. against relevant Chinese companies, Beijing has consistently refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing.
According to CNN reports, using vessel tracking data and crew members’ social media messages, several cargo ships transporting sodium chlorate from China to Iran were identified. These ships include the MV Basht, which left Zhuhai on September 15 and arrived at Bandar Abbas on September 29; the Brazin, which departed from Gaoqiao on October 2 and reached Bandar Abbas on October 16; the Elyana, which set sail from a Yangtze River port on September 18 and arrived at Bandar Abbas on October 12. Another vessel named the MV Artavand left Liuheng port in China on October 12 heading towards Bandar Abbas.
Intelligence units found that many ships shut off their AIS tracking systems during the voyage, constituting the operational mode of a “Dark Fleet.” European intelligence officials stated that this transport chain involves not only shell companies but also surface-legitimate Chinese companies. U.S. data shows that these companies are mostly located in Dalian and are part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s procurement network.
The UK’s Financial Times earlier exposed on January 22 this year that two freighters flying the Iranian flag, the Golbon and Jairan, departed from Daishan Island in Zhoushan, China, transporting over 1,000 tons of sodium chlorate, capable of producing 960 tons of ammonium perchlorate, a substance that constitutes 70% of solid fuel missile propellants. This amount of substance could provide enough fuel for 260 medium-range missiles such as Iran’s “Castle Destroyer” and “Martyr Qassem” missiles, with a range of up to 1,400 kilometers.
Former senior CIA China analyst Dennis Wilder told the Financial Times that since the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party has provided significant assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile development program, including technology, components, and training.
Wilder stated that China’s secret support for Iran is motivated by the need to produce missile support for Russia, counter the United States, and secure the purchase of oil at a favorable price.
Xie Peixue pointed out that the U.S. views Beijing’s support for Tehran as “a blatant provocation against international rules.” In October, the U.S. initiated the fourth round of sanctions, blacklisting multiple Chinese companies, leading to an expanding trust deficit between the U.S. and China, escalating confrontation. He expressed concern that this will force the U.S. to increase deployments in the Middle East, diluting resources for the Indo-Pacific strategy, “If the U.S. military has to maintain intervention in the Middle East, it will weaken its operational capabilities in the South China Sea and East China Sea, instead granting strategic depth to China.”
Su Ziyun believes that while Beijing intends to use Iran as a “strategic proxy” to check the U.S., “Israel has garnered acquiescence and support from most Arab countries, and the China-Iran cooperation is on its last legs.” Moreover, this “gray support” may increase Europe and the U.S.’s vigilance against Beijing.