China’s high-speed rail network is on the verge of surpassing 30,000 miles (approximately 48,300 kilometers), marking a record-breaking milestone in the country’s history. Foreign media outlets have dubbed this massive public infrastructure project as a colossal money pit, as the debt accumulated by China’s high-speed rail group has reached nearly a record-breaking $1 trillion. The proliferation of ghost high-speed rail stations in various parts of the country seems to reflect this dilemma.
On November 21st, The Wall Street Journal reported that on the first day Xi Jinping took office, he inherited an ambitious plan to construct a 10,000-mile (16,000-kilometer) high-speed railway network connecting major cities in China. The high-speed trains were also named “Fuxing.” Presently, China’s high-speed rail network is on the brink of surpassing 30,000 miles (48,000 kilometers), making it the world’s largest and most distinctive high-speed rail network.
The cost of this mega-project is staggering, with expenditures exceeding $500 billion in just the past five years on constructing new railways, trains, and stations. The annual operational expenses to service the debt alone amount to $25 billion. Due to low operational efficiency, many high-speed rail lines are in a state of loss or severe deficit.
The consequences of this massive, indiscriminate construction without considering economies of scale have led many high-speed rail lines to be “unpopular.” The debt of China’s high-speed rail group has surged close to a record $1 trillion, necessitating an annual debt repayment of $25 billion. The Chinese authorities still plan to increase China’s high-speed rail network by nearly 15,000 miles (240,000 kilometers) by 2035, requiring additional investments reaching billions of dollars.
To alleviate the debt burden, China’s high-speed rail has taken measures in recent years to reduce management expenses. It finally turned a profit of $460 million last year. However, this profit falls short of covering the losses incurred during the pandemic period from 2020 to 2022, amounting to $25 billion annually. Notably, the company’s earnings last year included over $1 billion in “other income,” often referring to government subsidies.
The report questioned the necessity of so many high-speed rail lines, as the costs far exceed those of traditional trains or buses. Many economists argue that traditional train or bus services could adequately meet the transportation needs of most regions in China, while high-speed rail is economically viable only in densely populated areas. Yet, China’s high-speed rail network has progressively expanded to reach rural areas, such as Fushun County in central Sichuan, with a primarily rural population of only 700,000 and declining. Since the inauguration of the first high-speed rail station in the county in 2021, there are now at least 12 high-speed rail stations within a 65-kilometer radius, with the main Fushun station often devoid of passengers.
Ghost high-speed rail stations, such as the unused Zhoucun East Station in Zibo, Shandong, which has been abandoned for 15 years, top the ranks according to the list of China’s ghost high-speed rail stations.
Ranked second on the list is the idle Zijinshan East Station, dormant for 14 years. Located in Qixia District, Nanjing, Jiangsu, the Zijinshan East Station serves as a connecting route between Nanjing South Station and Xianlin Station but has yet to be put into operation since its completion in 2010. Dubbed as the “two desolate stations of Nanjing,” this station, along with Jiangpu Station, remains unused.
The third-ranking station is Jiangpu Station in Nanjing, Jiangsu, which has been vacant for 13 years.
A search by Epoch Times reporters revealed that there are currently at least 20 idle high-speed rail stations across China, spanning from north to south, including multiple stations in Liaoning, Yunnan, Shandong, Hubei, and other regions.
Furthermore, stations like Ningbo East Station in Zhejiang, Zhifu Station in Yantai, Shushan East Station in Hefei, and Shuangliu West Station in Chengdu, which have been out of service for 11 years, continue to remain unused.
Some stations have been reluctantly reopened under public pressure after years of disuse, yet the cost is believed to be substantial. For example, Hele Station in Wanning, Hainan, was dormant for 14 years and was reopened on October 15th this year after investing 27 million RMB. However, the long-term stability of its operations remains uncertain.
The Haitou High-Speed Rail Station on the Hainan Island Loop, which invested over 40 million RMB, faced controversy for having been built for over seven years without utilization. Official reasons cited a passenger flow of less than a hundred people, leading to severe losses after its operation.
Under public pressure, the Haitou High-Speed Rail Station only commenced operations on December 15, 2023.
New ghost high-speed rail stations continue to emerge, such as the Hangzhou-Wenzhou High-Speed Rail, which took an impressive seven and a half years from planning to operation and was opened on September 6, 2024, with its first issue arising at the Wenzhou North Station.
The Wenzhou North Station of the Hangzhou-Wenzhou High-Speed Rail recently announced that ten train services between Wenzhou North Station and Hangzhou West Station will be suspended until December 21st. The reasons for the suspension and whether services will resume after December 21st have not been disclosed.
On May 21st, the China Business Newspaper raised questions about a multitude of idle high-speed rail stations due to remote locations, lack of surrounding facilities, and low passenger volumes. Using Guilin in Guangxi as an example, the city constructed nine high-speed rail stations, with the Wutong Station averaging less than 200 passengers daily and shutting down within four years of operation.
The report questioned how these costly high-speed rail stations ended up idle from planning and construction to abandonment. Who should be held accountable for these ineffective investments?
These issues seem to point towards the government.
An individual responsible for designing high-speed rail projects at China Railway’s Second Design Institute mentioned that local governments, in their push for new urban land development to alleviate urban relocation pressures, welcomed the idea of locating high-speed rail stations in suburban areas.
Local government officials stated that during the initial stages of high-speed rail construction, the former Ministry of Railways primarily funded the projects, granting considerable decision-making power to the railway department in matters such as route selection and station establishment. However, with the increasing proportion of local investments in recent years, local governments have gained more authority, linking the establishment of high-speed rail stations with government performance. This has significantly increased local government enthusiasm in investing and constructing high-speed rail stations.
Officials from China National Railway Group Co., Ltd. further explained that the railway department relies on local governments for land acquisition and relocation. In some cases, local governments propose to finance the construction of connecting lines and stations. While the railway department usually does not vehemently oppose these proposals, if the stations experience low passenger volumes after the lines are operational, train services may be reduced or temporarily suspended.
Professor Xie Tian from the Aiken School of Business at the University of South Carolina previously told The Epoch Times that railway investments are made by both central and local governments without conducting proper feasibility studies or considering genuine market demand. Essentially, these are rash projects undertaken for the betterment of the Communist Party’s GDP and governmental performance, despite the unnecessary waste. Consequently, the overexpansion of high-speed rail in China reflects a capacity surplus parallel to the broader economic imbalance present in the country.